From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: steffen.klassert@secunet.com, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au,
davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com, kuba@kernel.org,
pabeni@redhat.com, morbo@google.com, justinstitt@google.com,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, llvm@lists.linux.dev,
patches@lists.linux.dev, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] xfrm: Avoid clang fortify warning in copy_to_user_tmpl()
Date: Wed, 21 Feb 2024 14:32:01 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202402211431.ECE9690@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240221-xfrm-avoid-clang-fortify-warning-copy_to_user_tmpl-v1-1-254a788ab8ba@kernel.org>
On Wed, Feb 21, 2024 at 02:46:21PM -0700, Nathan Chancellor wrote:
> After a couple recent changes in LLVM, there is a warning (or error with
> CONFIG_WERROR=y or W=e) from the compile time fortify source routines,
> specifically the memset() in copy_to_user_tmpl().
>
> In file included from net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:14:
> ...
> include/linux/fortify-string.h:438:4: error: call to '__write_overflow_field' declared with 'warning' attribute: detected write beyond size of field (1st parameter); maybe use struct_group()? [-Werror,-Wattribute-warning]
> 438 | __write_overflow_field(p_size_field, size);
> | ^
> 1 error generated.
>
> While ->xfrm_nr has been validated against XFRM_MAX_DEPTH when its value
> is first assigned in copy_templates() by calling validate_tmpl() first
> (so there should not be any issue in practice), LLVM/clang cannot really
> deduce that across the boundaries of these functions. Without that
> knowledge, it cannot assume that the loop stops before i is greater than
> XFRM_MAX_DEPTH, which would indeed result a stack buffer overflow in the
> memset().
>
> To make the bounds of ->xfrm_nr clear to the compiler and add additional
> defense in case copy_to_user_tmpl() is ever used in a path where
> ->xfrm_nr has not been properly validated against XFRM_MAX_DEPTH first,
> add an explicit bound check and early return, which clears up the
> warning.
>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1985
> Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
This seems reasonable to me. Thanks for chasing all this down!
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> ---
> net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 3 +++
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
> index f037be190bae..912c1189ba41 100644
> --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
> +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
> @@ -2017,6 +2017,9 @@ static int copy_to_user_tmpl(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct sk_buff *skb)
> if (xp->xfrm_nr == 0)
> return 0;
>
> + if (xp->xfrm_nr > XFRM_MAX_DEPTH)
> + return -ENOBUFS;
> +
> for (i = 0; i < xp->xfrm_nr; i++) {
> struct xfrm_user_tmpl *up = &vec[i];
> struct xfrm_tmpl *kp = &xp->xfrm_vec[i];
>
> ---
> base-commit: 14dec56fdd4c70a0ebe40077368e367421ea6fef
> change-id: 20240221-xfrm-avoid-clang-fortify-warning-copy_to_user_tmpl-40cb10b003e3
>
> Best regards,
> --
> Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
>
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-02-21 22:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-02-21 21:46 [PATCH net] xfrm: Avoid clang fortify warning in copy_to_user_tmpl() Nathan Chancellor
2024-02-21 22:32 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2024-02-27 10:31 ` Steffen Klassert
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