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From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
To: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: paul@paul-moore.com, omosnace@redhat.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	horms@kernel.org,
	Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 05/42] netstate,selinux: create the selinux netlink socket per network namespace
Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2025 09:25:56 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250814132637.1659-6-stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250814132637.1659-1-stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>

The selinux netlink socket is used to notify userspace of changes to
the enforcing mode and policy reloads.  At present, these notifications
are always sent to the initial network namespace.  In order to support
multiple selinux namespaces, each with its own enforcing mode and
policy, we need to create and use a separate selinux netlink socket
for each network namespace.

Without this change, a policy reload in a child selinux namespace
causes a notification to be sent to processes in the init namespace
with a sequence number that may be higher than the policy sequence
number for that namespace.  As a result, userspace AVC instances in
the init namespace will then end up rejecting any further access
vector results from its own security server instance due to the
policy sequence number appearing to regress, which in turn causes
all subsequent uncached access checks to fail.  Similarly,
without this change, changing enforcing mode in the child selinux
namespace triggers a notification to all userspace AVC instances
in the init namespace that will switch their enforcing modes.

This change does alter SELinux behavior, since previously reloading
policy or changing enforcing mode in a non-init network namespace would
trigger a notification to processes in the init network namespace.
However, this behavior is not being relied upon by existing userspace
AFAICT and is arguably wrong regardless.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
---
 include/net/net_namespace.h |  3 +++
 security/selinux/netlink.c  | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/net_namespace.h b/include/net/net_namespace.h
index 025a7574b275..06f2501ad9a9 100644
--- a/include/net/net_namespace.h
+++ b/include/net/net_namespace.h
@@ -196,6 +196,9 @@ struct net {
 	/* Move to a better place when the config guard is removed. */
 	struct mutex		rtnl_mutex;
 #endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)
+	struct sock		*selnl;
+#endif
 } __randomize_layout;
 
 #include <linux/seq_file_net.h>
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlink.c b/security/selinux/netlink.c
index 1760aee712fd..03678a76f4bb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlink.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlink.c
@@ -19,8 +19,6 @@
 
 #include "security.h"
 
-static struct sock *selnl __ro_after_init;
-
 static int selnl_msglen(int msgtype)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
@@ -66,6 +64,7 @@ static void selnl_add_payload(struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int len, int msgtype, void *
 
 static void selnl_notify(int msgtype, void *data)
 {
+	struct sock *selnl = current->nsproxy->net_ns->selnl;
 	int len;
 	sk_buff_data_t tmp;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
@@ -105,16 +104,36 @@ void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno)
 	selnl_notify(SELNL_MSG_POLICYLOAD, &seqno);
 }
 
-static int __init selnl_init(void)
+static int __net_init selnl_net_init(struct net *net)
 {
+	struct sock *sk;
 	struct netlink_kernel_cfg cfg = {
 		.groups	= SELNLGRP_MAX,
 		.flags	= NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV,
 	};
 
-	selnl = netlink_kernel_create(&init_net, NETLINK_SELINUX, &cfg);
-	if (selnl == NULL)
-		panic("SELinux:  Cannot create netlink socket.");
+	sk = netlink_kernel_create(net, NETLINK_SELINUX, &cfg);
+	if (!sk)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	net->selnl = sk;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void __net_exit selnl_net_exit(struct net *net)
+{
+	netlink_kernel_release(net->selnl);
+	net->selnl = NULL;
+}
+
+static struct pernet_operations selnl_net_ops = {
+	.init = selnl_net_init,
+	.exit = selnl_net_exit,
+};
+
+static int __init selnl_init(void)
+{
+	if (register_pernet_subsys(&selnl_net_ops))
+		panic("Could not register selinux netlink operations\n");
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
2.50.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-08-14 13:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-08-14 13:25 [PATCH v7 00/42] SELinux namespace support Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:25 ` [PATCH v7 01/42] selinux: restore passing of selinux_state Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:25 ` [PATCH v7 02/42] selinux: introduce current_selinux_state Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:25 ` [PATCH v7 03/42] selinux: support multiple selinuxfs instances Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:25 ` [PATCH v7 04/42] selinux: dynamically allocate selinux namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:25 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2025-08-14 13:25 ` [PATCH v7 06/42] selinux: limit selinux netlink notifications to init namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:25 ` [PATCH v7 07/42] selinux: support per-task/cred selinux namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:25 ` [PATCH v7 08/42] selinux: introduce cred_selinux_state() and use it Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 09/42] selinux: init inode from nearest initialized namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 10/42] selinux: add a selinuxfs interface to unshare selinux namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 11/42] selinux: add limits for SELinux namespaces Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 12/42] selinux: exempt creation of init SELinux namespace from limits Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 13/42] selinux: refactor selinux_state_create() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 14/42] selinux: allow userspace to detect non-init SELinux namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 15/42] selinuxfs: restrict write operations to the same selinux namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 16/42] selinux: introduce a global SID table Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 17/42] selinux: wrap security server interfaces to use the " Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 18/42] selinux: introduce a Kconfig option for SELinux namespaces Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 19/42] selinux: eliminate global SID table if !CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_NS Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 20/42] selinux: maintain a small cache in the global SID table Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 21/42] selinux: update hook functions to use correct selinux namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 22/42] selinux: introduce cred_task_has_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 23/42] selinux: introduce cred_has_extended_perms() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 24/42] selinux: introduce cred_self_has_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 25/42] selinux: introduce cred_has_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 26/42] selinux: introduce cred_ssid_has_perm() and cred_other_has_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 27/42] selinux: introduce task_obj_has_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 28/42] selinux: update bprm hooks for selinux namespaces Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 29/42] selinux: add kerneldoc to new permission checking functions Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 30/42] selinux: convert selinux_file_send_sigiotask() to namespace-aware helper Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 31/42] selinux: rename cred_has_perm*() to cred_tsid_has_perm*() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 32/42] selinux: update cred_tsid_has_perm_noaudit() to return the combined avd Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 33/42] selinux: convert additional checks to cred_ssid_has_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 34/42] selinux: introduce selinux_state_has_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 35/42] selinux: annotate selinuxfs permission checks Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 36/42] selinux: annotate process transition " Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 37/42] selinux: convert xfrm and netlabel " Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 38/42] selinux: switch selinux_lsm_setattr() checks to current namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 39/42] selinux: make open_perms namespace-aware Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 40/42] selinux: split cred_ssid_has_perm() into two cases Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 41/42] selinux: convert nlmsg_sock_has_extended_perms() to namespace-aware Stephen Smalley
2025-08-14 13:26 ` [PATCH v7 42/42] selinux: disallow writes to /sys/fs/selinux/user in non-init namespaces Stephen Smalley

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