From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
To: jiayuan.chen@linux.dev
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
andrew+netdev@lunn.ch, horms@kernel.org, jiayuan.chen@shopee.com,
pabeni@redhat.com, jirislaby@kernel.org,
sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
netdev@vger.kernel.org,
syzbot+827272712bd6d12c79a4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
davem@davemloft.net, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
edumazet@google.com
Subject: Re: [net,v1] serial: caif: fix use-after-free in caif_serial ldisc_close()
Date: Thu, 5 Feb 2026 18:25:26 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260206022526.3191971-1-kuba@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260204081939.237738-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
This is an AI-generated review of your patch. The human sending this
email has considered the AI review valid, or at least plausible.
For local reproduction steps see https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/ai-local.html
---
serial: caif: fix use-after-free in caif_serial ldisc_close()
This commit fixes a use-after-free bug in the CAIF serial driver by
moving the tty_kref_put() call from ldisc_close() to ser_release(),
ensuring the tty reference is held as long as the network device exists.
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/000000000000a4a7550611e234f5@google.com/T/
> serial: caif: fix use-after-free in caif_serial ldisc_close()
>
> There is a use-after-free bug in caif_serial where handle_tx() may
> access ser->tty after the tty has been freed.
>
> The race condition occurs between ldisc_close() and packet transmission:
>
> CPU 0 (close) CPU 1 (xmit)
> ------------- ------------
> ldisc_close()
> tty_kref_put(ser->tty)
> [tty may be freed here]
> <-- race window -->
> caif_xmit()
> handle_tx()
> tty = ser->tty // dangling ptr
> tty->ops->write() // UAF!
> schedule_work()
> ser_release()
> unregister_netdevice()
>
> The root cause is that tty_kref_put() is called in ldisc_close() while
> the network device is still active and can receive packets.
>
> Since ser and tty have a 1:1 binding relationship with consistent
> lifecycles (ser is created/destroyed in ldisc_open/close, and each ser
> binds exactly one tty), we can safely defer the tty reference release
The statement "ser is created/destroyed in ldisc_open/close" isn't quite
accurate. While ser is created in ldisc_open() via alloc_netdev(), it's
not actually destroyed in ldisc_close(). Instead, ldisc_close() only moves
ser to the release list via list_move(&ser->node, &ser_release_list).
The actual destruction happens in ser_release() when unregister_netdevice()
is called, which eventually frees the netdev and embedded ser via
netdev_run_todo() invoked by rtnl_unlock(). Would it be more accurate to
say ser is destroyed in ser_release()?
> to ser_release() where the network device is unregistered.
>
> Fix this by moving tty_kref_put() from ldisc_close() to ser_release(),
> after unregister_netdevice(). This ensures the tty reference is held
> as long as the network device exists, preventing the UAF.
>
> Note: We save ser->tty before unregister_netdevice() because ser is
> embedded in netdev's private data and will be freed along with netdev
> (needs_free_netdev = true).
>
> How to reproduce: Add mdelay(500) at the beginning of ldisc_close()
> to widen the race window, then run the reproducer program [1].
>
> Note: There is a separate deadloop issue in handle_tx() when using
> PORT_UNKNOWN serial ports (e.g., /dev/ttyS3 in QEMU without proper
> serial backend). This deadloop exists even without this patch,
> and is caused by an independent bug: inconsistency between
> uart_write_room() and uart_write() in serial core. It has been
> addressed in a separate patch [2].
The claim about the deadloop being caused by inconsistency between
uart_write_room() and uart_write() couldn't be fully verified without
examining the referenced patch [2]. While the claim is plausible (if
uart_write_room() reports available space but uart_write() returns 0
bytes written, the deadloop would occur in handle_tx()), this appears
to be presented as fact rather than hypothesis. Could this be clarified
or softened to indicate it's the suspected cause pending verification?
[ ... ]
> Fixes: 9b27105b4a44 ("net-caif-driver: add CAIF serial driver (ldisc)")
The Fixes: tag appears to reference the wrong commit. The bug was actually
introduced by commit 56e0ef527b18 ("drivers/net: caif: fix wrong
rtnl_is_locked() usage"). The original commit 9b27105b4a44 didn't have any
tty_kref operations. Commit e31d5a05948e added tty_kref_get/put, but at
that time tty_kref_put was called in ldisc_close() which directly
unregistered the netdevice, so there was no race. Commit 56e0ef527b18
moved dev_close/unregister_netdevice to a work queue (ser_release) but
left tty_kref_put in ldisc_close, creating the race window. Should the
Fixes: tag be updated to:
Fixes: 56e0ef527b18 ("drivers/net: caif: fix wrong rtnl_is_locked() usage")
> diff --git a/drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c b/drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c
> --- a/drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c
> @@ -284,6 +284,7 @@ static void ser_release(struct work_struct *work)
> {
> struct list_head list;
> struct ser_device *ser, *tmp;
> + struct tty_struct *tty;
>
> spin_lock(&ser_lock);
> list_replace_init(&ser_release_list, &list);
> @@ -292,9 +293,11 @@ static void ser_release(struct work_struct *work)
> if (!list_empty(&list)) {
> rtnl_lock();
> list_for_each_entry_safe(ser, tmp, &list, node) {
> + tty = ser->tty;
> dev_close(ser->dev);
> unregister_netdevice(ser->dev);
> debugfs_deinit(ser);
> + tty_kref_put(tty);
> }
> rtnl_unlock();
> }
[ ... ]
> @@ -354,8 +357,6 @@ static int ldisc_open(struct tty_struct *tty)
> static void ldisc_close(struct tty_struct *tty)
> {
> struct ser_device *ser = tty->disc_data;
> -
> - tty_kref_put(ser->tty);
>
> spin_lock(&ser_lock);
> list_move(&ser->node, &ser_release_list);
--
pw-bot: cr
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-06 2:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-04 8:19 [PATCH net v1] serial: caif: fix use-after-free in caif_serial ldisc_close() Jiayuan Chen
2026-02-04 8:30 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-02-06 2:25 ` Jakub Kicinski [this message]
2026-02-06 3:34 ` [net,v1] " Jiayuan Chen
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260206022526.3191971-1-kuba@kernel.org \
--to=kuba@kernel.org \
--cc=andrew+netdev@lunn.ch \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=edumazet@google.com \
--cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=horms@kernel.org \
--cc=jiayuan.chen@linux.dev \
--cc=jiayuan.chen@shopee.com \
--cc=jirislaby@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=pabeni@redhat.com \
--cc=sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com \
--cc=syzbot+827272712bd6d12c79a4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox