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From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
To: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
	"Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Cc: "Eduard Zingerman" <eddyz87@gmail.com>,
	"Song Liu" <song@kernel.org>,
	"Yonghong Song" <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
	"KP Singh" <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
	"Stanislav Fomichev" <sdf@fomichev.me>,
	"Hao Luo" <haoluo@google.com>, "Jiri Olsa" <jolsa@kernel.org>,
	"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Stephen Smalley" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	"Ondrej Mosnacek" <omosnace@redhat.com>,
	"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
	"Kuniyuki Iwashima" <kuniyu@amazon.com>,
	"Kuniyuki Iwashima" <kuni1840@gmail.com>,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v1 bpf-next 4/5] bpf: Add kfunc to scrub SCM_RIGHTS at security_unix_may_send().
Date: Mon, 5 May 2025 14:56:49 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250505215802.48449-5-kuniyu@amazon.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250505215802.48449-1-kuniyu@amazon.com>

As Christian Brauner said [0], systemd calls cmsg_close_all() [1] after
each recvmsg() to close() unwanted file descriptors sent via SCM_RIGHTS.

However, this cannot work around the issue that close() for unwanted file
descriptors could block longer because the last fput() could occur on
the receiver side once sendmsg() with SCM_RIGHTS succeeds.

Also, even filtering by LSM at recvmsg() does not work for the same reason.

Thus, we need a better way to filter SCM_RIGHTS on the sender side.

Let's add a new kfunc to scrub all file descriptors from skb in
sendmsg().

This allows the receiver to keep recv()ing the bare data and disallows
the sender to impose the potential slowness of the last fput().

If necessary, we can add more granular filtering per file descriptor
after refactoring GC code and adding some fd-to-file helpers for BPF.

Sample:

SEC("lsm/unix_may_send")
int BPF_PROG(unix_scrub_scm_rights,
             struct socket *sock, struct socket *other, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
        struct unix_skb_parms *cb;

        if (skb && bpf_unix_scrub_fds(skb))
                return -EPERM;

        return 0;
}

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20250502-fanden-unbeschadet-89973225255f@brauner/ #[0]
Link: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/v257.5/src/basic/fd-util.c#L612-L628 #[1]
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
---
 include/net/af_unix.h |  1 +
 net/core/filter.c     | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
 net/unix/af_unix.c    | 15 +++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
index 1af1841b7601..109f92df2de2 100644
--- a/include/net/af_unix.h
+++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
@@ -58,4 +58,5 @@ struct unix_sock {
 #define unix_state_lock(s)	spin_lock(&unix_sk(s)->lock)
 #define unix_state_unlock(s)	spin_unlock(&unix_sk(s)->lock)
 
+int unix_scrub_fds(struct sk_buff *skb);
 #endif
diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
index 79cab4d78dc3..a9c46584da10 100644
--- a/net/core/filter.c
+++ b/net/core/filter.c
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@
 #include <net/mptcp.h>
 #include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.h>
 #include <net/netkit.h>
-#include <linux/un.h>
+#include <net/af_unix.h>
 #include <net/xdp_sock_drv.h>
 #include <net/inet_dscp.h>
 
@@ -12153,6 +12153,11 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_sock_ops_enable_tx_tstamp(struct bpf_sock_ops_kern *skops,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_unix_scrub_fds(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return unix_scrub_fds(skb);
+}
+
 __bpf_kfunc_end_defs();
 
 int bpf_dynptr_from_skb_rdonly(struct __sk_buff *skb, u64 flags,
@@ -12190,6 +12195,10 @@ BTF_KFUNCS_START(bpf_kfunc_check_set_sock_ops)
 BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_sock_ops_enable_tx_tstamp, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
 BTF_KFUNCS_END(bpf_kfunc_check_set_sock_ops)
 
+BTF_KFUNCS_START(bpf_kfunc_check_set_scm_rights)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_unix_scrub_fds, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_KFUNCS_END(bpf_kfunc_check_set_scm_rights)
+
 static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set bpf_kfunc_set_skb = {
 	.owner = THIS_MODULE,
 	.set = &bpf_kfunc_check_set_skb,
@@ -12215,6 +12224,11 @@ static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set bpf_kfunc_set_sock_ops = {
 	.set = &bpf_kfunc_check_set_sock_ops,
 };
 
+static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set bpf_kfunc_set_scm_rights = {
+	.owner = THIS_MODULE,
+	.set = &bpf_kfunc_check_set_scm_rights,
+};
+
 static int __init bpf_kfunc_init(void)
 {
 	int ret;
@@ -12234,7 +12248,8 @@ static int __init bpf_kfunc_init(void)
 	ret = ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR,
 					       &bpf_kfunc_set_sock_addr);
 	ret = ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, &bpf_kfunc_set_tcp_reqsk);
-	return ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS, &bpf_kfunc_set_sock_ops);
+	ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS, &bpf_kfunc_set_sock_ops);
+	return ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, &bpf_kfunc_set_scm_rights);
 }
 late_initcall(bpf_kfunc_init);
 
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 692cce579c89..4c088316dfb7 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1885,6 +1885,21 @@ static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool sen
 	return err;
 }
 
+int unix_scrub_fds(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct scm_cookie scm = {};
+
+	if (skb->destructor != unix_destruct_scm)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (UNIXCB(skb).fp) {
+		unix_detach_fds(&scm, skb);
+		scm_fp_destroy(&scm);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static bool unix_passcred_enabled(const struct socket *sock,
 				  const struct sock *other)
 {
-- 
2.49.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-05-05 22:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-05-05 21:56 [PATCH v1 bpf-next 0/5] af_unix: Allow BPF LSM to scrub SCM_RIGHTS at sendmsg() Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-05 21:56 ` [PATCH v1 bpf-next 1/5] af_unix: Call security_unix_may_send() in sendmsg() for all socket types Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-05 21:56 ` [PATCH v1 bpf-next 2/5] af_unix: Pass skb to security_unix_may_send() Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-05 21:56 ` [PATCH v1 bpf-next 3/5] af_unix: Remove redundant scm->fp check in __scm_destroy() Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-09 14:13   ` kernel test robot
2025-05-05 21:56 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima [this message]
2025-05-06  0:13   ` [PATCH v1 bpf-next 4/5] bpf: Add kfunc to scrub SCM_RIGHTS at security_unix_may_send() Alexei Starovoitov
2025-05-06  8:25     ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-05-09 15:06   ` kernel test robot
2025-05-05 21:56 ` [PATCH v1 bpf-next 5/5] selftest: bpf: Add test for bpf_unix_scrub_fds() Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-05 22:49 ` [PATCH v1 bpf-next 0/5] af_unix: Allow BPF LSM to scrub SCM_RIGHTS at sendmsg() Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2025-05-06  0:21   ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-06 16:25     ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2025-05-06 18:16       ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-06  9:15   ` Christian Brauner
2025-05-06 16:08     ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2025-05-06 18:14       ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-05 23:21 ` Paul Moore
2025-05-06  0:35   ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-06 14:57     ` Paul Moore
2025-05-06 12:17 ` Lennart Poettering
2025-05-06 18:19   ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
     [not found] <CAADnVQK1t3ZqERODdHJM_HaZDMm+JH4OFvwTsLNqZG0=4SQQcA@mail.gmail.com.txt>
2025-05-06  0:44 ` [PATCH v1 bpf-next 4/5] bpf: Add kfunc to scrub SCM_RIGHTS at security_unix_may_send() Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-06  0:56   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-05-06  8:56     ` Christian Brauner

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