From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
To: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: paul@paul-moore.com, omosnace@redhat.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
horms@kernel.org,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 11/42] selinux: add limits for SELinux namespaces
Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2025 09:26:02 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250814132637.1659-12-stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250814132637.1659-1-stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Add maxns and maxnsdepth limits for SELinux namespaces
to enable control over the max number of SELinux namespaces
and the max depth to which one can nest SELinux namespaces.
Provide Kconfig options to control the default values for both
limits, and allow them to be overridden via selinuxfs in the
init SELinux namespace only.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
---
security/selinux/Kconfig | 18 ++++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 18 +++-
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +-
security/selinux/include/security.h | 6 +-
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 129 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 169 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
index 61abc1e094a8..82db54462253 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
@@ -87,3 +87,21 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
echo -n 'file "security/selinux/*" +p' > \
/proc/dynamic_debug/control
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_MAXNS
+ int "SELinux default maximum number of namespaces"
+ depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+ range 0 65535
+ default 65535
+ help
+ This option sets the default maximum number of SELinux namespaces.
+ The value may be viewed or modified via /sys/fs/selinux/maxns.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_MAXNSDEPTH
+ int "SELinux default maximum depth of namespaces"
+ depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+ range 0 32
+ default 32
+ help
+ This option sets the default maximum depth of SELinux namespaces.
+ The value may be viewed or modified via /sys/fs/selinux/maxnsdepth.
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 65d9762b992a..739f58b134ed 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -7802,12 +7802,23 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
static void selinux_state_free(struct work_struct *work);
+unsigned int selinux_maxns = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_MAXNS;
+unsigned int selinux_maxnsdepth = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_MAXNSDEPTH;
+
+static atomic_t selinux_nsnum = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
int selinux_state_create(struct selinux_state *parent,
struct selinux_state **state)
{
struct selinux_state *newstate;
int rc;
+ if (atomic_read(&selinux_nsnum) >= selinux_maxns)
+ return -ENOSPC;
+
+ if (parent && parent->depth >= selinux_maxnsdepth)
+ return -ENOSPC;
+
newstate = kzalloc(sizeof(*newstate), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!newstate)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -7822,8 +7833,12 @@ int selinux_state_create(struct selinux_state *parent,
if (rc)
goto err;
- if (parent)
+ if (parent) {
newstate->parent = get_selinux_state(parent);
+ newstate->depth = parent->depth + 1;
+ }
+
+ atomic_inc(&selinux_nsnum);
*state = newstate;
return 0;
@@ -7843,6 +7858,7 @@ static void selinux_state_free(struct work_struct *work)
__free_page(state->status_page);
selinux_state_policy_free(state);
selinux_avc_free(state->avc);
+ atomic_dec(&selinux_nsnum);
kfree(state);
state = parent;
} while (state && refcount_dec_and_test(&state->count));
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 55903f68e285..be52ebb6b94a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ const struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
{ "compute_av", "compute_create", "compute_member", "check_context",
"load_policy", "compute_relabel", "compute_user", "setenforce",
"setbool", "setsecparam", "setcheckreqprot", "read_policy",
- "validate_trans", "unshare", NULL } },
+ "validate_trans", "unshare", "setmaxns", "setmaxnsdepth", NULL } },
{ "process",
{ "fork", "transition", "sigchld", "sigkill",
"sigstop", "signull", "signal", "ptrace",
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index c4a0766aa24e..d8312a39a265 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -111,8 +111,12 @@ struct selinux_state {
refcount_t count;
struct work_struct work;
+ unsigned short depth;
} __randomize_layout;
+extern struct selinux_state *init_selinux_state;
+
+extern unsigned int selinux_maxns, selinux_maxnsdepth;
int selinux_state_create(struct selinux_state *parent,
struct selinux_state **state);
void __put_selinux_state(struct selinux_state *state);
@@ -136,8 +140,6 @@ get_selinux_state(struct selinux_state *state)
return state;
}
-extern struct selinux_state *init_selinux_state;
-
struct avdc_entry {
u32 isid; /* inode SID */
u32 allowed; /* allowed permission bitmask */
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 70dc9fb3269e..06e2aeb478cd 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ enum sel_inos {
SEL_POLICY, /* allow userspace to read the in kernel policy */
SEL_VALIDATE_TRANS, /* compute validatetrans decision */
SEL_UNSHARE, /* unshare selinux namespace */
+ SEL_MAXNS, /* maximum number of SELinux namespaces */
+ SEL_MAXNSDEPTH, /* maximum depth of SELinux namespaces */
SEL_INO_NEXT, /* The next inode number to use */
};
@@ -383,6 +385,131 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_unshare_ops = {
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
+static ssize_t sel_read_maxns(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t length;
+
+ length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", selinux_maxns);
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_maxns(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+
+{
+ struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+ struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
+ char *page = NULL;
+ ssize_t length;
+
+ /*
+ * Only permit setting from the init SELinux namespace, and only
+ * on the init SELinux namespace.
+ */
+ if (current_selinux_state != init_selinux_state ||
+ state != init_selinux_state)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ length = avc_has_perm(current_selinux_state,
+ current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETMAXNS,
+ NULL);
+ if (length)
+ return length;
+
+ if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+ if (IS_ERR(page))
+ return PTR_ERR(page);
+
+ length = kstrtouint(page, 0, &selinux_maxns);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = count;
+out:
+ kfree(page);
+ return length;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_maxns_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_maxns,
+ .write = sel_write_maxns,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_maxnsdepth(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t length;
+
+ length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", selinux_maxnsdepth);
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_maxnsdepth(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+
+{
+ struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+ struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
+ char *page = NULL;
+ ssize_t length;
+
+ /*
+ * Only permit setting from the init SELinux namespace, and only
+ * on the init SELinux namespace.
+ */
+ if (current_selinux_state != init_selinux_state ||
+ state != init_selinux_state)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ length = avc_has_perm(current_selinux_state,
+ current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETMAXNSDEPTH,
+ NULL);
+ if (length)
+ return length;
+
+ if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+ if (IS_ERR(page))
+ return PTR_ERR(page);
+
+ length = kstrtouint(page, 0, &selinux_maxnsdepth);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = count;
+out:
+ kfree(page);
+ return length;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_maxnsdepth_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_maxnsdepth,
+ .write = sel_write_maxnsdepth,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+
static ssize_t sel_read_policyvers(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
@@ -2119,6 +2246,8 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
[SEL_VALIDATE_TRANS] = {"validatetrans", &sel_transition_ops,
S_IWUGO},
[SEL_UNSHARE] = {"unshare", &sel_unshare_ops, 0200},
+ [SEL_MAXNS] = {"maxns", &sel_maxns_ops, 0600},
+ [SEL_MAXNSDEPTH] = {"maxnsdepth", &sel_maxnsdepth_ops, 0600},
/* last one */ {"", NULL, 0}
};
--
2.50.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-08-14 13:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-08-14 13:25 [PATCH v7 00/42] SELinux namespace support Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:25 ` [PATCH v7 01/42] selinux: restore passing of selinux_state Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:25 ` [PATCH v7 02/42] selinux: introduce current_selinux_state Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:25 ` [PATCH v7 03/42] selinux: support multiple selinuxfs instances Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:25 ` [PATCH v7 04/42] selinux: dynamically allocate selinux namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:25 ` [PATCH v7 05/42] netstate,selinux: create the selinux netlink socket per network namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:25 ` [PATCH v7 06/42] selinux: limit selinux netlink notifications to init namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:25 ` [PATCH v7 07/42] selinux: support per-task/cred selinux namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:25 ` [PATCH v7 08/42] selinux: introduce cred_selinux_state() and use it Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 09/42] selinux: init inode from nearest initialized namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 10/42] selinux: add a selinuxfs interface to unshare selinux namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 12/42] selinux: exempt creation of init SELinux namespace from limits Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 13/42] selinux: refactor selinux_state_create() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 14/42] selinux: allow userspace to detect non-init SELinux namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 15/42] selinuxfs: restrict write operations to the same selinux namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 16/42] selinux: introduce a global SID table Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 17/42] selinux: wrap security server interfaces to use the " Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 18/42] selinux: introduce a Kconfig option for SELinux namespaces Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 19/42] selinux: eliminate global SID table if !CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_NS Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 20/42] selinux: maintain a small cache in the global SID table Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 21/42] selinux: update hook functions to use correct selinux namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 22/42] selinux: introduce cred_task_has_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 23/42] selinux: introduce cred_has_extended_perms() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 24/42] selinux: introduce cred_self_has_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 25/42] selinux: introduce cred_has_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 26/42] selinux: introduce cred_ssid_has_perm() and cred_other_has_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 27/42] selinux: introduce task_obj_has_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 28/42] selinux: update bprm hooks for selinux namespaces Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 29/42] selinux: add kerneldoc to new permission checking functions Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 30/42] selinux: convert selinux_file_send_sigiotask() to namespace-aware helper Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 31/42] selinux: rename cred_has_perm*() to cred_tsid_has_perm*() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 32/42] selinux: update cred_tsid_has_perm_noaudit() to return the combined avd Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 33/42] selinux: convert additional checks to cred_ssid_has_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 34/42] selinux: introduce selinux_state_has_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 35/42] selinux: annotate selinuxfs permission checks Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 36/42] selinux: annotate process transition " Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 37/42] selinux: convert xfrm and netlabel " Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 38/42] selinux: switch selinux_lsm_setattr() checks to current namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 39/42] selinux: make open_perms namespace-aware Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 40/42] selinux: split cred_ssid_has_perm() into two cases Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 41/42] selinux: convert nlmsg_sock_has_extended_perms() to namespace-aware Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 42/42] selinux: disallow writes to /sys/fs/selinux/user in non-init namespaces Stephen Smalley
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