From: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: jiayuan.chen@linux.dev, Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@shopee.com>,
syzbot+1f22cb1769f249df9fa0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH net v1] net: atm: fix crash due to unvalidated vcc pointer in sigd_send()
Date: Thu, 5 Feb 2026 17:54:51 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260205095501.131890-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev> (raw)
From: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@shopee.com>
Reproducer available at [1].
The ATM send path (sendmsg -> vcc_sendmsg -> sigd_send) reads the vcc
pointer from msg->vcc and uses it directly without any validation. This
pointer comes from userspace via sendmsg() and can be arbitrarily forged:
int fd = socket(AF_ATMSVC, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
ioctl(fd, ATMSIGD_CTRL); // become ATM signaling daemon
struct msghdr msg = { .msg_iov = &iov, ... };
*(unsigned long *)(buf + 4) = 0xdeadbeef; // fake vcc pointer
sendmsg(fd, &msg, 0); // kernel dereferences 0xdeadbeef
In normal operation, the kernel sends the vcc pointer to the signaling
daemon via sigd_enq() when processing operations like connect(), bind(),
or listen(). The daemon is expected to return the same pointer when
responding. However, a malicious daemon can send arbitrary pointer values.
Fix this by introducing find_get_vcc() which validates the pointer by
searching through vcc_hash (similar to how sigd_close() iterates over
all VCCs), and acquires a reference via sock_hold() if found.
Since struct atm_vcc embeds struct sock as its first member, they share
the same lifetime. Therefore using sock_hold/sock_put is sufficient to
keep the vcc alive while it is being used.
Note that there may be a race with sigd_close() which could mark the vcc
with various flags (e.g., ATM_VF_RELEASED) after find_get_vcc() returns.
However, sock_hold() guarantees the memory remains valid, so this race
only affects the logical state, not memory safety.
[1]: https://gist.github.com/mrpre/1ba5949c45529c511152e2f4c755b0f3
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot+1f22cb1769f249df9fa0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/69039850.a70a0220.5b2ed.005d.GAE@google.com/T/
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@shopee.com>
---
net/atm/signaling.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/atm/signaling.c b/net/atm/signaling.c
index e70ae2c113f9..358fbe5e4d1d 100644
--- a/net/atm/signaling.c
+++ b/net/atm/signaling.c
@@ -22,6 +22,36 @@
struct atm_vcc *sigd = NULL;
+/*
+ * find_get_vcc - validate and get a reference to a vcc pointer
+ * @vcc: the vcc pointer to validate
+ *
+ * This function validates that @vcc points to a registered VCC in vcc_hash.
+ * If found, it increments the socket reference count and returns the vcc.
+ * The caller must call sock_put(sk_atm(vcc)) when done.
+ *
+ * Returns the vcc pointer if valid, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+static struct atm_vcc *find_get_vcc(struct atm_vcc *vcc)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ read_lock(&vcc_sklist_lock);
+ for (i = 0; i < VCC_HTABLE_SIZE; i++) {
+ struct sock *s;
+
+ sk_for_each(s, &vcc_hash[i]) {
+ if (atm_sk(s) == vcc) {
+ sock_hold(s);
+ read_unlock(&vcc_sklist_lock);
+ return vcc;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ read_unlock(&vcc_sklist_lock);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
static void sigd_put_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (!sigd) {
@@ -69,7 +99,14 @@ static int sigd_send(struct atm_vcc *vcc, struct sk_buff *skb)
msg = (struct atmsvc_msg *) skb->data;
WARN_ON(refcount_sub_and_test(skb->truesize, &sk_atm(vcc)->sk_wmem_alloc));
- vcc = *(struct atm_vcc **) &msg->vcc;
+
+ vcc = find_get_vcc(*(struct atm_vcc **)&msg->vcc);
+ if (!vcc) {
+ pr_debug("invalid vcc pointer in msg\n");
+ dev_kfree_skb(skb);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
pr_debug("%d (0x%lx)\n", (int)msg->type, (unsigned long)vcc);
sk = sk_atm(vcc);
@@ -100,7 +137,16 @@ static int sigd_send(struct atm_vcc *vcc, struct sk_buff *skb)
clear_bit(ATM_VF_WAITING, &vcc->flags);
break;
case as_indicate:
- vcc = *(struct atm_vcc **)&msg->listen_vcc;
+ /* Release the reference from msg->vcc, we'll use msg->listen_vcc instead */
+ sock_put(sk);
+
+ vcc = find_get_vcc(*(struct atm_vcc **)&msg->listen_vcc);
+ if (!vcc) {
+ pr_debug("invalid listen_vcc pointer in msg\n");
+ dev_kfree_skb(skb);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
sk = sk_atm(vcc);
pr_debug("as_indicate!!!\n");
lock_sock(sk);
@@ -115,6 +161,8 @@ static int sigd_send(struct atm_vcc *vcc, struct sk_buff *skb)
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
as_indicate_complete:
release_sock(sk);
+ /* Paired with find_get_vcc(msg->listen_vcc) above */
+ sock_put(sk);
return 0;
case as_close:
set_bit(ATM_VF_RELEASED, &vcc->flags);
@@ -131,11 +179,15 @@ static int sigd_send(struct atm_vcc *vcc, struct sk_buff *skb)
break;
default:
pr_alert("bad message type %d\n", (int)msg->type);
+ /* Paired with find_get_vcc(msg->vcc) above */
+ sock_put(sk);
return -EINVAL;
}
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
out:
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
+ /* Paired with find_get_vcc(msg->vcc) above */
+ sock_put(sk);
return 0;
}
--
2.43.0
next reply other threads:[~2026-02-05 9:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-05 9:54 Jiayuan Chen [this message]
2026-02-10 10:40 ` [PATCH net v1] net: atm: fix crash due to unvalidated vcc pointer in sigd_send() patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260205095501.131890-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev \
--to=jiayuan.chen@linux.dev \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=edumazet@google.com \
--cc=horms@kernel.org \
--cc=jiayuan.chen@shopee.com \
--cc=kuba@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=pabeni@redhat.com \
--cc=syzbot+1f22cb1769f249df9fa0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox