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From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
To: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
	Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>,
	Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuni1840@gmail.com>, <netdev@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v4 net-next 3/9] scm: Move scm_recv() from scm.h to scm.c.
Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 15:49:11 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250515224946.6931-4-kuniyu@amazon.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250515224946.6931-1-kuniyu@amazon.com>

scm_recv() has been placed in scm.h since the pre-git era for no
particular reason (I think), which makes the file really fragile.

For example, when you move SOCK_PASSCRED from include/linux/net.h to
enum sock_flags in include/net/sock.h, you will see weird build failure
due to terrible dependency.

To avoid the build failure in the future, let's move scm_recv(_unix())?
and its callees to scm.c.

Note that only scm_recv() needs to be exported for Bluetooth.

scm_send() should be moved to scm.c too, but I'll revisit later.

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
---
v3: Remove inline in scm.c
---
 include/net/scm.h | 121 ++-------------------------------------------
 net/core/scm.c    | 123 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 127 insertions(+), 117 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 22bb49589fde..84c4707e78a5 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -102,123 +102,10 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 	return __scm_send(sock, msg, scm);
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
-static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
-{
-	struct lsm_context ctx;
-	int err;
-
-	if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
-		err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &ctx);
-
-		if (err >= 0) {
-			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, ctx.len,
-				 ctx.context);
-			security_release_secctx(&ctx);
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-static inline bool scm_has_secdata(struct socket *sock)
-{
-	return test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags);
-}
-#else
-static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
-{ }
-
-static inline bool scm_has_secdata(struct socket *sock)
-{
-	return false;
-}
-#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
-
-static __inline__ void scm_pidfd_recv(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
-{
-	struct file *pidfd_file = NULL;
-	int len, pidfd;
-
-	/* put_cmsg() doesn't return an error if CMSG is truncated,
-	 * that's why we need to opencode these checks here.
-	 */
-	if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)
-		len = sizeof(struct compat_cmsghdr) + sizeof(int);
-	else
-		len = sizeof(struct cmsghdr) + sizeof(int);
-
-	if (msg->msg_controllen < len) {
-		msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
-		return;
-	}
-
-	if (!scm->pid)
-		return;
-
-	pidfd = pidfd_prepare(scm->pid, 0, &pidfd_file);
-
-	if (put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_PIDFD, sizeof(int), &pidfd)) {
-		if (pidfd_file) {
-			put_unused_fd(pidfd);
-			fput(pidfd_file);
-		}
-
-		return;
-	}
-
-	if (pidfd_file)
-		fd_install(pidfd, pidfd_file);
-}
-
-static inline bool __scm_recv_common(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
-				     struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags)
-{
-	if (!msg->msg_control) {
-		if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) ||
-		    test_bit(SOCK_PASSPIDFD, &sock->flags) ||
-		    scm->fp || scm_has_secdata(sock))
-			msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
-		scm_destroy(scm);
-		return false;
-	}
-
-	if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags)) {
-		struct user_namespace *current_ns = current_user_ns();
-		struct ucred ucreds = {
-			.pid = scm->creds.pid,
-			.uid = from_kuid_munged(current_ns, scm->creds.uid),
-			.gid = from_kgid_munged(current_ns, scm->creds.gid),
-		};
-		put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_CREDENTIALS, sizeof(ucreds), &ucreds);
-	}
-
-	scm_passec(sock, msg, scm);
-
-	if (scm->fp)
-		scm_detach_fds(msg, scm);
-
-	return true;
-}
-
-static inline void scm_recv(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
-			    struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags)
-{
-	if (!__scm_recv_common(sock, msg, scm, flags))
-		return;
-
-	scm_destroy_cred(scm);
-}
-
-static inline void scm_recv_unix(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
-				 struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags)
-{
-	if (!__scm_recv_common(sock, msg, scm, flags))
-		return;
-
-	if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSPIDFD, &sock->flags))
-		scm_pidfd_recv(msg, scm);
-
-	scm_destroy_cred(scm);
-}
+void scm_recv(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+	      struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags);
+void scm_recv_unix(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+		   struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags);
 
 static inline int scm_recv_one_fd(struct file *f, int __user *ufd,
 				  unsigned int flags)
diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
index 733c0cbd393d..66e02b18c359 100644
--- a/net/core/scm.c
+++ b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -404,3 +404,126 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl)
 	return new_fpl;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(scm_fp_dup);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+static void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
+{
+	struct lsm_context ctx;
+	int err;
+
+	if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
+		err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &ctx);
+
+		if (err >= 0) {
+			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, ctx.len,
+				 ctx.context);
+
+			security_release_secctx(&ctx);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static bool scm_has_secdata(struct socket *sock)
+{
+	return test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags);
+}
+#else
+static void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
+{
+}
+
+static bool scm_has_secdata(struct socket *sock)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void scm_pidfd_recv(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
+{
+	struct file *pidfd_file = NULL;
+	int len, pidfd;
+
+	/* put_cmsg() doesn't return an error if CMSG is truncated,
+	 * that's why we need to opencode these checks here.
+	 */
+	if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)
+		len = sizeof(struct compat_cmsghdr) + sizeof(int);
+	else
+		len = sizeof(struct cmsghdr) + sizeof(int);
+
+	if (msg->msg_controllen < len) {
+		msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (!scm->pid)
+		return;
+
+	pidfd = pidfd_prepare(scm->pid, 0, &pidfd_file);
+
+	if (put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_PIDFD, sizeof(int), &pidfd)) {
+		if (pidfd_file) {
+			put_unused_fd(pidfd);
+			fput(pidfd_file);
+		}
+
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (pidfd_file)
+		fd_install(pidfd, pidfd_file);
+}
+
+static bool __scm_recv_common(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+			      struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags)
+{
+	if (!msg->msg_control) {
+		if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) ||
+		    test_bit(SOCK_PASSPIDFD, &sock->flags) ||
+		    scm->fp || scm_has_secdata(sock))
+			msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
+
+		scm_destroy(scm);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags)) {
+		struct user_namespace *current_ns = current_user_ns();
+		struct ucred ucreds = {
+			.pid = scm->creds.pid,
+			.uid = from_kuid_munged(current_ns, scm->creds.uid),
+			.gid = from_kgid_munged(current_ns, scm->creds.gid),
+		};
+
+		put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_CREDENTIALS, sizeof(ucreds), &ucreds);
+	}
+
+	scm_passec(sock, msg, scm);
+
+	if (scm->fp)
+		scm_detach_fds(msg, scm);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+void scm_recv(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+	      struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags)
+{
+	if (!__scm_recv_common(sock, msg, scm, flags))
+		return;
+
+	scm_destroy_cred(scm);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(scm_recv);
+
+void scm_recv_unix(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+		   struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags)
+{
+	if (!__scm_recv_common(sock, msg, scm, flags))
+		return;
+
+	if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSPIDFD, &sock->flags))
+		scm_pidfd_recv(msg, scm);
+
+	scm_destroy_cred(scm);
+}
-- 
2.49.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-05-15 22:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-05-15 22:49 [PATCH v4 net-next 0/9] af_unix: Introduce SO_PASSRIGHTS Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 22:49 ` [PATCH v4 net-next 1/9] af_unix: Factorise test_bit() for SOCK_PASSCRED and SOCK_PASSPIDFD Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-16 16:28   ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-15 22:49 ` [PATCH v4 net-next 2/9] af_unix: Don't pass struct socket to maybe_add_creds() Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 22:49 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima [this message]
2025-05-15 22:49 ` [PATCH v4 net-next 4/9] tcp: Restrict SO_TXREHASH to TCP socket Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 22:49 ` [PATCH v4 net-next 5/9] net: Restrict SO_PASS{CRED,PIDFD,SEC} to AF_{UNIX,NETLINK,BLUETOOTH} Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 22:49 ` [PATCH v4 net-next 6/9] af_unix: Move SOCK_PASS{CRED,PIDFD,SEC} to struct sock Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-16 16:29   ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-15 22:49 ` [PATCH v4 net-next 7/9] af_unix: Inherit sk_flags at connect() Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-16 16:47   ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-16 17:22     ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-16 19:27       ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-16 20:54         ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-16 21:09           ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-16 21:13             ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 22:49 ` [PATCH v4 net-next 8/9] af_unix: Introduce SO_PASSRIGHTS Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-16 16:30   ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-15 22:49 ` [PATCH v4 net-next 9/9] selftest: af_unix: Test SO_PASSRIGHTS Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-16 16:30   ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-19 14:00 ` [PATCH v4 net-next 0/9] af_unix: Introduce SO_PASSRIGHTS Jakub Kicinski
2025-05-19 17:09   ` Kuniyuki Iwashima

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