From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
To: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
"Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Cc: "Eduard Zingerman" <eddyz87@gmail.com>,
"Song Liu" <song@kernel.org>,
"Yonghong Song" <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
"KP Singh" <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
"Stanislav Fomichev" <sdf@fomichev.me>,
"Hao Luo" <haoluo@google.com>, "Jiri Olsa" <jolsa@kernel.org>,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Stephen Smalley" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
"Ondrej Mosnacek" <omosnace@redhat.com>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
"Kuniyuki Iwashima" <kuniyu@amazon.com>,
"Kuniyuki Iwashima" <kuni1840@gmail.com>,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v1 bpf-next 0/5] af_unix: Allow BPF LSM to scrub SCM_RIGHTS at sendmsg().
Date: Mon, 5 May 2025 14:56:45 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250505215802.48449-1-kuniyu@amazon.com> (raw)
As long as recvmsg() or recvmmsg() is used with cmsg, it is not
possible to avoid receiving file descriptors via SCM_RIGHTS.
This behaviour has occasionally been flagged as problematic.
For instance, as noted on the uAPI Group page [0], an untrusted peer
could send a file descriptor pointing to a hung NFS mount and then
close it. Once the receiver calls recvmsg() with msg_control, the
descriptor is automatically installed, and then the responsibility
for the final close() now falls on the receiver, which may result
in blocking the process for a long time.
systemd calls cmsg_close_all() [1] after each recvmsg() to close()
unwanted file descriptors sent via SCM_RIGHTS.
However, this cannot work around the issue because the last fput()
could occur on the receiver side once sendmsg() with SCM_RIGHTS
succeeds. Also, even filtering by LSM at recvmsg() does not work
for the same reason.
Thus, we need a better way to filter SCM_RIGHTS on the sender side.
This series allows BPF LSM to inspect skb at sendmsg() and scrub
SCM_RIGHTS fds by kfunc.
Link: https://uapi-group.org/kernel-features/#disabling-reception-of-scm_rights-for-af_unix-sockets #[0]
Link: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/v257.5/src/basic/fd-util.c#L612-L628 #[1]
Kuniyuki Iwashima (5):
af_unix: Call security_unix_may_send() in sendmsg() for all socket
types
af_unix: Pass skb to security_unix_may_send().
af_unix: Remove redundant scm->fp check in __scm_destroy().
bpf: Add kfunc to scrub SCM_RIGHTS at security_unix_may_send().
selftest: bpf: Add test for bpf_unix_scrub_fds().
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 3 +-
include/linux/security.h | 5 +-
include/net/af_unix.h | 1 +
include/net/scm.h | 5 +-
net/compat.c | 2 +-
net/core/filter.c | 19 ++-
net/core/scm.c | 19 +--
net/unix/af_unix.c | 48 ++++--
security/landlock/task.c | 6 +-
security/security.c | 5 +-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 6 +-
.../bpf/prog_tests/lsm_unix_may_send.c | 160 ++++++++++++++++++
.../selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_unix_may_send.c | 30 ++++
14 files changed, 282 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lsm_unix_may_send.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_unix_may_send.c
--
2.49.0
next reply other threads:[~2025-05-05 21:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-05-05 21:56 Kuniyuki Iwashima [this message]
2025-05-05 21:56 ` [PATCH v1 bpf-next 1/5] af_unix: Call security_unix_may_send() in sendmsg() for all socket types Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-05 21:56 ` [PATCH v1 bpf-next 2/5] af_unix: Pass skb to security_unix_may_send() Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-05 21:56 ` [PATCH v1 bpf-next 3/5] af_unix: Remove redundant scm->fp check in __scm_destroy() Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-09 14:13 ` kernel test robot
2025-05-05 21:56 ` [PATCH v1 bpf-next 4/5] bpf: Add kfunc to scrub SCM_RIGHTS at security_unix_may_send() Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-06 0:13 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-05-06 8:25 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-05-09 15:06 ` kernel test robot
2025-05-05 21:56 ` [PATCH v1 bpf-next 5/5] selftest: bpf: Add test for bpf_unix_scrub_fds() Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-05 22:49 ` [PATCH v1 bpf-next 0/5] af_unix: Allow BPF LSM to scrub SCM_RIGHTS at sendmsg() Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2025-05-06 0:21 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-06 16:25 ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2025-05-06 18:16 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-06 9:15 ` Christian Brauner
2025-05-06 16:08 ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2025-05-06 18:14 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-05 23:21 ` Paul Moore
2025-05-06 0:35 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-06 14:57 ` Paul Moore
2025-05-06 12:17 ` Lennart Poettering
2025-05-06 18:19 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
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