[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.10 10/70] bpf, x64: Fix a jit convergence issue

[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.10 10/70] bpf, x64: Fix a jit convergence issue

[Sasha Levin]

From: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>

[ Upstream commit c8831bdbfbab672c006a18006d36932a494b2fd6 ]

Daniel Hodges reported a jit error when playing with a sched-ext program.
The error message is:
  unexpected jmp_cond padding: -4 bytes

But further investigation shows the error is actual due to failed
convergence. The following are some analysis:

  ...
  pass4, final_proglen=4391:
    ...
    20e:    48 85 ff                test   rdi,rdi
    211:    74 7d                   je     0x290
    213:    48 8b 77 00             mov    rsi,QWORD PTR [rdi+0x0]
    ...
    289:    48 85 ff                test   rdi,rdi
    28c:    74 17                   je     0x2a5
    28e:    e9 7f ff ff ff          jmp    0x212
    293:    bf 03 00 00 00          mov    edi,0x3

Note that insn at 0x211 is 2-byte cond jump insn for offset 0x7d (-125)
and insn at 0x28e is 5-byte jmp insn with offset -129.

  pass5, final_proglen=4392:
    ...
    20e:    48 85 ff                test   rdi,rdi
    211:    0f 84 80 00 00 00       je     0x297
    217:    48 8b 77 00             mov    rsi,QWORD PTR [rdi+0x0]
    ...
    28d:    48 85 ff                test   rdi,rdi
    290:    74 1a                   je     0x2ac
    292:    eb 84                   jmp    0x218
    294:    bf 03 00 00 00          mov    edi,0x3

Note that insn at 0x211 is 6-byte cond jump insn now since its offset
becomes 0x80 based on previous round (0x293 - 0x213 = 0x80). At the same
time, insn at 0x292 is a 2-byte insn since its offset is -124.

pass6 will repeat the same code as in pass4. pass7 will repeat the same
code as in pass5, and so on. This will prevent eventual convergence.

Passes 1-14 are with padding = 0. At pass15, padding is 1 and related
insn looks like:

    211:    0f 84 80 00 00 00       je     0x297
    217:    48 8b 77 00             mov    rsi,QWORD PTR [rdi+0x0]
    ...
    24d:    48 85 d2                test   rdx,rdx

The similar code in pass14:
    211:    74 7d                   je     0x290
    213:    48 8b 77 00             mov    rsi,QWORD PTR [rdi+0x0]
    ...
    249:    48 85 d2                test   rdx,rdx
    24c:    74 21                   je     0x26f
    24e:    48 01 f7                add    rdi,rsi
    ...

Before generating the following insn,
  250:    74 21                   je     0x273
"padding = 1" enables some checking to ensure nops is either 0 or 4
where
  #define INSN_SZ_DIFF (((addrs[i] - addrs[i - 1]) - (prog - temp)))
  nops = INSN_SZ_DIFF - 2

In this specific case,
  addrs[i] = 0x24e // from pass14
  addrs[i-1] = 0x24d // from pass15
  prog - temp = 3 // from 'test rdx,rdx' in pass15
so
  nops = -4
and this triggers the failure.

To fix the issue, we need to break cycles of je <-> jmp. For example,
in the above case, we have
  211:    74 7d                   je     0x290
the offset is 0x7d. If 2-byte je insn is generated only if
the offset is less than 0x7d (<= 0x7c), the cycle can be
break and we can achieve the convergence.

I did some study on other cases like je <-> je, jmp <-> je and
jmp <-> jmp which may cause cycles. Those cases are not from actual
reproducible cases since it is pretty hard to construct a test case
for them. the results show that the offset <= 0x7b (0x7b = 123) should
be enough to cover all cases. This patch added a new helper to generate 8-bit
cond/uncond jmp insns only if the offset range is [-128, 123].

Reported-by: Daniel Hodges <hodgesd@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240904221251.37109-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index 5159c7a229229..dd60500497ead 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -64,6 +64,56 @@ static bool is_imm8(int value)
 	return value <= 127 && value >= -128;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Let us limit the positive offset to be <= 123.
+ * This is to ensure eventual jit convergence For the following patterns:
+ * ...
+ * pass4, final_proglen=4391:
+ *   ...
+ *   20e:    48 85 ff                test   rdi,rdi
+ *   211:    74 7d                   je     0x290
+ *   213:    48 8b 77 00             mov    rsi,QWORD PTR [rdi+0x0]
+ *   ...
+ *   289:    48 85 ff                test   rdi,rdi
+ *   28c:    74 17                   je     0x2a5
+ *   28e:    e9 7f ff ff ff          jmp    0x212
+ *   293:    bf 03 00 00 00          mov    edi,0x3
+ * Note that insn at 0x211 is 2-byte cond jump insn for offset 0x7d (-125)
+ * and insn at 0x28e is 5-byte jmp insn with offset -129.
+ *
+ * pass5, final_proglen=4392:
+ *   ...
+ *   20e:    48 85 ff                test   rdi,rdi
+ *   211:    0f 84 80 00 00 00       je     0x297
+ *   217:    48 8b 77 00             mov    rsi,QWORD PTR [rdi+0x0]
+ *   ...
+ *   28d:    48 85 ff                test   rdi,rdi
+ *   290:    74 1a                   je     0x2ac
+ *   292:    eb 84                   jmp    0x218
+ *   294:    bf 03 00 00 00          mov    edi,0x3
+ * Note that insn at 0x211 is 6-byte cond jump insn now since its offset
+ * becomes 0x80 based on previous round (0x293 - 0x213 = 0x80).
+ * At the same time, insn at 0x292 is a 2-byte insn since its offset is
+ * -124.
+ *
+ * pass6 will repeat the same code as in pass4 and this will prevent
+ * eventual convergence.
+ *
+ * To fix this issue, we need to break je (2->6 bytes) <-> jmp (5->2 bytes)
+ * cycle in the above. In the above example je offset <= 0x7c should work.
+ *
+ * For other cases, je <-> je needs offset <= 0x7b to avoid no convergence
+ * issue. For jmp <-> je and jmp <-> jmp cases, jmp offset <= 0x7c should
+ * avoid no convergence issue.
+ *
+ * Overall, let us limit the positive offset for 8bit cond/uncond jmp insn
+ * to maximum 123 (0x7b). This way, the jit pass can eventually converge.
+ */
+static bool is_imm8_jmp_offset(int value)
+{
+	return value <= 123 && value >= -128;
+}
+
 static bool is_simm32(s64 value)
 {
 	return value == (s64)(s32)value;
@@ -2191,7 +2241,7 @@ st:			if (is_imm8(insn->off))
 				return -EFAULT;
 			}
 			jmp_offset = addrs[i + insn->off] - addrs[i];
-			if (is_imm8(jmp_offset)) {
+			if (is_imm8_jmp_offset(jmp_offset)) {
 				if (jmp_padding) {
 					/* To keep the jmp_offset valid, the extra bytes are
 					 * padded before the jump insn, so we subtract the
@@ -2273,7 +2323,7 @@ st:			if (is_imm8(insn->off))
 				break;
 			}
 emit_jmp:
-			if (is_imm8(jmp_offset)) {
+			if (is_imm8_jmp_offset(jmp_offset)) {
 				if (jmp_padding) {
 					/* To avoid breaking jmp_offset, the extra bytes
 					 * are padded before the actual jmp insn, so
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.10 19/70] bpf: Prevent tail call between progs attached to different hooks

[Sasha Levin]

From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 28ead3eaabc16ecc907cfb71876da028080f6356 ]

bpf progs can be attached to kernel functions, and the attached functions
can take different parameters or return different return values. If
prog attached to one kernel function tail calls prog attached to another
kernel function, the ctx access or return value verification could be
bypassed.

For example, if prog1 is attached to func1 which takes only 1 parameter
and prog2 is attached to func2 which takes two parameters. Since verifier
assumes the bpf ctx passed to prog2 is constructed based on func2's
prototype, verifier allows prog2 to access the second parameter from
the bpf ctx passed to it. The problem is that verifier does not prevent
prog1 from passing its bpf ctx to prog2 via tail call. In this case,
the bpf ctx passed to prog2 is constructed from func1 instead of func2,
that is, the assumption for ctx access verification is bypassed.

Another example, if BPF LSM prog1 is attached to hook file_alloc_security,
and BPF LSM prog2 is attached to hook bpf_lsm_audit_rule_known. Verifier
knows the return value rules for these two hooks, e.g. it is legal for
bpf_lsm_audit_rule_known to return positive number 1, and it is illegal
for file_alloc_security to return positive number. So verifier allows
prog2 to return positive number 1, but does not allow prog1 to return
positive number. The problem is that verifier does not prevent prog1
from calling prog2 via tail call. In this case, prog2's return value 1
will be used as the return value for prog1's hook file_alloc_security.
That is, the return value rule is bypassed.

This patch adds restriction for tail call to prevent such bypasses.

Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240719110059.797546-4-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/bpf.h |  1 +
 kernel/bpf/core.c   | 21 ++++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index 5e694a308081a..5f77a04736a0e 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -294,6 +294,7 @@ struct bpf_map {
 	 * same prog type, JITed flag and xdp_has_frags flag.
 	 */
 	struct {
+		const struct btf_type *attach_func_proto;
 		spinlock_t lock;
 		enum bpf_prog_type type;
 		bool jited;
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index 695a0fb2cd4df..5ccb43adf13db 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -2303,6 +2303,7 @@ bool bpf_prog_map_compatible(struct bpf_map *map,
 {
 	enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(fp);
 	bool ret;
+	struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = fp->aux;
 
 	if (fp->kprobe_override)
 		return false;
@@ -2312,7 +2313,7 @@ bool bpf_prog_map_compatible(struct bpf_map *map,
 	 * in the case of devmap and cpumap). Until device checks
 	 * are implemented, prohibit adding dev-bound programs to program maps.
 	 */
-	if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(fp->aux))
+	if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(aux))
 		return false;
 
 	spin_lock(&map->owner.lock);
@@ -2322,12 +2323,26 @@ bool bpf_prog_map_compatible(struct bpf_map *map,
 		 */
 		map->owner.type  = prog_type;
 		map->owner.jited = fp->jited;
-		map->owner.xdp_has_frags = fp->aux->xdp_has_frags;
+		map->owner.xdp_has_frags = aux->xdp_has_frags;
+		map->owner.attach_func_proto = aux->attach_func_proto;
 		ret = true;
 	} else {
 		ret = map->owner.type  == prog_type &&
 		      map->owner.jited == fp->jited &&
-		      map->owner.xdp_has_frags == fp->aux->xdp_has_frags;
+		      map->owner.xdp_has_frags == aux->xdp_has_frags;
+		if (ret &&
+		    map->owner.attach_func_proto != aux->attach_func_proto) {
+			switch (prog_type) {
+			case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
+			case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
+			case BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT:
+			case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS:
+				ret = false;
+				break;
+			default:
+				break;
+			}
+		}
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&map->owner.lock);
 
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.10 53/70] netfilter: nf_nat: don't try nat source port reallocation for reverse dir clash

[Sasha Levin]

From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>

[ Upstream commit d8f84a9bc7c4e07fdc4edc00f9e868b8db974ccb ]

A conntrack entry can be inserted to the connection tracking table if there
is no existing entry with an identical tuple in either direction.

Example:
INITIATOR -> NAT/PAT -> RESPONDER

Initiator passes through NAT/PAT ("us") and SNAT is done (saddr rewrite).
Then, later, NAT/PAT machine itself also wants to connect to RESPONDER.

This will not work if the SNAT done earlier has same IP:PORT source pair.

Conntrack table has:
ORIGINAL: $IP_INITATOR:$SPORT -> $IP_RESPONDER:$DPORT
REPLY:    $IP_RESPONDER:$DPORT -> $IP_NAT:$SPORT

and new locally originating connection wants:
ORIGINAL: $IP_NAT:$SPORT -> $IP_RESPONDER:$DPORT
REPLY:    $IP_RESPONDER:$DPORT -> $IP_NAT:$SPORT

This is handled by the NAT engine which will do a source port reallocation
for the locally originating connection that is colliding with an existing
tuple by attempting a source port rewrite.

This is done even if this new connection attempt did not go through a
masquerade/snat rule.

There is a rare race condition with connection-less protocols like UDP,
where we do the port reallocation even though its not needed.

This happens when new packets from the same, pre-existing flow are received
in both directions at the exact same time on different CPUs after the
conntrack table was flushed (or conntrack becomes active for first time).

With strict ordering/single cpu, the first packet creates new ct entry and
second packet is resolved as established reply packet.

With parallel processing, both packets are picked up as new and both get
their own ct entry.

In this case, the 'reply' packet (picked up as ORIGINAL) can be mangled by
NAT engine because a port collision is detected.

This change isn't enough to prevent a packet drop later during
nf_conntrack_confirm(), the existing clash resolution strategy will not
detect such reverse clash case.  This is resolved by a followup patch.

Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c | 120 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 118 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c
index 016c816d91cbc..c212b1b137222 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c
@@ -183,7 +183,35 @@ hash_by_src(const struct net *net,
 	return reciprocal_scale(hash, nf_nat_htable_size);
 }
 
-/* Is this tuple already taken? (not by us) */
+/**
+ * nf_nat_used_tuple - check if proposed nat tuple clashes with existing entry
+ * @tuple: proposed NAT binding
+ * @ignored_conntrack: our (unconfirmed) conntrack entry
+ *
+ * A conntrack entry can be inserted to the connection tracking table
+ * if there is no existing entry with an identical tuple in either direction.
+ *
+ * Example:
+ * INITIATOR -> NAT/PAT -> RESPONDER
+ *
+ * INITIATOR passes through NAT/PAT ("us") and SNAT is done (saddr rewrite).
+ * Then, later, NAT/PAT itself also connects to RESPONDER.
+ *
+ * This will not work if the SNAT done earlier has same IP:PORT source pair.
+ *
+ * Conntrack table has:
+ * ORIGINAL: $IP_INITIATOR:$SPORT -> $IP_RESPONDER:$DPORT
+ * REPLY:    $IP_RESPONDER:$DPORT -> $IP_NAT:$SPORT
+ *
+ * and new locally originating connection wants:
+ * ORIGINAL: $IP_NAT:$SPORT -> $IP_RESPONDER:$DPORT
+ * REPLY:    $IP_RESPONDER:$DPORT -> $IP_NAT:$SPORT
+ *
+ * ... which would mean incoming packets cannot be distinguished between
+ * the existing and the newly added entry (identical IP_CT_DIR_REPLY tuple).
+ *
+ * @return: true if the proposed NAT mapping collides with an existing entry.
+ */
 static int
 nf_nat_used_tuple(const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
 		  const struct nf_conn *ignored_conntrack)
@@ -200,6 +228,94 @@ nf_nat_used_tuple(const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
 	return nf_conntrack_tuple_taken(&reply, ignored_conntrack);
 }
 
+static bool nf_nat_allow_clash(const struct nf_conn *ct)
+{
+	return nf_ct_l4proto_find(nf_ct_protonum(ct))->allow_clash;
+}
+
+/**
+ * nf_nat_used_tuple_new - check if to-be-inserted conntrack collides with existing entry
+ * @tuple: proposed NAT binding
+ * @ignored_ct: our (unconfirmed) conntrack entry
+ *
+ * Same as nf_nat_used_tuple, but also check for rare clash in reverse
+ * direction. Should be called only when @tuple has not been altered, i.e.
+ * @ignored_conntrack will not be subject to NAT.
+ *
+ * @return: true if the proposed NAT mapping collides with existing entry.
+ */
+static noinline bool
+nf_nat_used_tuple_new(const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
+		      const struct nf_conn *ignored_ct)
+{
+	static const unsigned long uses_nat = IPS_NAT_MASK | IPS_SEQ_ADJUST_BIT;
+	const struct nf_conntrack_tuple_hash *thash;
+	const struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone;
+	struct nf_conn *ct;
+	bool taken = true;
+	struct net *net;
+
+	if (!nf_nat_used_tuple(tuple, ignored_ct))
+		return false;
+
+	if (!nf_nat_allow_clash(ignored_ct))
+		return true;
+
+	/* Initial choice clashes with existing conntrack.
+	 * Check for (rare) reverse collision.
+	 *
+	 * This can happen when new packets are received in both directions
+	 * at the exact same time on different CPUs.
+	 *
+	 * Without SMP, first packet creates new conntrack entry and second
+	 * packet is resolved as established reply packet.
+	 *
+	 * With parallel processing, both packets could be picked up as
+	 * new and both get their own ct entry allocated.
+	 *
+	 * If ignored_conntrack and colliding ct are not subject to NAT then
+	 * pretend the tuple is available and let later clash resolution
+	 * handle this at insertion time.
+	 *
+	 * Without it, the 'reply' packet has its source port rewritten
+	 * by nat engine.
+	 */
+	if (READ_ONCE(ignored_ct->status) & uses_nat)
+		return true;
+
+	net = nf_ct_net(ignored_ct);
+	zone = nf_ct_zone(ignored_ct);
+
+	thash = nf_conntrack_find_get(net, zone, tuple);
+	if (unlikely(!thash)) /* clashing entry went away */
+		return false;
+
+	ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(thash);
+
+	/* NB: IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL should be impossible because
+	 * nf_nat_used_tuple() handles origin collisions.
+	 *
+	 * Handle remote chance other CPU confirmed its ct right after.
+	 */
+	if (thash->tuple.dst.dir != IP_CT_DIR_REPLY)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* clashing connection subject to NAT? Retry with new tuple. */
+	if (READ_ONCE(ct->status) & uses_nat)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (nf_ct_tuple_equal(&ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple,
+			      &ignored_ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple) &&
+	    nf_ct_tuple_equal(&ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple,
+			      &ignored_ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple)) {
+		taken = false;
+		goto out;
+	}
+out:
+	nf_ct_put(ct);
+	return taken;
+}
+
 static bool nf_nat_may_kill(struct nf_conn *ct, unsigned long flags)
 {
 	static const unsigned long flags_refuse = IPS_FIXED_TIMEOUT |
@@ -611,7 +727,7 @@ get_unique_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
 	    !(range->flags & NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_RANDOM_ALL)) {
 		/* try the original tuple first */
 		if (nf_in_range(orig_tuple, range)) {
-			if (!nf_nat_used_tuple(orig_tuple, ct)) {
+			if (!nf_nat_used_tuple_new(orig_tuple, ct)) {
 				*tuple = *orig_tuple;
 				return;
 			}
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.10 54/70] netfilter: nf_reject: Fix build warning when CONFIG_BRIDGE_NETFILTER=n

[Sasha Levin]

From: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit fc56878ca1c288e49b5cbb43860a5938e3463654 ]

If CONFIG_BRIDGE_NETFILTER is not enabled, which is the case for x86_64
defconfig, then building nf_reject_ipv4.c and nf_reject_ipv6.c with W=1
using gcc-14 results in the following warnings, which are treated as
errors:

net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c: In function 'nf_send_reset':
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c:243:23: error: variable 'niph' set but not used [-Werror=unused-but-set-variable]
  243 |         struct iphdr *niph;
      |                       ^~~~
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c: In function 'nf_send_reset6':
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c:286:25: error: variable 'ip6h' set but not used [-Werror=unused-but-set-variable]
  286 |         struct ipv6hdr *ip6h;
      |                         ^~~~
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors

Address this by reducing the scope of these local variables to where
they are used, which is code only compiled when CONFIG_BRIDGE_NETFILTER
enabled.

Compile tested and run through netfilter selftests.

Reported-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/20240906145513.567781-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c | 10 ++++------
 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c |  5 ++---
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c
index 04504b2b51df5..87fd945a0d27a 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c
@@ -239,9 +239,8 @@ static int nf_reject_fill_skb_dst(struct sk_buff *skb_in)
 void nf_send_reset(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *oldskb,
 		   int hook)
 {
-	struct sk_buff *nskb;
-	struct iphdr *niph;
 	const struct tcphdr *oth;
+	struct sk_buff *nskb;
 	struct tcphdr _oth;
 
 	oth = nf_reject_ip_tcphdr_get(oldskb, &_oth, hook);
@@ -266,14 +265,12 @@ void nf_send_reset(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *oldskb,
 	nskb->mark = IP4_REPLY_MARK(net, oldskb->mark);
 
 	skb_reserve(nskb, LL_MAX_HEADER);
-	niph = nf_reject_iphdr_put(nskb, oldskb, IPPROTO_TCP,
-				   ip4_dst_hoplimit(skb_dst(nskb)));
+	nf_reject_iphdr_put(nskb, oldskb, IPPROTO_TCP,
+			    ip4_dst_hoplimit(skb_dst(nskb)));
 	nf_reject_ip_tcphdr_put(nskb, oldskb, oth);
 	if (ip_route_me_harder(net, sk, nskb, RTN_UNSPEC))
 		goto free_nskb;
 
-	niph = ip_hdr(nskb);
-
 	/* "Never happens" */
 	if (nskb->len > dst_mtu(skb_dst(nskb)))
 		goto free_nskb;
@@ -290,6 +287,7 @@ void nf_send_reset(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *oldskb,
 	 */
 	if (nf_bridge_info_exists(oldskb)) {
 		struct ethhdr *oeth = eth_hdr(oldskb);
+		struct iphdr *niph = ip_hdr(nskb);
 		struct net_device *br_indev;
 
 		br_indev = nf_bridge_get_physindev(oldskb, net);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c
index dedee264b8f6c..69a78550261fb 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c
@@ -283,7 +283,6 @@ void nf_send_reset6(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *oldskb,
 	const struct tcphdr *otcph;
 	unsigned int otcplen, hh_len;
 	const struct ipv6hdr *oip6h = ipv6_hdr(oldskb);
-	struct ipv6hdr *ip6h;
 	struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
 	struct flowi6 fl6;
 
@@ -339,8 +338,7 @@ void nf_send_reset6(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *oldskb,
 	nskb->mark = fl6.flowi6_mark;
 
 	skb_reserve(nskb, hh_len + dst->header_len);
-	ip6h = nf_reject_ip6hdr_put(nskb, oldskb, IPPROTO_TCP,
-				    ip6_dst_hoplimit(dst));
+	nf_reject_ip6hdr_put(nskb, oldskb, IPPROTO_TCP, ip6_dst_hoplimit(dst));
 	nf_reject_ip6_tcphdr_put(nskb, oldskb, otcph, otcplen);
 
 	nf_ct_attach(nskb, oldskb);
@@ -355,6 +353,7 @@ void nf_send_reset6(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *oldskb,
 	 */
 	if (nf_bridge_info_exists(oldskb)) {
 		struct ethhdr *oeth = eth_hdr(oldskb);
+		struct ipv6hdr *ip6h = ipv6_hdr(nskb);
 		struct net_device *br_indev;
 
 		br_indev = nf_bridge_get_physindev(oldskb, net);
-- 
2.43.0