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From: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: davem@davemloft.net, kuba@kernel.org, linux-can@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel@pengutronix.de, Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org>,
	Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Subject: [PATCH net 5/7] can: sun4i_can: populate ndo_change_mtu() to prevent buffer overflow
Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2025 09:32:51 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250923073427.493034-6-mkl@pengutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250923073427.493034-1-mkl@pengutronix.de>

From: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org>

Sending an PF_PACKET allows to bypass the CAN framework logic and to
directly reach the xmit() function of a CAN driver. The only check
which is performed by the PF_PACKET framework is to make sure that
skb->len fits the interface's MTU.

Unfortunately, because the sun4i_can driver does not populate its
net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu(), it is possible for an attacker to
configure an invalid MTU by doing, for example:

  $ ip link set can0 mtu 9999

After doing so, the attacker could open a PF_PACKET socket using the
ETH_P_CANXL protocol:

	socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_CANXL))

to inject a malicious CAN XL frames. For example:

	struct canxl_frame frame = {
		.flags = 0xff,
		.len = 2048,
	};

The CAN drivers' xmit() function are calling can_dev_dropped_skb() to
check that the skb is valid, unfortunately under above conditions, the
malicious packet is able to go through can_dev_dropped_skb() checks:

  1. the skb->protocol is set to ETH_P_CANXL which is valid (the
     function does not check the actual device capabilities).

  2. the length is a valid CAN XL length.

And so, sun4ican_start_xmit() receives a CAN XL frame which it is not
able to correctly handle and will thus misinterpret it as a CAN frame.

This can result in a buffer overflow. The driver will consume cf->len
as-is with no further checks on this line:

	dlc = cf->len;

Here, cf->len corresponds to the flags field of the CAN XL frame. In
our previous example, we set canxl_frame->flags to 0xff. Because the
maximum expected length is 8, a buffer overflow of 247 bytes occurs a
couple line below when doing:

	for (i = 0; i < dlc; i++)
		writel(cf->data[i], priv->base + (dreg + i * 4));

Populate net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu() to ensure that the
interface's MTU can not be set to anything bigger than CAN_MTU. By
fixing the root cause, this prevents the buffer overflow.

Fixes: 0738eff14d81 ("can: Allwinner A10/A20 CAN Controller support - Kernel module")
Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250918-can-fix-mtu-v1-3-0d1cada9393b@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
---
 drivers/net/can/sun4i_can.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/can/sun4i_can.c b/drivers/net/can/sun4i_can.c
index 6fcb301ef611..53bfd873de9b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/can/sun4i_can.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/sun4i_can.c
@@ -768,6 +768,7 @@ static const struct net_device_ops sun4ican_netdev_ops = {
 	.ndo_open = sun4ican_open,
 	.ndo_stop = sun4ican_close,
 	.ndo_start_xmit = sun4ican_start_xmit,
+	.ndo_change_mtu = can_change_mtu,
 };
 
 static const struct ethtool_ops sun4ican_ethtool_ops = {
-- 
2.51.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-09-23  7:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-09-23  7:32 [PATCH net 0/7] pull-request: can 2025-09-23 Marc Kleine-Budde
2025-09-23  7:32 ` [PATCH net 1/7] can: hi311x: fix null pointer dereference when resuming from sleep before interface was enabled Marc Kleine-Budde
2025-09-24  0:00   ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
2025-09-24  8:53   ` [PATCH net 1/7] can: hi311x: fix null pointer dereference when resuming from sleep before interface was enabled: manual merge Matthieu Baerts
2025-09-24  9:03     ` Marc Kleine-Budde
2025-09-23  7:32 ` [PATCH net 2/7] can: rcar_canfd: Fix controller mode setting Marc Kleine-Budde
2025-09-23  7:32 ` [PATCH net 3/7] can: etas_es58x: populate ndo_change_mtu() to prevent buffer overflow Marc Kleine-Budde
2025-09-23  7:32 ` [PATCH net 4/7] can: hi311x: " Marc Kleine-Budde
2025-09-23  7:32 ` Marc Kleine-Budde [this message]
2025-09-23  7:32 ` [PATCH net 6/7] can: mcba_usb: " Marc Kleine-Budde
2025-09-23  7:32 ` [PATCH net 7/7] can: peak_usb: fix shift-out-of-bounds issue Marc Kleine-Budde

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