Re: [PATCH v7 5/9] pidfs, coredump: add PIDFD_INFO_COREDUMP

Jann Horn
2025-05-15T21:38:16Z

On Thu, May 15, 2025 at 10:56 PM Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> wrote:
> On Thu, May 15, 2025 at 12:04 AM Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> wrote:
> > Extend the PIDFD_INFO_COREDUMP ioctl() with the new PIDFD_INFO_COREDUMP
> > mask flag. This adds the fields @coredump_mask and @coredump_cookie to
> > struct pidfd_info.
>
> FWIW, now that you're using path-based sockets and override_creds(),
> one option may be to drop this patch and say "if you don't want
> untrusted processes to directly connect to the coredumping socket,
> just set the listening socket to mode 0000 or mode 0600"...

Er, forget I said that, of course we'd still want to have at least the
@coredump_mask.

> > Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
> [...]
> > diff --git a/fs/coredump.c b/fs/coredump.c
> > index e1256ebb89c1..bfc4a32f737c 100644
> > --- a/fs/coredump.c
> > +++ b/fs/coredump.c
> [...]
> > @@ -876,8 +880,34 @@ void do_coredump(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo)
> > goto close_fail;
> > }
> >
> > + /*
> > + * Set the thread-group leader pid which is used for the
> > + * peer credentials during connect() below. Then
> > + * immediately register it in pidfs...
> > + */
> > + cprm.pid = task_tgid(current);
> > + retval = pidfs_register_pid(cprm.pid);
> > + if (retval) {
> > + sock_release(socket);
> > + goto close_fail;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * ... and set the coredump information so userspace
> > + * has it available after connect()...
> > + */
> > + pidfs_coredump(&cprm);
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * ... On connect() the peer credentials are recorded
> > + * and @cprm.pid registered in pidfs...
>
> I don't understand this comment. Wasn't "@cprm.pid registered in
> pidfs" above with the explicit `pidfs_register_pid(cprm.pid)`?
>
> > + */
> > retval = kernel_connect(socket, (struct sockaddr *)(&addr),
> > addr_len, O_NONBLOCK | SOCK_COREDUMP);
> > +
> > + /* ... So we can safely put our pidfs reference now... */
> > + pidfs_put_pid(cprm.pid);
>
> Why can we safely put the pidfs reference now but couldn't do it
> before the kernel_connect()? Does the kernel_connect() look up this
> pidfs entry by calling something like pidfs_alloc_file()? Or does that
> only happen later on, when the peer does getsockopt(SO_PEERPIDFD)?
>
> > if (retval) {
> > if (retval == -EAGAIN)
> > coredump_report_failure("Coredump socket %s receive queue full", addr.sun_path);
> [...]
> > diff --git a/fs/pidfs.c b/fs/pidfs.c
> > index 3b39e471840b..d7b9a0dd2db6 100644
> > --- a/fs/pidfs.c
> > +++ b/fs/pidfs.c
> [...]
> > @@ -280,6 +299,13 @@ static long pidfd_info(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
> > }
> > }
> >
> > + if (mask & PIDFD_INFO_COREDUMP) {
> > + kinfo.mask |= PIDFD_INFO_COREDUMP;
> > + smp_rmb();
>
> I assume I would regret it if I asked what these barriers are for,
> because the answer is something terrifying about how we otherwise
> don't have a guarantee that memory accesses can't be reordered between
> multiple subsequent syscalls or something like that?
>
> checkpatch complains about the lack of comments on these memory barriers.
>
> > + kinfo.coredump_cookie = READ_ONCE(pidfs_i(inode)->__pei.coredump_cookie);
> > + kinfo.coredump_mask = READ_ONCE(pidfs_i(inode)->__pei.coredump_mask);
> > + }
> > +
> > task = get_pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID);
> > if (!task) {
> > /*
> [...]
> > diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> > index a9d1c9ba2961..053d2e48e918 100644
> > --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
> > +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> [...]
> > @@ -742,6 +743,7 @@ static void unix_release_sock(struct sock *sk, int embrion)
> >
> > struct unix_peercred {
> > struct pid *peer_pid;
> > + u64 cookie;
>
> Maybe add a comment here documenting that for now, this is assumed to
> be used exclusively for coredump sockets.
>
>
> > const struct cred *peer_cred;
> > };
> >