From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EE59F17BA1; Wed, 4 Dec 2024 03:47:02 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1733284023; cv=none; b=gc6B3CqIIG1B+Xex/OT2E78vz0TN+ntWoH6LlBi2el3VZ7NwY700K6tqN6a3bOi8IvHEu+byC8a0eFCBIrOGKjJjdphcc1S4wKrZrDhKdmcKFF/da908hZ5tYBZ2E2oSedQIVGDIgHoVnFQ0bOKT2nCvjcQx6ipeA8PHJIFEAcE= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1733284023; c=relaxed/simple; bh=rV2kU3EXJi1nCePhMpNyNdzmMfRJXruCC3USeEGD31I=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=tJK6H/lnDJZ9cutIXV21cemDeoqQ+z4yyDERRa4WJC4S8O10fENER/lZLC0cNqcV5ljnIGVOfp4WJcyAz2pH2sr9NGtcoaGZp7IjFGe1kkOc+roo0hAqPFlQnF9sIKTo+8Wyzzq9CIQzBJDo5ec71ibSzkeQqgA3xCqecUCLySE= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=jiZUFoaj; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="jiZUFoaj" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5F5FCC4CED1; Wed, 4 Dec 2024 03:47:02 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1733284022; bh=rV2kU3EXJi1nCePhMpNyNdzmMfRJXruCC3USeEGD31I=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=jiZUFoajZ1VdviSWCV/zCWDPWG/1oOFQDpiDcFsI1RCBRxLCvQEwK9hOn7koG0Dq3 mKMlCNOjDcZb25GXAy+rw0uZKwmMAq+f9tmk6BlKeyA58LAlWyDC3yfi8D7F/VAkSW uJuKMkl9GPHZuAXfcA8mzAfisM5tKXCTJn795gtBZmAdsRTnZ8mQ0e/WNagXd0tvD1 IDn3XMWRIHn7EWwO6tzr9lZYSbDVhL3AASR0NBnxQTh9Az7L65/vfgIxmbqQr7Tufq KSTR37Mdg1CbprUX7jYXDGEXHkUEW6r5aHSfeW6uZPjcFnQM0c7+mrD+COjAj9nEtA /JNNsENNecjbA== Date: Tue, 3 Dec 2024 19:47:01 -0800 From: Jakub Kicinski To: Sabrina Dubroca Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, Vadim Fedorenko , Frantisek Krenzelok , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Apoorv Kothari , Boris Pismenny , John Fastabend , Shuah Khan , linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Gal Pressman , Marcel Holtmann , Simon Horman Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v4 1/6] tls: block decryption when a rekey is pending Message-ID: <20241203194701.48e74c8e@kernel.org> In-Reply-To: <327cb575d15fa5c5379f9c38a5132d78953fb648.1731597571.git.sd@queasysnail.net> References: <327cb575d15fa5c5379f9c38a5132d78953fb648.1731597571.git.sd@queasysnail.net> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On Thu, 14 Nov 2024 16:50:48 +0100 Sabrina Dubroca wrote: > +static int tls_check_pending_rekey(struct tls_context *ctx, struct sk_buff *skb) > +{ > + const struct tls_msg *tlm = tls_msg(skb); > + const struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb); > + char hs_type; > + int err; > + > + if (likely(tlm->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE)) > + return 0; > + > + if (rxm->full_len < 1) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + err = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset, &hs_type, 1); > + if (err < 0) > + return err; > + > + if (hs_type == TLS_HANDSHAKE_KEYUPDATE) { > + struct tls_sw_context_rx *rx_ctx = ctx->priv_ctx_rx; > + > + WRITE_ONCE(rx_ctx->key_update_pending, true); > + } > + > + return 0; > +} > + > static int tls_rx_one_record(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, > struct tls_decrypt_arg *darg) > { > @@ -1739,6 +1769,10 @@ static int tls_rx_one_record(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, > rxm->full_len -= prot->overhead_size; > tls_advance_record_sn(sk, prot, &tls_ctx->rx); > > + err = tls_check_pending_rekey(tls_ctx, darg->skb); > + if (err < 0) > + return err; Sorry if I already asked this, is this 100% safe to error out from here after we decrypted the record? Normally once we successfully decrypted and pulled the message header / trailer we always call tls_rx_rec_done() The only reason the check_pending_rekey() can fail is if the message is mis-formatted, I wonder if we are better off ignoring mis-formatted rekeys? User space will see them and break the connection, anyway. Alternatively - we could add a selftest for this.