From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>,
Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-afs@lists.infradead.org,
linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/8] crypto/krb5: Provide Kerberos 5 crypto through AEAD API
Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2025 21:50:58 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250110055058.GA63811@sol.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250110010313.1471063-3-dhowells@redhat.com>
On Fri, Jan 10, 2025 at 01:03:04AM +0000, David Howells wrote:
> Use the AEAD crypto API to provide Kerberos 5 crypto, plus some
> supplementary library functions that lie outside of the AEAD API.
>
> The crypto algorithms only perform the actual crypto operations; they do
> not do any laying out of the message and nor do they insert any metadata or
> padding. Everything is done by dead-reckoning as the AEAD API does not
> provide a useful way to pass the extra parameters required.
>
> When setting the key on a crypto algorithm, setkey takes a composite
> structure consisting of an indication of the mode of transformation to be
> applied to the message (checksum only or full encryption); the usage type
> to be used in deriving the keys; an indicator indicating what key is being
> presented (K0 or Kc/Ke+Ki); and the material for those key(s). Based on
> this, the setkey code allocates and keys the appropriate ciphers and
> hashes.
>
> When dispatching a request, both checksumming (MIC) and encryption use the
> encrypt and decrypt methods. A source message, prelaid out with
> confounders or other metadata inserted is provided in the source buffer.
> The cryptolen indicates the amount of source message data, not including
> the trailer after the data (which includes the integrity checksum) and not
> including any associated data.
>
> Associated data is only used by checksumming encrypt/decrypt. The
> associated data is added to the checksum hash before the data in the
> message, but does not occupy any part of the output message.
>
> Authentication tags are not used at all and should cause EINVAL if used (a
> later patch does that).
>
> For the moment, the kerberos encryption algorithms use separate hash and
> cipher algorithms internally, but should really use dual hash+cipher and
> cipher+hash algorithms if possible to avoid doing these in series. Offload
> off this may be possible through something like the Intel QAT.
It sounds like a lot of workarounds had to be implemented to fit these protocols
into the crypto_aead API.
It also seems unlikely that there will be other implementations of these
protocols added to the kernel, besides the one you're adding in crypto/krb5/.
Given that, providing this functionality as library functions instead would be
much simpler. Take a look at how crypto/kdf_sp800108.c works, for example.
- Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-01-10 5:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-01-10 1:03 [RFC PATCH 0/8] crypto: Add generic Kerberos library with crypto as AEAD algorithms David Howells
2025-01-10 1:03 ` [RFC PATCH 1/8] crypto/krb5: Add some constants out of sunrpc headers David Howells
2025-01-10 1:03 ` [RFC PATCH 2/8] crypto/krb5: Provide Kerberos 5 crypto through AEAD API David Howells
2025-01-10 5:50 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2025-01-10 7:13 ` David Howells
2025-01-10 9:47 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-01-10 14:33 ` David Howells
2025-01-10 9:48 ` Herbert Xu
2025-01-10 10:26 ` David Howells
2025-01-10 10:30 ` Herbert Xu
2025-01-10 11:09 ` David Howells
2025-01-17 8:13 ` David Howells
2025-01-17 8:30 ` David Howells
2025-01-10 10:02 ` Herbert Xu
2025-01-10 10:39 ` David Howells
2025-01-10 10:42 ` Herbert Xu
2025-01-10 18:22 ` Jeffrey E Altman
2025-01-10 1:03 ` [RFC PATCH 3/8] crypto/krb5: Test manager data David Howells
2025-01-10 1:03 ` [RFC PATCH 4/8] rxrpc: Add the security index for yfs-rxgk David Howells
2025-01-10 1:03 ` [RFC PATCH 5/8] rxrpc: Add YFS RxGK (GSSAPI) security class David Howells
2025-01-10 1:03 ` [RFC PATCH 6/8] rxrpc: rxgk: Provide infrastructure and key derivation David Howells
2025-01-10 1:03 ` [RFC PATCH 7/8] rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI) David Howells
2025-01-10 1:03 ` [RFC PATCH 8/8] rxrpc: rxgk: Implement connection rekeying David Howells
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20250110055058.GA63811@sol.localdomain \
--to=ebiggers@kernel.org \
--cc=chuck.lever@oracle.com \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=edumazet@google.com \
--cc=herbert@gondor.apana.org.au \
--cc=horms@kernel.org \
--cc=kuba@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-afs@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=marc.dionne@auristor.com \
--cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=pabeni@redhat.com \
--cc=trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).