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From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
To: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: paul@paul-moore.com, omosnace@redhat.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	horms@kernel.org,
	Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 33/42] selinux: convert additional checks to cred_ssid_has_perm()
Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2025 09:26:24 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250814132637.1659-34-stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250814132637.1659-1-stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>

Convert additional permission checks in the hook functions to
use the namespace-aware cred_ssid_has_perm() helper function.

In particular, the following hook functions are updated:
selinux_socket_bind()
selinux_socket_connect_helper()
selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect()
selinux_socket_unix_may_send()
selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv()

In each of these cases, the check is between two object SIDs
and does not use the current cred SID.

selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv() may bear revisiting since the
source SID is the SID of the receiving task (not current).
An alternative would be to use the receiving task's cred
and the cred_tsid_has_perm() helper for these checks.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index f229a8099167..71ccd86c5303 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4938,6 +4938,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
 
 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 {
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 	u16 family;
@@ -5019,10 +5020,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 						      snum, &sid);
 				if (err)
 					goto out;
-				err = avc_has_perm(current_selinux_state,
-						   sksec->sid, sid,
-						   sksec->sclass,
-						   SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
+				err = cred_ssid_has_perm(cred, sksec->sid,
+							 sid, sksec->sclass,
+							 SOCKET__NAME_BIND,
+							 &ad);
 				if (err)
 					goto out;
 			}
@@ -5056,9 +5057,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 		else
 			ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
 
-		err = avc_has_perm(current_selinux_state,
-				   sksec->sid, sid,
-				   sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
+		err = cred_ssid_has_perm(cred, sksec->sid, sid,
+					 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
 		if (err)
 			goto out;
 	}
@@ -5077,6 +5077,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
 					 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 {
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 	int err;
@@ -5151,8 +5152,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
 		ad.u.net = &net;
 		ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
 		ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family;
-		err = avc_has_perm(current_selinux_state,
-				   sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
+		err = cred_ssid_has_perm(cred, sksec->sid, sid,
+					 sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 	}
@@ -5253,6 +5254,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
 					      struct sock *other,
 					      struct sock *newsk)
 {
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = selinux_sock(sock);
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = selinux_sock(other);
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = selinux_sock(newsk);
@@ -5262,10 +5264,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
 
 	ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, other);
 
-	err = avc_has_perm(current_selinux_state,
-			   sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
-			   sksec_other->sclass,
-			   UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
+	err = cred_ssid_has_perm(cred, sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
+				 sksec_other->sclass,
+				 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
@@ -5285,6 +5286,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
 					struct socket *other)
 {
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct sk_security_struct *ssec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
 	struct sk_security_struct *osec = selinux_sock(other->sk);
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -5292,9 +5294,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
 
 	ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, other->sk);
 
-	return avc_has_perm(current_selinux_state,
-			    ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
-			    &ad);
+	return cred_ssid_has_perm(cred, ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass,
+				  SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct selinux_state *state,
@@ -6417,6 +6418,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *m
 				    struct task_struct *target,
 				    long type, int mode)
 {
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
 	struct msg_security_struct *msec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -6429,13 +6431,11 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *m
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(current_selinux_state,
-			  sid, isec->sid,
-			  SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
+	rc = cred_ssid_has_perm(cred, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+				MSGQ__READ, &ad);
 	if (!rc)
-		rc = avc_has_perm(current_selinux_state,
-				  sid, msec->sid,
-				  SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
+		rc = cred_ssid_has_perm(cred, sid, msec->sid,
+					SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
 	return rc;
 }
 
-- 
2.50.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-08-14 13:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-08-14 13:25 [PATCH v7 00/42] SELinux namespace support Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:25 ` [PATCH v7 01/42] selinux: restore passing of selinux_state Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:25 ` [PATCH v7 02/42] selinux: introduce current_selinux_state Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:25 ` [PATCH v7 03/42] selinux: support multiple selinuxfs instances Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:25 ` [PATCH v7 04/42] selinux: dynamically allocate selinux namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:25 ` [PATCH v7 05/42] netstate,selinux: create the selinux netlink socket per network namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:25 ` [PATCH v7 06/42] selinux: limit selinux netlink notifications to init namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:25 ` [PATCH v7 07/42] selinux: support per-task/cred selinux namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:25 ` [PATCH v7 08/42] selinux: introduce cred_selinux_state() and use it Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 09/42] selinux: init inode from nearest initialized namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 10/42] selinux: add a selinuxfs interface to unshare selinux namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 11/42] selinux: add limits for SELinux namespaces Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 12/42] selinux: exempt creation of init SELinux namespace from limits Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 13/42] selinux: refactor selinux_state_create() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 14/42] selinux: allow userspace to detect non-init SELinux namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 15/42] selinuxfs: restrict write operations to the same selinux namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 16/42] selinux: introduce a global SID table Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 17/42] selinux: wrap security server interfaces to use the " Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 18/42] selinux: introduce a Kconfig option for SELinux namespaces Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 19/42] selinux: eliminate global SID table if !CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_NS Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 20/42] selinux: maintain a small cache in the global SID table Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 21/42] selinux: update hook functions to use correct selinux namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 22/42] selinux: introduce cred_task_has_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 23/42] selinux: introduce cred_has_extended_perms() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 24/42] selinux: introduce cred_self_has_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 25/42] selinux: introduce cred_has_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 26/42] selinux: introduce cred_ssid_has_perm() and cred_other_has_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 27/42] selinux: introduce task_obj_has_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 28/42] selinux: update bprm hooks for selinux namespaces Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 29/42] selinux: add kerneldoc to new permission checking functions Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 30/42] selinux: convert selinux_file_send_sigiotask() to namespace-aware helper Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 31/42] selinux: rename cred_has_perm*() to cred_tsid_has_perm*() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 32/42] selinux: update cred_tsid_has_perm_noaudit() to return the combined avd Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 34/42] selinux: introduce selinux_state_has_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 35/42] selinux: annotate selinuxfs permission checks Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 36/42] selinux: annotate process transition " Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 37/42] selinux: convert xfrm and netlabel " Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 38/42] selinux: switch selinux_lsm_setattr() checks to current namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 39/42] selinux: make open_perms namespace-aware Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 40/42] selinux: split cred_ssid_has_perm() into two cases Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 41/42] selinux: convert nlmsg_sock_has_extended_perms() to namespace-aware Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 42/42] selinux: disallow writes to /sys/fs/selinux/user in non-init namespaces Stephen Smalley

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