* [PATCH 1/5] udpencap: Remove Obsolete UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE Support
2024-05-03 8:27 [PATCH 0/5] pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2024-05-03 Steffen Klassert
@ 2024-05-03 8:27 ` Steffen Klassert
2024-05-07 2:50 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
2024-05-03 8:27 ` [PATCH 2/5] xfrm: Add Direction to the SA in or out Steffen Klassert
` (4 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Klassert @ 2024-05-03 8:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller, Jakub Kicinski; +Cc: Herbert Xu, Steffen Klassert, netdev
From: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE mode, introduced into the Linux kernel
in 2004 [2], has remained inactive and obsolete for an extended period.
This mode was originally defined in an early version of an IETF draft
[1] from 2001. By the time it was integrated into the kernel in 2004 [2],
it had already been replaced by UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP [3] in later
versions of draft-ietf-ipsec-udp-encaps, particularly in version 06.
Over time, UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE has lost its relevance, with no
known use cases.
With this commit, we remove support for UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE,
simplifying the codebase and eliminating unnecessary complexity.
Kernel will return an error -ENOPROTOOPT if the userspace tries to set
this option.
References:
[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ipsec-udp-encaps-00.txt
[2] Commit that added UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE to the Linux historic
repository.
Author: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Date: Fri Apr 9 01:47:47 2004 -0700
[IPSEC]: Support draft-ietf-ipsec-udp-encaps-00/01, some ipec impls need it.
[3] Commit that added UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP to the Linux historic
repository.
Author: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
Date: Wed Apr 2 13:21:02 2003 -0800
[IPSEC]: Implement UDP Encapsulation framework.
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
include/uapi/linux/udp.h | 2 +-
net/ipv4/esp4.c | 12 ------------
net/ipv4/udp.c | 2 --
net/ipv4/xfrm4_input.c | 13 -------------
net/ipv6/esp6.c | 12 ------------
net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c | 13 -------------
6 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 53 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/udp.h b/include/uapi/linux/udp.h
index 4828794efcf8..1a0fe8b151fb 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/udp.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/udp.h
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct udphdr {
#define UDP_GRO 104 /* This socket can receive UDP GRO packets */
/* UDP encapsulation types */
-#define UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE 1 /* draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-00/01 */
+#define UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE 1 /* unused draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-00/01 */
#define UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP 2 /* draft-ietf-ipsec-udp-encaps-06 */
#define UDP_ENCAP_L2TPINUDP 3 /* rfc2661 */
#define UDP_ENCAP_GTP0 4 /* GSM TS 09.60 */
diff --git a/net/ipv4/esp4.c b/net/ipv4/esp4.c
index 3d647c9a7a21..7d38ddd64115 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/esp4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/esp4.c
@@ -347,7 +347,6 @@ static struct ip_esp_hdr *esp_output_udp_encap(struct sk_buff *skb,
__be16 dport)
{
struct udphdr *uh;
- __be32 *udpdata32;
unsigned int len;
len = skb->len + esp->tailen - skb_transport_offset(skb);
@@ -362,12 +361,6 @@ static struct ip_esp_hdr *esp_output_udp_encap(struct sk_buff *skb,
*skb_mac_header(skb) = IPPROTO_UDP;
- if (encap_type == UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE) {
- udpdata32 = (__be32 *)(uh + 1);
- udpdata32[0] = udpdata32[1] = 0;
- return (struct ip_esp_hdr *)(udpdata32 + 2);
- }
-
return (struct ip_esp_hdr *)(uh + 1);
}
@@ -423,7 +416,6 @@ static int esp_output_encap(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb,
switch (encap_type) {
default:
case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP:
- case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE:
esph = esp_output_udp_encap(skb, encap_type, esp, sport, dport);
break;
case TCP_ENCAP_ESPINTCP:
@@ -775,7 +767,6 @@ int esp_input_done2(struct sk_buff *skb, int err)
source = th->source;
break;
case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP:
- case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE:
source = uh->source;
break;
default:
@@ -1179,9 +1170,6 @@ static int esp_init_state(struct xfrm_state *x, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP:
x->props.header_len += sizeof(struct udphdr);
break;
- case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE:
- x->props.header_len += sizeof(struct udphdr) + 2 * sizeof(u32);
- break;
#ifdef CONFIG_INET_ESPINTCP
case TCP_ENCAP_ESPINTCP:
/* only the length field, TCP encap is done by
diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c
index 7613daa339b0..4ca781065a07 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c
@@ -2699,8 +2699,6 @@ int udp_lib_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP:
set_xfrm_gro_udp_encap_rcv(val, sk->sk_family, sk);
- fallthrough;
- case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE:
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET6)
WRITE_ONCE(up->encap_rcv,
diff --git a/net/ipv4/xfrm4_input.c b/net/ipv4/xfrm4_input.c
index dae35101d189..0918b0682174 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/xfrm4_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/xfrm4_input.c
@@ -113,19 +113,6 @@ static int __xfrm4_udp_encap_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, bool pull
/* Must be an IKE packet.. pass it through */
return 1;
break;
- case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE:
- /* Check if this is a keepalive packet. If so, eat it. */
- if (len == 1 && udpdata[0] == 0xff) {
- return -EINVAL;
- } else if (len > 2 * sizeof(u32) + sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) &&
- udpdata32[0] == 0 && udpdata32[1] == 0) {
-
- /* ESP Packet with Non-IKE marker */
- len = sizeof(struct udphdr) + 2 * sizeof(u32);
- } else
- /* Must be an IKE packet.. pass it through */
- return 1;
- break;
}
/* At this point we are sure that this is an ESPinUDP packet,
diff --git a/net/ipv6/esp6.c b/net/ipv6/esp6.c
index fe8d53f5a5ee..27df148530a6 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/esp6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/esp6.c
@@ -383,7 +383,6 @@ static struct ip_esp_hdr *esp6_output_udp_encap(struct sk_buff *skb,
__be16 dport)
{
struct udphdr *uh;
- __be32 *udpdata32;
unsigned int len;
len = skb->len + esp->tailen - skb_transport_offset(skb);
@@ -398,12 +397,6 @@ static struct ip_esp_hdr *esp6_output_udp_encap(struct sk_buff *skb,
*skb_mac_header(skb) = IPPROTO_UDP;
- if (encap_type == UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE) {
- udpdata32 = (__be32 *)(uh + 1);
- udpdata32[0] = udpdata32[1] = 0;
- return (struct ip_esp_hdr *)(udpdata32 + 2);
- }
-
return (struct ip_esp_hdr *)(uh + 1);
}
@@ -459,7 +452,6 @@ static int esp6_output_encap(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb,
switch (encap_type) {
default:
case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP:
- case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE:
esph = esp6_output_udp_encap(skb, encap_type, esp, sport, dport);
break;
case TCP_ENCAP_ESPINTCP:
@@ -822,7 +814,6 @@ int esp6_input_done2(struct sk_buff *skb, int err)
source = th->source;
break;
case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP:
- case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE:
source = uh->source;
break;
default:
@@ -1232,9 +1223,6 @@ static int esp6_init_state(struct xfrm_state *x, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP:
x->props.header_len += sizeof(struct udphdr);
break;
- case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE:
- x->props.header_len += sizeof(struct udphdr) + 2 * sizeof(u32);
- break;
#ifdef CONFIG_INET6_ESPINTCP
case TCP_ENCAP_ESPINTCP:
/* only the length field, TCP encap is done by
diff --git a/net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c b/net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c
index a17d783dc7c0..2c6aeb090b7a 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c
@@ -109,19 +109,6 @@ static int __xfrm6_udp_encap_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, bool pull
/* Must be an IKE packet.. pass it through */
return 1;
break;
- case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE:
- /* Check if this is a keepalive packet. If so, eat it. */
- if (len == 1 && udpdata[0] == 0xff) {
- return -EINVAL;
- } else if (len > 2 * sizeof(u32) + sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) &&
- udpdata32[0] == 0 && udpdata32[1] == 0) {
-
- /* ESP Packet with Non-IKE marker */
- len = sizeof(struct udphdr) + 2 * sizeof(u32);
- } else
- /* Must be an IKE packet.. pass it through */
- return 1;
- break;
}
/* At this point we are sure that this is an ESPinUDP packet,
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 1/5] udpencap: Remove Obsolete UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE Support
2024-05-03 8:27 ` [PATCH 1/5] udpencap: Remove Obsolete UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE Support Steffen Klassert
@ 2024-05-07 2:50 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: patchwork-bot+netdevbpf @ 2024-05-07 2:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steffen Klassert; +Cc: davem, kuba, herbert, netdev
Hello:
This series was applied to netdev/net-next.git (main)
by Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>:
On Fri, 3 May 2024 10:27:27 +0200 you wrote:
> From: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
>
> The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE mode, introduced into the Linux kernel
> in 2004 [2], has remained inactive and obsolete for an extended period.
>
> This mode was originally defined in an early version of an IETF draft
> [1] from 2001. By the time it was integrated into the kernel in 2004 [2],
> it had already been replaced by UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP [3] in later
> versions of draft-ietf-ipsec-udp-encaps, particularly in version 06.
>
> [...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [1/5] udpencap: Remove Obsolete UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE Support
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/aeb48a428d7d
- [2/5] xfrm: Add Direction to the SA in or out
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/a4a87fa4e96c
- [3/5] xfrm: Add dir validation to "out" data path lookup
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/601a0867f86c
- [4/5] xfrm: Add dir validation to "in" data path lookup
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/304b44f0d5a4
- [5/5] xfrm: Restrict SA direction attribute to specific netlink message types
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/451b50967897
You are awesome, thank you!
--
Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot.
https://korg.docs.kernel.org/patchwork/pwbot.html
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 2/5] xfrm: Add Direction to the SA in or out
2024-05-03 8:27 [PATCH 0/5] pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2024-05-03 Steffen Klassert
2024-05-03 8:27 ` [PATCH 1/5] udpencap: Remove Obsolete UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE Support Steffen Klassert
@ 2024-05-03 8:27 ` Steffen Klassert
2024-05-03 8:27 ` [PATCH 3/5] xfrm: Add dir validation to "out" data path lookup Steffen Klassert
` (3 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Klassert @ 2024-05-03 8:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller, Jakub Kicinski; +Cc: Herbert Xu, Steffen Klassert, netdev
From: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
This patch introduces the 'dir' attribute, 'in' or 'out', to the
xfrm_state, SA, enhancing usability by delineating the scope of values
based on direction. An input SA will restrict values pertinent to input,
effectively segregating them from output-related values.
And an output SA will restrict attributes for output. This change aims
to streamline the configuration process and improve the overall
consistency of SA attributes during configuration.
This feature sets the groundwork for future patches, including
the upcoming IP-TFS patch.
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
include/net/xfrm.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h | 6 ++
net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c | 7 +-
net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c | 6 ++
net/xfrm/xfrm_replay.c | 3 +-
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 8 +++
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 138 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
7 files changed, 160 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h
index 57c743b7e4fe..7c9be06f8302 100644
--- a/include/net/xfrm.h
+++ b/include/net/xfrm.h
@@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ struct xfrm_state {
/* Private data of this transformer, format is opaque,
* interpreted by xfrm_type methods. */
void *data;
+ u8 dir;
};
static inline struct net *xs_net(struct xfrm_state *x)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h b/include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h
index 6a77328be114..18ceaba8486e 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h
@@ -141,6 +141,11 @@ enum {
XFRM_POLICY_MAX = 3
};
+enum xfrm_sa_dir {
+ XFRM_SA_DIR_IN = 1,
+ XFRM_SA_DIR_OUT = 2
+};
+
enum {
XFRM_SHARE_ANY, /* No limitations */
XFRM_SHARE_SESSION, /* For this session only */
@@ -315,6 +320,7 @@ enum xfrm_attr_type_t {
XFRMA_SET_MARK_MASK, /* __u32 */
XFRMA_IF_ID, /* __u32 */
XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH, /* __u32 in seconds for input SA */
+ XFRMA_SA_DIR, /* __u8 */
__XFRMA_MAX
#define XFRMA_OUTPUT_MARK XFRMA_SET_MARK /* Compatibility */
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c
index 655fe4ff8621..703d4172c7d7 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ static const int compat_msg_min[XFRM_NR_MSGTYPES] = {
};
static const struct nla_policy compat_policy[XFRMA_MAX+1] = {
+ [XFRMA_UNSPEC] = { .strict_start_type = XFRMA_SA_DIR },
[XFRMA_SA] = { .len = XMSGSIZE(compat_xfrm_usersa_info)},
[XFRMA_POLICY] = { .len = XMSGSIZE(compat_xfrm_userpolicy_info)},
[XFRMA_LASTUSED] = { .type = NLA_U64},
@@ -129,6 +130,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy compat_policy[XFRMA_MAX+1] = {
[XFRMA_SET_MARK_MASK] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[XFRMA_IF_ID] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
+ [XFRMA_SA_DIR] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U8, XFRM_SA_DIR_IN, XFRM_SA_DIR_OUT),
};
static struct nlmsghdr *xfrm_nlmsg_put_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
@@ -277,9 +279,10 @@ static int xfrm_xlate64_attr(struct sk_buff *dst, const struct nlattr *src)
case XFRMA_SET_MARK_MASK:
case XFRMA_IF_ID:
case XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH:
+ case XFRMA_SA_DIR:
return xfrm_nla_cpy(dst, src, nla_len(src));
default:
- BUILD_BUG_ON(XFRMA_MAX != XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(XFRMA_MAX != XFRMA_SA_DIR);
pr_warn_once("unsupported nla_type %d\n", src->nla_type);
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
@@ -434,7 +437,7 @@ static int xfrm_xlate32_attr(void *dst, const struct nlattr *nla,
int err;
if (type > XFRMA_MAX) {
- BUILD_BUG_ON(XFRMA_MAX != XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(XFRMA_MAX != XFRMA_SA_DIR);
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Bad attribute");
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c
index 6346690d5c69..2455a76a1cff 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c
@@ -253,6 +253,12 @@ int xfrm_dev_state_add(struct net *net, struct xfrm_state *x,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if ((xuo->flags & XFRM_OFFLOAD_INBOUND && x->dir == XFRM_SA_DIR_OUT) ||
+ (!(xuo->flags & XFRM_OFFLOAD_INBOUND) && x->dir == XFRM_SA_DIR_IN)) {
+ NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Mismatched SA and offload direction");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
is_packet_offload = xuo->flags & XFRM_OFFLOAD_PACKET;
/* We don't yet support UDP encapsulation and TFC padding. */
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_replay.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_replay.c
index ce56d659c55a..bc56c6305725 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_replay.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_replay.c
@@ -778,7 +778,8 @@ int xfrm_init_replay(struct xfrm_state *x, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
}
if (x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_ESN) {
- if (replay_esn->replay_window == 0) {
+ if (replay_esn->replay_window == 0 &&
+ (!x->dir || x->dir == XFRM_SA_DIR_IN)) {
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "ESN replay window must be > 0");
return -EINVAL;
}
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
index 0c306473a79d..649bb739df0d 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
@@ -1292,6 +1292,7 @@ xfrm_state_find(const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
if (km_query(x, tmpl, pol) == 0) {
spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock);
x->km.state = XFRM_STATE_ACQ;
+ x->dir = XFRM_SA_DIR_OUT;
list_add(&x->km.all, &net->xfrm.state_all);
XFRM_STATE_INSERT(bydst, &x->bydst,
net->xfrm.state_bydst + h,
@@ -1744,6 +1745,7 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_clone(struct xfrm_state *orig,
x->lastused = orig->lastused;
x->new_mapping = 0;
x->new_mapping_sport = 0;
+ x->dir = orig->dir;
return x;
@@ -1864,8 +1866,14 @@ int xfrm_state_update(struct xfrm_state *x)
}
if (x1->km.state == XFRM_STATE_ACQ) {
+ if (x->dir && x1->dir != x->dir)
+ goto out;
+
__xfrm_state_insert(x);
x = NULL;
+ } else {
+ if (x1->dir != x->dir)
+ goto out;
}
err = 0;
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 810b520493f3..f5eb3af4fb81 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static inline int verify_sec_ctx_len(struct nlattr **attrs, struct netlink_ext_a
}
static inline int verify_replay(struct xfrm_usersa_info *p,
- struct nlattr **attrs,
+ struct nlattr **attrs, u8 sa_dir,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL];
@@ -168,6 +168,30 @@ static inline int verify_replay(struct xfrm_usersa_info *p,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (sa_dir == XFRM_SA_DIR_OUT) {
+ if (rs->replay_window) {
+ NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Replay window should be 0 for output SA");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (rs->seq || rs->seq_hi) {
+ NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack,
+ "Replay seq and seq_hi should be 0 for output SA");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (rs->bmp_len) {
+ NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Replay bmp_len should 0 for output SA");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (sa_dir == XFRM_SA_DIR_IN) {
+ if (rs->oseq || rs->oseq_hi) {
+ NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack,
+ "Replay oseq and oseq_hi should be 0 for input SA");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
return 0;
}
@@ -176,6 +200,7 @@ static int verify_newsa_info(struct xfrm_usersa_info *p,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
int err;
+ u8 sa_dir = attrs[XFRMA_SA_DIR] ? nla_get_u8(attrs[XFRMA_SA_DIR]) : 0;
err = -EINVAL;
switch (p->family) {
@@ -334,7 +359,7 @@ static int verify_newsa_info(struct xfrm_usersa_info *p,
goto out;
if ((err = verify_sec_ctx_len(attrs, extack)))
goto out;
- if ((err = verify_replay(p, attrs, extack)))
+ if ((err = verify_replay(p, attrs, sa_dir, extack)))
goto out;
err = -EINVAL;
@@ -358,6 +383,77 @@ static int verify_newsa_info(struct xfrm_usersa_info *p,
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
+
+ if (sa_dir == XFRM_SA_DIR_OUT) {
+ NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack,
+ "MTIMER_THRESH attribute should not be set on output SA");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (sa_dir == XFRM_SA_DIR_OUT) {
+ if (p->flags & XFRM_STATE_DECAP_DSCP) {
+ NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Flag DECAP_DSCP should not be set for output SA");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (p->flags & XFRM_STATE_ICMP) {
+ NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Flag ICMP should not be set for output SA");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (p->flags & XFRM_STATE_WILDRECV) {
+ NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Flag WILDRECV should not be set for output SA");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (p->replay_window) {
+ NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Replay window should be 0 for output SA");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (attrs[XFRMA_REPLAY_VAL]) {
+ struct xfrm_replay_state *replay;
+
+ replay = nla_data(attrs[XFRMA_REPLAY_VAL]);
+
+ if (replay->seq || replay->bitmap) {
+ NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack,
+ "Replay seq and bitmap should be 0 for output SA");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (sa_dir == XFRM_SA_DIR_IN) {
+ if (p->flags & XFRM_STATE_NOPMTUDISC) {
+ NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Flag NOPMTUDISC should not be set for input SA");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (attrs[XFRMA_SA_EXTRA_FLAGS]) {
+ u32 xflags = nla_get_u32(attrs[XFRMA_SA_EXTRA_FLAGS]);
+
+ if (xflags & XFRM_SA_XFLAG_DONT_ENCAP_DSCP) {
+ NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Flag DONT_ENCAP_DSCP should not be set for input SA");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (xflags & XFRM_SA_XFLAG_OSEQ_MAY_WRAP) {
+ NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Flag OSEQ_MAY_WRAP should not be set for input SA");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ }
}
out:
@@ -734,6 +830,9 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_construct(struct net *net,
if (attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID])
x->if_id = nla_get_u32(attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID]);
+ if (attrs[XFRMA_SA_DIR])
+ x->dir = nla_get_u8(attrs[XFRMA_SA_DIR]);
+
err = __xfrm_init_state(x, false, attrs[XFRMA_OFFLOAD_DEV], extack);
if (err)
goto error;
@@ -1182,8 +1281,13 @@ static int copy_to_user_state_extra(struct xfrm_state *x,
if (ret)
goto out;
}
- if (x->mapping_maxage)
+ if (x->mapping_maxage) {
ret = nla_put_u32(skb, XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH, x->mapping_maxage);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (x->dir)
+ ret = nla_put_u8(skb, XFRMA_SA_DIR, x->dir);
out:
return ret;
}
@@ -1618,6 +1722,9 @@ static int xfrm_alloc_userspi(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
if (err)
goto out;
+ if (attrs[XFRMA_SA_DIR])
+ x->dir = nla_get_u8(attrs[XFRMA_SA_DIR]);
+
resp_skb = xfrm_state_netlink(skb, x, nlh->nlmsg_seq);
if (IS_ERR(resp_skb)) {
err = PTR_ERR(resp_skb);
@@ -2402,7 +2509,8 @@ static inline unsigned int xfrm_aevent_msgsize(struct xfrm_state *x)
+ nla_total_size_64bit(sizeof(struct xfrm_lifetime_cur))
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(struct xfrm_mark))
+ nla_total_size(4) /* XFRM_AE_RTHR */
- + nla_total_size(4); /* XFRM_AE_ETHR */
+ + nla_total_size(4) /* XFRM_AE_ETHR */
+ + nla_total_size(sizeof(x->dir)); /* XFRMA_SA_DIR */
}
static int build_aevent(struct sk_buff *skb, struct xfrm_state *x, const struct km_event *c)
@@ -2459,6 +2567,12 @@ static int build_aevent(struct sk_buff *skb, struct xfrm_state *x, const struct
if (err)
goto out_cancel;
+ if (x->dir) {
+ err = nla_put_u8(skb, XFRMA_SA_DIR, x->dir);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_cancel;
+ }
+
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
return 0;
@@ -3018,6 +3132,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrm_msg_min);
#undef XMSGSIZE
const struct nla_policy xfrma_policy[XFRMA_MAX+1] = {
+ [XFRMA_UNSPEC] = { .strict_start_type = XFRMA_SA_DIR },
[XFRMA_SA] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_usersa_info)},
[XFRMA_POLICY] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_userpolicy_info)},
[XFRMA_LASTUSED] = { .type = NLA_U64},
@@ -3049,6 +3164,7 @@ const struct nla_policy xfrma_policy[XFRMA_MAX+1] = {
[XFRMA_SET_MARK_MASK] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[XFRMA_IF_ID] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
+ [XFRMA_SA_DIR] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U8, XFRM_SA_DIR_IN, XFRM_SA_DIR_OUT),
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrma_policy);
@@ -3189,8 +3305,9 @@ static void xfrm_netlink_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
static inline unsigned int xfrm_expire_msgsize(void)
{
- return NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_expire))
- + nla_total_size(sizeof(struct xfrm_mark));
+ return NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_expire)) +
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(struct xfrm_mark)) +
+ nla_total_size(sizeof_field(struct xfrm_state, dir));
}
static int build_expire(struct sk_buff *skb, struct xfrm_state *x, const struct km_event *c)
@@ -3217,6 +3334,12 @@ static int build_expire(struct sk_buff *skb, struct xfrm_state *x, const struct
if (err)
return err;
+ if (x->dir) {
+ err = nla_put_u8(skb, XFRMA_SA_DIR, x->dir);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
return 0;
}
@@ -3324,6 +3447,9 @@ static inline unsigned int xfrm_sa_len(struct xfrm_state *x)
if (x->mapping_maxage)
l += nla_total_size(sizeof(x->mapping_maxage));
+ if (x->dir)
+ l += nla_total_size(sizeof(x->dir));
+
return l;
}
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3/5] xfrm: Add dir validation to "out" data path lookup
2024-05-03 8:27 [PATCH 0/5] pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2024-05-03 Steffen Klassert
2024-05-03 8:27 ` [PATCH 1/5] udpencap: Remove Obsolete UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE Support Steffen Klassert
2024-05-03 8:27 ` [PATCH 2/5] xfrm: Add Direction to the SA in or out Steffen Klassert
@ 2024-05-03 8:27 ` Steffen Klassert
2024-05-03 8:27 ` [PATCH 4/5] xfrm: Add dir validation to "in" " Steffen Klassert
` (2 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Klassert @ 2024-05-03 8:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller, Jakub Kicinski; +Cc: Herbert Xu, Steffen Klassert, netdev
From: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Introduces validation for the x->dir attribute within the XFRM output
data lookup path. If the configured direction does not match the expected
direction, output, increment the XfrmOutStateDirError counter and drop
the packet to ensure data integrity and correct flow handling.
grep -vw 0 /proc/net/xfrm_stat
XfrmOutPolError 1
XfrmOutStateDirError 1
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
Documentation/networking/xfrm_proc.rst | 3 +++
include/uapi/linux/snmp.h | 1 +
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 6 ++++++
net/xfrm/xfrm_proc.c | 1 +
4 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/networking/xfrm_proc.rst b/Documentation/networking/xfrm_proc.rst
index 0a771c5a7399..5ac3acf4cf51 100644
--- a/Documentation/networking/xfrm_proc.rst
+++ b/Documentation/networking/xfrm_proc.rst
@@ -111,3 +111,6 @@ XfrmOutPolError:
XfrmOutStateInvalid:
State is invalid, perhaps expired
+
+XfrmOutStateDirError:
+ State direction mismatch (lookup found an input state on the output path, expected output or no direction)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/snmp.h b/include/uapi/linux/snmp.h
index a0819c6a5988..23792b8412bd 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/snmp.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/snmp.h
@@ -337,6 +337,7 @@ enum
LINUX_MIB_XFRMFWDHDRERROR, /* XfrmFwdHdrError*/
LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTSTATEINVALID, /* XfrmOutStateInvalid */
LINUX_MIB_XFRMACQUIREERROR, /* XfrmAcquireError */
+ LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTSTATEDIRERROR, /* XfrmOutStateDirError */
__LINUX_MIB_XFRMMAX
};
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
index 6affe5cd85d8..298b3a9eb48d 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
@@ -2489,6 +2489,12 @@ xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one(struct xfrm_policy *policy, const struct flowi *fl,
x = xfrm_state_find(remote, local, fl, tmpl, policy, &error,
family, policy->if_id);
+ if (x && x->dir && x->dir != XFRM_SA_DIR_OUT) {
+ XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTSTATEDIRERROR);
+ xfrm_state_put(x);
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ goto fail;
+ }
if (x && x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_VALID) {
xfrm[nx++] = x;
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_proc.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_proc.c
index 5f9bf8e5c933..98606f1078f7 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_proc.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_proc.c
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ static const struct snmp_mib xfrm_mib_list[] = {
SNMP_MIB_ITEM("XfrmFwdHdrError", LINUX_MIB_XFRMFWDHDRERROR),
SNMP_MIB_ITEM("XfrmOutStateInvalid", LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTSTATEINVALID),
SNMP_MIB_ITEM("XfrmAcquireError", LINUX_MIB_XFRMACQUIREERROR),
+ SNMP_MIB_ITEM("XfrmOutStateDirError", LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTSTATEDIRERROR),
SNMP_MIB_SENTINEL
};
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4/5] xfrm: Add dir validation to "in" data path lookup
2024-05-03 8:27 [PATCH 0/5] pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2024-05-03 Steffen Klassert
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2024-05-03 8:27 ` [PATCH 3/5] xfrm: Add dir validation to "out" data path lookup Steffen Klassert
@ 2024-05-03 8:27 ` Steffen Klassert
2024-05-03 8:27 ` [PATCH 5/5] xfrm: Restrict SA direction attribute to specific netlink message types Steffen Klassert
2024-05-04 14:36 ` [PATCH 0/5] pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2024-05-03 Simon Horman
5 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Klassert @ 2024-05-03 8:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller, Jakub Kicinski; +Cc: Herbert Xu, Steffen Klassert, netdev
From: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Introduces validation for the x->dir attribute within the XFRM input
data lookup path. If the configured direction does not match the
expected direction, input, increment the XfrmInStateDirError counter
and drop the packet to ensure data integrity and correct flow handling.
grep -vw 0 /proc/net/xfrm_stat
XfrmInStateDirError 1
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
Documentation/networking/xfrm_proc.rst | 3 +++
include/uapi/linux/snmp.h | 1 +
net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c | 7 +++++++
net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c | 11 +++++++++++
net/xfrm/xfrm_proc.c | 1 +
5 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/networking/xfrm_proc.rst b/Documentation/networking/xfrm_proc.rst
index 5ac3acf4cf51..973d1571acac 100644
--- a/Documentation/networking/xfrm_proc.rst
+++ b/Documentation/networking/xfrm_proc.rst
@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ XfrmAcquireError:
XfrmFwdHdrError:
Forward routing of a packet is not allowed
+XfrmInStateDirError:
+ State direction mismatch (lookup found an output state on the input path, expected input or no direction)
+
Outbound errors
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
XfrmOutError:
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/snmp.h b/include/uapi/linux/snmp.h
index 23792b8412bd..adf5fd78dd50 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/snmp.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/snmp.h
@@ -338,6 +338,7 @@ enum
LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTSTATEINVALID, /* XfrmOutStateInvalid */
LINUX_MIB_XFRMACQUIREERROR, /* XfrmAcquireError */
LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTSTATEDIRERROR, /* XfrmOutStateDirError */
+ LINUX_MIB_XFRMINSTATEDIRERROR, /* XfrmInStateDirError */
__LINUX_MIB_XFRMMAX
};
diff --git a/net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c b/net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c
index 2c6aeb090b7a..d5bac0d76b6e 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c
@@ -266,6 +266,13 @@ int xfrm6_input_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, xfrm_address_t *daddr,
if (!x)
continue;
+ if (unlikely(x->dir && x->dir != XFRM_SA_DIR_IN)) {
+ XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINSTATEDIRERROR);
+ xfrm_state_put(x);
+ x = NULL;
+ continue;
+ }
+
spin_lock(&x->lock);
if ((!i || (x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_WILDRECV)) &&
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
index 161f535c8b94..71b42de6e3c9 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
@@ -466,6 +466,11 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type)
if (encap_type < 0 || (xo && xo->flags & XFRM_GRO)) {
x = xfrm_input_state(skb);
+ if (unlikely(x->dir && x->dir != XFRM_SA_DIR_IN)) {
+ XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINSTATEDIRERROR);
+ goto drop;
+ }
+
if (unlikely(x->km.state != XFRM_STATE_VALID)) {
if (x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_ACQ)
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMACQUIREERROR);
@@ -571,6 +576,12 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type)
goto drop;
}
+ if (unlikely(x->dir && x->dir != XFRM_SA_DIR_IN)) {
+ XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINSTATEDIRERROR);
+ xfrm_state_put(x);
+ goto drop;
+ }
+
skb->mark = xfrm_smark_get(skb->mark, x);
sp->xvec[sp->len++] = x;
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_proc.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_proc.c
index 98606f1078f7..eeb984be03a7 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_proc.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_proc.c
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static const struct snmp_mib xfrm_mib_list[] = {
SNMP_MIB_ITEM("XfrmOutStateInvalid", LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTSTATEINVALID),
SNMP_MIB_ITEM("XfrmAcquireError", LINUX_MIB_XFRMACQUIREERROR),
SNMP_MIB_ITEM("XfrmOutStateDirError", LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTSTATEDIRERROR),
+ SNMP_MIB_ITEM("XfrmInStateDirError", LINUX_MIB_XFRMINSTATEDIRERROR),
SNMP_MIB_SENTINEL
};
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5/5] xfrm: Restrict SA direction attribute to specific netlink message types
2024-05-03 8:27 [PATCH 0/5] pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2024-05-03 Steffen Klassert
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2024-05-03 8:27 ` [PATCH 4/5] xfrm: Add dir validation to "in" " Steffen Klassert
@ 2024-05-03 8:27 ` Steffen Klassert
2024-05-04 14:36 ` [PATCH 0/5] pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2024-05-03 Simon Horman
5 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Klassert @ 2024-05-03 8:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller, Jakub Kicinski; +Cc: Herbert Xu, Steffen Klassert, netdev
From: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Reject the usage of the SA_DIR attribute in xfrm netlink messages when
it's not applicable. This ensures that SA_DIR is only accepted for
certain message types (NEWSA, UPDSA, and ALLOCSPI)
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index f5eb3af4fb81..e83c687bd64e 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -3213,6 +3213,24 @@ static const struct xfrm_link {
[XFRM_MSG_GETDEFAULT - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = { .doit = xfrm_get_default },
};
+static int xfrm_reject_unused_attr(int type, struct nlattr **attrs,
+ struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
+{
+ if (attrs[XFRMA_SA_DIR]) {
+ switch (type) {
+ case XFRM_MSG_NEWSA:
+ case XFRM_MSG_UPDSA:
+ case XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI:
+ break;
+ default:
+ NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Invalid attribute SA_DIR");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int xfrm_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
@@ -3272,6 +3290,12 @@ static int xfrm_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
if (err < 0)
goto err;
+ if (!link->nla_pol || link->nla_pol == xfrma_policy) {
+ err = xfrm_reject_unused_attr((type + XFRM_MSG_BASE), attrs, extack);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (link->doit == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto err;
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 0/5] pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2024-05-03
2024-05-03 8:27 [PATCH 0/5] pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2024-05-03 Steffen Klassert
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2024-05-03 8:27 ` [PATCH 5/5] xfrm: Restrict SA direction attribute to specific netlink message types Steffen Klassert
@ 2024-05-04 14:36 ` Simon Horman
2024-05-07 9:00 ` Steffen Klassert
5 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Simon Horman @ 2024-05-04 14:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steffen Klassert; +Cc: David Miller, Jakub Kicinski, Herbert Xu, netdev
On Fri, May 03, 2024 at 10:27:26AM +0200, Steffen Klassert wrote:
> 1) Remove Obsolete UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE Support.
> This was defined by an early version of an IETF draft
> that did not make it to a standard.
>
> 2) Introduce direction attribute for xfrm states.
> xfrm states have a direction, a stsate can be used
> either for input or output packet processing.
> Add a direction to xfrm states to make it clear
> for what a xfrm state is used.
>
> All patches from Antony Antony.
>
> Please pull or let me know if there are problems.
Hi Steffen, all,
This comment is not strictly related to this pull request
and certainly not intended to impede progress of it towards upstream.
However, while looking over it I noticed that Sparse flags a rather
large number of warnings in xfrm code, mostly relating to __rcu annotations.
I'm wondering if, at some point, these could be addressed somehow.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 0/5] pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2024-05-03
2024-05-04 14:36 ` [PATCH 0/5] pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2024-05-03 Simon Horman
@ 2024-05-07 9:00 ` Steffen Klassert
2024-05-07 16:54 ` Simon Horman
0 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Klassert @ 2024-05-07 9:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Simon Horman; +Cc: David Miller, Jakub Kicinski, Herbert Xu, netdev
On Sat, May 04, 2024 at 03:36:57PM +0100, Simon Horman wrote:
>
> Hi Steffen, all,
>
> This comment is not strictly related to this pull request
> and certainly not intended to impede progress of it towards upstream.
>
> However, while looking over it I noticed that Sparse flags a rather
> large number of warnings in xfrm code, mostly relating to __rcu annotations.
> I'm wondering if, at some point, these could be addressed somehow.
Yes, maybe just start to not introduce new ones and then fix
existing ones over time. I'll have a look on how I can integrate
Sparse checks in my workflow.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 0/5] pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2024-05-03
2024-05-07 9:00 ` Steffen Klassert
@ 2024-05-07 16:54 ` Simon Horman
0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Simon Horman @ 2024-05-07 16:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steffen Klassert; +Cc: David Miller, Jakub Kicinski, Herbert Xu, netdev
On Tue, May 07, 2024 at 11:00:27AM +0200, Steffen Klassert wrote:
> On Sat, May 04, 2024 at 03:36:57PM +0100, Simon Horman wrote:
> >
> > Hi Steffen, all,
> >
> > This comment is not strictly related to this pull request
> > and certainly not intended to impede progress of it towards upstream.
> >
> > However, while looking over it I noticed that Sparse flags a rather
> > large number of warnings in xfrm code, mostly relating to __rcu annotations.
> > I'm wondering if, at some point, these could be addressed somehow.
>
> Yes, maybe just start to not introduce new ones and then fix
> existing ones over time. I'll have a look on how I can integrate
> Sparse checks in my workflow.
Thanks Steffen,
That would be much appreciated.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread