* [PATCH net] sctp: add mutual exclusion in proc_sctp_do_udp_port()
@ 2025-03-31 9:15 Eric Dumazet
2025-03-31 15:54 ` Xin Long
2025-04-02 23:40 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
0 siblings, 2 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Eric Dumazet @ 2025-03-31 9:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David S . Miller, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni
Cc: Simon Horman, netdev, eric.dumazet, Eric Dumazet,
syzbot+fae49d997eb56fa7c74d, Marcelo Ricardo Leitner, Xin Long
We must serialize calls to sctp_udp_sock_stop() and sctp_udp_sock_start()
or risk a crash as syzbot reported:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000d: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000068-0x000000000000006f]
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6551 Comm: syz.1.44 Not tainted 6.14.0-syzkaller-g7f2ff7b62617 #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025
RIP: 0010:kernel_sock_shutdown+0x47/0x70 net/socket.c:3653
Call Trace:
<TASK>
udp_tunnel_sock_release+0x68/0x80 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel_core.c:181
sctp_udp_sock_stop+0x71/0x160 net/sctp/protocol.c:930
proc_sctp_do_udp_port+0x264/0x450 net/sctp/sysctl.c:553
proc_sys_call_handler+0x3d0/0x5b0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:601
iter_file_splice_write+0x91c/0x1150 fs/splice.c:738
do_splice_from fs/splice.c:935 [inline]
direct_splice_actor+0x18f/0x6c0 fs/splice.c:1158
splice_direct_to_actor+0x342/0xa30 fs/splice.c:1102
do_splice_direct_actor fs/splice.c:1201 [inline]
do_splice_direct+0x174/0x240 fs/splice.c:1227
do_sendfile+0xafd/0xe50 fs/read_write.c:1368
__do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1429 [inline]
__se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1415 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1d8/0x220 fs/read_write.c:1415
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
Fixes: 046c052b475e ("sctp: enable udp tunneling socks")
Reported-by: syzbot+fae49d997eb56fa7c74d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/67ea5c01.050a0220.1547ec.012b.GAE@google.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
---
net/sctp/sysctl.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/sctp/sysctl.c b/net/sctp/sysctl.c
index 8e1e97be4df79f3245e2bbbeb0a75841abc67f58..ee3eac338a9deef064f273e29bb59b057835d3f1 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sysctl.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sysctl.c
@@ -525,6 +525,8 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_auth(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
return ret;
}
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(sctp_sysctl_mutex);
+
static int proc_sctp_do_udp_port(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
@@ -549,6 +551,7 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_udp_port(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
if (new_value > max || new_value < min)
return -EINVAL;
+ mutex_lock(&sctp_sysctl_mutex);
net->sctp.udp_port = new_value;
sctp_udp_sock_stop(net);
if (new_value) {
@@ -561,6 +564,7 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_udp_port(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
lock_sock(sk);
sctp_sk(sk)->udp_port = htons(net->sctp.udp_port);
release_sock(sk);
+ mutex_unlock(&sctp_sysctl_mutex);
}
return ret;
--
2.49.0.472.ge94155a9ec-goog
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net] sctp: add mutual exclusion in proc_sctp_do_udp_port()
2025-03-31 9:15 [PATCH net] sctp: add mutual exclusion in proc_sctp_do_udp_port() Eric Dumazet
@ 2025-03-31 15:54 ` Xin Long
2025-03-31 16:11 ` Eric Dumazet
2025-04-02 23:40 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
1 sibling, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Xin Long @ 2025-03-31 15:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric Dumazet
Cc: David S . Miller, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, Simon Horman,
netdev, eric.dumazet, syzbot+fae49d997eb56fa7c74d,
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner
On Mon, Mar 31, 2025 at 5:15 AM Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> wrote:
>
> We must serialize calls to sctp_udp_sock_stop() and sctp_udp_sock_start()
> or risk a crash as syzbot reported:
>
> Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000d: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
> KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000068-0x000000000000006f]
> CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6551 Comm: syz.1.44 Not tainted 6.14.0-syzkaller-g7f2ff7b62617 #0 PREEMPT(full)
> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025
> RIP: 0010:kernel_sock_shutdown+0x47/0x70 net/socket.c:3653
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> udp_tunnel_sock_release+0x68/0x80 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel_core.c:181
> sctp_udp_sock_stop+0x71/0x160 net/sctp/protocol.c:930
> proc_sctp_do_udp_port+0x264/0x450 net/sctp/sysctl.c:553
> proc_sys_call_handler+0x3d0/0x5b0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:601
> iter_file_splice_write+0x91c/0x1150 fs/splice.c:738
> do_splice_from fs/splice.c:935 [inline]
> direct_splice_actor+0x18f/0x6c0 fs/splice.c:1158
> splice_direct_to_actor+0x342/0xa30 fs/splice.c:1102
> do_splice_direct_actor fs/splice.c:1201 [inline]
> do_splice_direct+0x174/0x240 fs/splice.c:1227
> do_sendfile+0xafd/0xe50 fs/read_write.c:1368
> __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1429 [inline]
> __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1415 [inline]
> __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1d8/0x220 fs/read_write.c:1415
> do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
>
> Fixes: 046c052b475e ("sctp: enable udp tunneling socks")
> Reported-by: syzbot+fae49d997eb56fa7c74d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/67ea5c01.050a0220.1547ec.012b.GAE@google.com/T/#u
> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
> Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
> Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
> ---
> net/sctp/sysctl.c | 4 ++++
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/net/sctp/sysctl.c b/net/sctp/sysctl.c
> index 8e1e97be4df79f3245e2bbbeb0a75841abc67f58..ee3eac338a9deef064f273e29bb59b057835d3f1 100644
> --- a/net/sctp/sysctl.c
> +++ b/net/sctp/sysctl.c
> @@ -525,6 +525,8 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_auth(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
> return ret;
> }
>
> +static DEFINE_MUTEX(sctp_sysctl_mutex);
> +
> static int proc_sctp_do_udp_port(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
> void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
> {
> @@ -549,6 +551,7 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_udp_port(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
> if (new_value > max || new_value < min)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> + mutex_lock(&sctp_sysctl_mutex);
> net->sctp.udp_port = new_value;
> sctp_udp_sock_stop(net);
> if (new_value) {
> @@ -561,6 +564,7 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_udp_port(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
> lock_sock(sk);
> sctp_sk(sk)->udp_port = htons(net->sctp.udp_port);
> release_sock(sk);
> + mutex_unlock(&sctp_sysctl_mutex);
> }
>
> return ret;
> --
> 2.49.0.472.ge94155a9ec-goog
>
Instead of introducing a new lock for this, wouldn't be better to just
move up `lock_sock(sk)` a little bit?
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net] sctp: add mutual exclusion in proc_sctp_do_udp_port()
2025-03-31 15:54 ` Xin Long
@ 2025-03-31 16:11 ` Eric Dumazet
2025-03-31 18:50 ` David Laight
2025-04-01 0:15 ` Xin Long
0 siblings, 2 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Eric Dumazet @ 2025-03-31 16:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Xin Long
Cc: David S . Miller, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, Simon Horman,
netdev, eric.dumazet, syzbot+fae49d997eb56fa7c74d,
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner
On Mon, Mar 31, 2025 at 5:54 PM Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Mar 31, 2025 at 5:15 AM Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> wrote:
> >
> > We must serialize calls to sctp_udp_sock_stop() and sctp_udp_sock_start()
> > or risk a crash as syzbot reported:
> >
> > Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000d: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
> > KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000068-0x000000000000006f]
> > CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6551 Comm: syz.1.44 Not tainted 6.14.0-syzkaller-g7f2ff7b62617 #0 PREEMPT(full)
> > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025
> > RIP: 0010:kernel_sock_shutdown+0x47/0x70 net/socket.c:3653
> > Call Trace:
> > <TASK>
> > udp_tunnel_sock_release+0x68/0x80 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel_core.c:181
> > sctp_udp_sock_stop+0x71/0x160 net/sctp/protocol.c:930
> > proc_sctp_do_udp_port+0x264/0x450 net/sctp/sysctl.c:553
> > proc_sys_call_handler+0x3d0/0x5b0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:601
> > iter_file_splice_write+0x91c/0x1150 fs/splice.c:738
> > do_splice_from fs/splice.c:935 [inline]
> > direct_splice_actor+0x18f/0x6c0 fs/splice.c:1158
> > splice_direct_to_actor+0x342/0xa30 fs/splice.c:1102
> > do_splice_direct_actor fs/splice.c:1201 [inline]
> > do_splice_direct+0x174/0x240 fs/splice.c:1227
> > do_sendfile+0xafd/0xe50 fs/read_write.c:1368
> > __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1429 [inline]
> > __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1415 [inline]
> > __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1d8/0x220 fs/read_write.c:1415
> > do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
> >
> > Fixes: 046c052b475e ("sctp: enable udp tunneling socks")
> > Reported-by: syzbot+fae49d997eb56fa7c74d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> > Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/67ea5c01.050a0220.1547ec.012b.GAE@google.com/T/#u
> > Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
> > Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
> > Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
> > ---
> > net/sctp/sysctl.c | 4 ++++
> > 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/net/sctp/sysctl.c b/net/sctp/sysctl.c
> > index 8e1e97be4df79f3245e2bbbeb0a75841abc67f58..ee3eac338a9deef064f273e29bb59b057835d3f1 100644
> > --- a/net/sctp/sysctl.c
> > +++ b/net/sctp/sysctl.c
> > @@ -525,6 +525,8 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_auth(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
> > return ret;
> > }
> >
> > +static DEFINE_MUTEX(sctp_sysctl_mutex);
> > +
> > static int proc_sctp_do_udp_port(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
> > void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
> > {
> > @@ -549,6 +551,7 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_udp_port(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
> > if (new_value > max || new_value < min)
> > return -EINVAL;
> >
> > + mutex_lock(&sctp_sysctl_mutex);
> > net->sctp.udp_port = new_value;
> > sctp_udp_sock_stop(net);
> > if (new_value) {
> > @@ -561,6 +564,7 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_udp_port(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
> > lock_sock(sk);
> > sctp_sk(sk)->udp_port = htons(net->sctp.udp_port);
> > release_sock(sk);
> > + mutex_unlock(&sctp_sysctl_mutex);
> > }
> >
> > return ret;
> > --
> > 2.49.0.472.ge94155a9ec-goog
> >
> Instead of introducing a new lock for this, wouldn't be better to just
> move up `lock_sock(sk)` a little bit?
It depends if calling synchronize_rcu() two times while holding the
socket lock is ok or not ?
What is the issue about using a separate mutex ?
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net] sctp: add mutual exclusion in proc_sctp_do_udp_port()
2025-03-31 16:11 ` Eric Dumazet
@ 2025-03-31 18:50 ` David Laight
2025-04-01 0:22 ` Xin Long
2025-04-01 0:15 ` Xin Long
1 sibling, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: David Laight @ 2025-03-31 18:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric Dumazet
Cc: Xin Long, David S . Miller, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni,
Simon Horman, netdev, eric.dumazet, syzbot+fae49d997eb56fa7c74d,
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner
On Mon, 31 Mar 2025 18:11:38 +0200
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 31, 2025 at 5:54 PM Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Mar 31, 2025 at 5:15 AM Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > We must serialize calls to sctp_udp_sock_stop() and sctp_udp_sock_start()
> > > or risk a crash as syzbot reported:
> > >
> > > Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000d: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
> > > KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000068-0x000000000000006f]
> > > CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6551 Comm: syz.1.44 Not tainted 6.14.0-syzkaller-g7f2ff7b62617 #0 PREEMPT(full)
> > > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025
> > > RIP: 0010:kernel_sock_shutdown+0x47/0x70 net/socket.c:3653
> > > Call Trace:
> > > <TASK>
> > > udp_tunnel_sock_release+0x68/0x80 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel_core.c:181
> > > sctp_udp_sock_stop+0x71/0x160 net/sctp/protocol.c:930
> > > proc_sctp_do_udp_port+0x264/0x450 net/sctp/sysctl.c:553
> > > proc_sys_call_handler+0x3d0/0x5b0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:601
> > > iter_file_splice_write+0x91c/0x1150 fs/splice.c:738
> > > do_splice_from fs/splice.c:935 [inline]
> > > direct_splice_actor+0x18f/0x6c0 fs/splice.c:1158
> > > splice_direct_to_actor+0x342/0xa30 fs/splice.c:1102
> > > do_splice_direct_actor fs/splice.c:1201 [inline]
> > > do_splice_direct+0x174/0x240 fs/splice.c:1227
> > > do_sendfile+0xafd/0xe50 fs/read_write.c:1368
> > > __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1429 [inline]
> > > __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1415 [inline]
> > > __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1d8/0x220 fs/read_write.c:1415
> > > do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
> > >
> > > Fixes: 046c052b475e ("sctp: enable udp tunneling socks")
> > > Reported-by: syzbot+fae49d997eb56fa7c74d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> > > Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/67ea5c01.050a0220.1547ec.012b.GAE@google.com/T/#u
> > > Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
> > > Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
> > > Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
> > > ---
> > > net/sctp/sysctl.c | 4 ++++
> > > 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/net/sctp/sysctl.c b/net/sctp/sysctl.c
> > > index 8e1e97be4df79f3245e2bbbeb0a75841abc67f58..ee3eac338a9deef064f273e29bb59b057835d3f1 100644
> > > --- a/net/sctp/sysctl.c
> > > +++ b/net/sctp/sysctl.c
> > > @@ -525,6 +525,8 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_auth(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
> > > return ret;
> > > }
> > >
> > > +static DEFINE_MUTEX(sctp_sysctl_mutex);
> > > +
> > > static int proc_sctp_do_udp_port(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
> > > void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
> > > {
> > > @@ -549,6 +551,7 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_udp_port(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
> > > if (new_value > max || new_value < min)
> > > return -EINVAL;
> > >
> > > + mutex_lock(&sctp_sysctl_mutex);
> > > net->sctp.udp_port = new_value;
> > > sctp_udp_sock_stop(net);
> > > if (new_value) {
> > > @@ -561,6 +564,7 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_udp_port(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
> > > lock_sock(sk);
> > > sctp_sk(sk)->udp_port = htons(net->sctp.udp_port);
> > > release_sock(sk);
> > > + mutex_unlock(&sctp_sysctl_mutex);
> > > }
> > >
> > > return ret;
> > > --
> > > 2.49.0.472.ge94155a9ec-goog
> > >
> > Instead of introducing a new lock for this, wouldn't be better to just
> > move up `lock_sock(sk)` a little bit?
>
> It depends if calling synchronize_rcu() two times while holding the
> socket lock is ok or not ?
>
> What is the issue about using a separate mutex ?
>
Don't they need locking against a different path that is using the socket?
Not only against concurrent accesses to the sysctl?
Presuming the crash was because of the net->sctp.udp4_sock = NULL
assignment in sock_stop(), if 'min' is zero allowing 'new_value' zero
then the pointer is left NULL.
IIRC sctp_sk(sk) is fixed, so the sock_lock() doesn't do much apart
from stop some unlikely 'data tearing'.
David
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net] sctp: add mutual exclusion in proc_sctp_do_udp_port()
2025-03-31 16:11 ` Eric Dumazet
2025-03-31 18:50 ` David Laight
@ 2025-04-01 0:15 ` Xin Long
1 sibling, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Xin Long @ 2025-04-01 0:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric Dumazet
Cc: David S . Miller, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, Simon Horman,
netdev, eric.dumazet, syzbot+fae49d997eb56fa7c74d,
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner
On Mon, Mar 31, 2025 at 12:11 PM Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Mar 31, 2025 at 5:54 PM Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Mar 31, 2025 at 5:15 AM Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > We must serialize calls to sctp_udp_sock_stop() and sctp_udp_sock_start()
> > > or risk a crash as syzbot reported:
> > >
> > > Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000d: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
> > > KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000068-0x000000000000006f]
> > > CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6551 Comm: syz.1.44 Not tainted 6.14.0-syzkaller-g7f2ff7b62617 #0 PREEMPT(full)
> > > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025
> > > RIP: 0010:kernel_sock_shutdown+0x47/0x70 net/socket.c:3653
> > > Call Trace:
> > > <TASK>
> > > udp_tunnel_sock_release+0x68/0x80 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel_core.c:181
> > > sctp_udp_sock_stop+0x71/0x160 net/sctp/protocol.c:930
> > > proc_sctp_do_udp_port+0x264/0x450 net/sctp/sysctl.c:553
> > > proc_sys_call_handler+0x3d0/0x5b0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:601
> > > iter_file_splice_write+0x91c/0x1150 fs/splice.c:738
> > > do_splice_from fs/splice.c:935 [inline]
> > > direct_splice_actor+0x18f/0x6c0 fs/splice.c:1158
> > > splice_direct_to_actor+0x342/0xa30 fs/splice.c:1102
> > > do_splice_direct_actor fs/splice.c:1201 [inline]
> > > do_splice_direct+0x174/0x240 fs/splice.c:1227
> > > do_sendfile+0xafd/0xe50 fs/read_write.c:1368
> > > __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1429 [inline]
> > > __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1415 [inline]
> > > __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1d8/0x220 fs/read_write.c:1415
> > > do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
> > >
> > > Fixes: 046c052b475e ("sctp: enable udp tunneling socks")
> > > Reported-by: syzbot+fae49d997eb56fa7c74d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> > > Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/67ea5c01.050a0220.1547ec.012b.GAE@google.com/T/#u
> > > Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
> > > Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
> > > Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
> > > ---
> > > net/sctp/sysctl.c | 4 ++++
> > > 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/net/sctp/sysctl.c b/net/sctp/sysctl.c
> > > index 8e1e97be4df79f3245e2bbbeb0a75841abc67f58..ee3eac338a9deef064f273e29bb59b057835d3f1 100644
> > > --- a/net/sctp/sysctl.c
> > > +++ b/net/sctp/sysctl.c
> > > @@ -525,6 +525,8 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_auth(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
> > > return ret;
> > > }
> > >
> > > +static DEFINE_MUTEX(sctp_sysctl_mutex);
> > > +
> > > static int proc_sctp_do_udp_port(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
> > > void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
> > > {
> > > @@ -549,6 +551,7 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_udp_port(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
> > > if (new_value > max || new_value < min)
> > > return -EINVAL;
> > >
> > > + mutex_lock(&sctp_sysctl_mutex);
> > > net->sctp.udp_port = new_value;
> > > sctp_udp_sock_stop(net);
> > > if (new_value) {
> > > @@ -561,6 +564,7 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_udp_port(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
> > > lock_sock(sk);
> > > sctp_sk(sk)->udp_port = htons(net->sctp.udp_port);
> > > release_sock(sk);
> > > + mutex_unlock(&sctp_sysctl_mutex);
> > > }
> > >
> > > return ret;
> > > --
> > > 2.49.0.472.ge94155a9ec-goog
> > >
> > Instead of introducing a new lock for this, wouldn't be better to just
> > move up `lock_sock(sk)` a little bit?
>
> It depends if calling synchronize_rcu() two times while holding the
> socket lock is ok or not ?
hm, It doesn't sound normal, although this ctl_sock only handles the
out-of-blue packets.
>
> What is the issue about using a separate mutex ?
no issue, just don't want to introduce a new lock for this only.
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net] sctp: add mutual exclusion in proc_sctp_do_udp_port()
2025-03-31 18:50 ` David Laight
@ 2025-04-01 0:22 ` Xin Long
0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Xin Long @ 2025-04-01 0:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Laight
Cc: Eric Dumazet, David S . Miller, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni,
Simon Horman, netdev, eric.dumazet, syzbot+fae49d997eb56fa7c74d,
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner
On Mon, Mar 31, 2025 at 2:50 PM David Laight
<david.laight.linux@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, 31 Mar 2025 18:11:38 +0200
> Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> wrote:
>
> > On Mon, Mar 31, 2025 at 5:54 PM Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Mon, Mar 31, 2025 at 5:15 AM Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > We must serialize calls to sctp_udp_sock_stop() and sctp_udp_sock_start()
> > > > or risk a crash as syzbot reported:
> > > >
> > > > Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000d: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
> > > > KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000068-0x000000000000006f]
> > > > CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6551 Comm: syz.1.44 Not tainted 6.14.0-syzkaller-g7f2ff7b62617 #0 PREEMPT(full)
> > > > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025
> > > > RIP: 0010:kernel_sock_shutdown+0x47/0x70 net/socket.c:3653
> > > > Call Trace:
> > > > <TASK>
> > > > udp_tunnel_sock_release+0x68/0x80 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel_core.c:181
> > > > sctp_udp_sock_stop+0x71/0x160 net/sctp/protocol.c:930
> > > > proc_sctp_do_udp_port+0x264/0x450 net/sctp/sysctl.c:553
> > > > proc_sys_call_handler+0x3d0/0x5b0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:601
> > > > iter_file_splice_write+0x91c/0x1150 fs/splice.c:738
> > > > do_splice_from fs/splice.c:935 [inline]
> > > > direct_splice_actor+0x18f/0x6c0 fs/splice.c:1158
> > > > splice_direct_to_actor+0x342/0xa30 fs/splice.c:1102
> > > > do_splice_direct_actor fs/splice.c:1201 [inline]
> > > > do_splice_direct+0x174/0x240 fs/splice.c:1227
> > > > do_sendfile+0xafd/0xe50 fs/read_write.c:1368
> > > > __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1429 [inline]
> > > > __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1415 [inline]
> > > > __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1d8/0x220 fs/read_write.c:1415
> > > > do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
> > > >
> > > > Fixes: 046c052b475e ("sctp: enable udp tunneling socks")
> > > > Reported-by: syzbot+fae49d997eb56fa7c74d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> > > > Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/67ea5c01.050a0220.1547ec.012b.GAE@google.com/T/#u
> > > > Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
> > > > Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
> > > > Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
> > > > ---
> > > > net/sctp/sysctl.c | 4 ++++
> > > > 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
> > > >
> > > > diff --git a/net/sctp/sysctl.c b/net/sctp/sysctl.c
> > > > index 8e1e97be4df79f3245e2bbbeb0a75841abc67f58..ee3eac338a9deef064f273e29bb59b057835d3f1 100644
> > > > --- a/net/sctp/sysctl.c
> > > > +++ b/net/sctp/sysctl.c
> > > > @@ -525,6 +525,8 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_auth(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
> > > > return ret;
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > +static DEFINE_MUTEX(sctp_sysctl_mutex);
> > > > +
> > > > static int proc_sctp_do_udp_port(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
> > > > void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
> > > > {
> > > > @@ -549,6 +551,7 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_udp_port(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
> > > > if (new_value > max || new_value < min)
> > > > return -EINVAL;
> > > >
> > > > + mutex_lock(&sctp_sysctl_mutex);
> > > > net->sctp.udp_port = new_value;
> > > > sctp_udp_sock_stop(net);
> > > > if (new_value) {
> > > > @@ -561,6 +564,7 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_udp_port(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
> > > > lock_sock(sk);
> > > > sctp_sk(sk)->udp_port = htons(net->sctp.udp_port);
> > > > release_sock(sk);
> > > > + mutex_unlock(&sctp_sysctl_mutex);
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > return ret;
> > > > --
> > > > 2.49.0.472.ge94155a9ec-goog
> > > >
> > > Instead of introducing a new lock for this, wouldn't be better to just
> > > move up `lock_sock(sk)` a little bit?
> >
> > It depends if calling synchronize_rcu() two times while holding the
> > socket lock is ok or not ?
> >
> > What is the issue about using a separate mutex ?
> >
>
> Don't they need locking against a different path that is using the socket?
> Not only against concurrent accesses to the sysctl?
>
Hi Davide,
The lock is used to protect the variable 'net->sctp.udp4_sock', and there
are no other paths accessing it.
The udp socket is created to listen on a specific port for receiving only,
there's no need to access net->sctp.udp4_sock in sctp data path.
Thanks.
> Presuming the crash was because of the net->sctp.udp4_sock = NULL
> assignment in sock_stop(), if 'min' is zero allowing 'new_value' zero
> then the pointer is left NULL.
>
> IIRC sctp_sk(sk) is fixed, so the sock_lock() doesn't do much apart
> from stop some unlikely 'data tearing'.
>
> David
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net] sctp: add mutual exclusion in proc_sctp_do_udp_port()
2025-03-31 9:15 [PATCH net] sctp: add mutual exclusion in proc_sctp_do_udp_port() Eric Dumazet
2025-03-31 15:54 ` Xin Long
@ 2025-04-02 23:40 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
1 sibling, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: patchwork-bot+netdevbpf @ 2025-04-02 23:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric Dumazet
Cc: davem, kuba, pabeni, horms, netdev, eric.dumazet,
syzbot+fae49d997eb56fa7c74d, marcelo.leitner, lucien.xin
Hello:
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main)
by Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>:
On Mon, 31 Mar 2025 09:15:32 +0000 you wrote:
> We must serialize calls to sctp_udp_sock_stop() and sctp_udp_sock_start()
> or risk a crash as syzbot reported:
>
> Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000d: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
> KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000068-0x000000000000006f]
> CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6551 Comm: syz.1.44 Not tainted 6.14.0-syzkaller-g7f2ff7b62617 #0 PREEMPT(full)
> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025
> RIP: 0010:kernel_sock_shutdown+0x47/0x70 net/socket.c:3653
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> udp_tunnel_sock_release+0x68/0x80 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel_core.c:181
> sctp_udp_sock_stop+0x71/0x160 net/sctp/protocol.c:930
> proc_sctp_do_udp_port+0x264/0x450 net/sctp/sysctl.c:553
> proc_sys_call_handler+0x3d0/0x5b0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:601
> iter_file_splice_write+0x91c/0x1150 fs/splice.c:738
> do_splice_from fs/splice.c:935 [inline]
> direct_splice_actor+0x18f/0x6c0 fs/splice.c:1158
> splice_direct_to_actor+0x342/0xa30 fs/splice.c:1102
> do_splice_direct_actor fs/splice.c:1201 [inline]
> do_splice_direct+0x174/0x240 fs/splice.c:1227
> do_sendfile+0xafd/0xe50 fs/read_write.c:1368
> __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1429 [inline]
> __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1415 [inline]
> __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1d8/0x220 fs/read_write.c:1415
> do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
>
> [...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [net] sctp: add mutual exclusion in proc_sctp_do_udp_port()
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/10206302af85
You are awesome, thank you!
--
Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot.
https://korg.docs.kernel.org/patchwork/pwbot.html
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2025-04-02 23:39 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
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2025-03-31 9:15 [PATCH net] sctp: add mutual exclusion in proc_sctp_do_udp_port() Eric Dumazet
2025-03-31 15:54 ` Xin Long
2025-03-31 16:11 ` Eric Dumazet
2025-03-31 18:50 ` David Laight
2025-04-01 0:22 ` Xin Long
2025-04-01 0:15 ` Xin Long
2025-04-02 23:40 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
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