From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>, Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me>,
Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>,
Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co>,
Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>,
Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuni1840@gmail.com>,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v1 bpf 2/2] bpf: Reject access to unix_sk(sk)->listener.
Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2026 23:07:11 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260207230720.2542943-3-kuniyu@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260207230720.2542943-1-kuniyu@google.com>
With the previous patch, bpf prog cannot access unix_sk(sk)->peer.
struct unix_sock has two pointers to struct sock, and another
pointer unix_sk(sk)->listener also has the same problem mentioned
in the previous patch.
unix_sk(sk)->listener is set by unix_stream_connect() and
cleared by unix_update_edges() during accept(), and both are
done under unix_state_lock().
There are some functions where unix_sk(sk)->peer is passed and
bpf prog can access unix_sk(unix_sk(sk)->peer)->listener locklessly,
which is unsafe. (e.g. unix_maybe_add_creds())
Let's reject bpf access to unix_sk(sk)->listener too.
Fixes: aed6ecef55d7 ("af_unix: Save listener for embryo socket.")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 1 +
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_sock.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index b328a1640c82..2ffc6eff5584 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -7157,6 +7157,7 @@ BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct vm_area_struct) {
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_UNTRUSTED(struct unix_sock) {
struct sock *peer;
+ struct sock *listener;
};
static bool type_is_rcu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_sock.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_sock.c
index 8de4d3ed98d4..730850e93d6d 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_sock.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_sock.c
@@ -1191,4 +1191,28 @@ int BPF_PROG(trace_unix_dgram_sendmsg, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
return 0;
}
+SEC("fentry/unix_maybe_add_creds")
+__failure __msg("R1 type=untrusted_ptr_ expected=sock_common, sock, tcp_sock, xdp_sock, ptr_, trusted_ptr_")
+int BPF_PROG(trace_unix_maybe_add_creds, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct sock *sk, struct sock *other)
+{
+ struct unix_sock *u_other, *u_listener;
+
+ if (!other)
+ return 0;
+
+ u_other = bpf_skc_to_unix_sock(other);
+ if (!u_other)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* unix_accept() could clear u_other->listener
+ * and the listener could be close()d.
+ */
+ u_listener = bpf_skc_to_unix_sock(u_other->listener);
+ if (!u_listener)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
--
2.53.0.rc2.204.g2597b5adb4-goog
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-07 23:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-07 23:07 [PATCH v1 bpf 0/2] bpf: Reject access to unix_sk(sk)->{peer,listener} Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-02-07 23:07 ` [PATCH v1 bpf 1/2] bpf: Reject access to unix_sk(sk)->peer Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-02-09 23:00 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2026-02-10 1:19 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-02-11 2:47 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2026-02-11 4:23 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-02-11 21:25 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2026-02-11 22:22 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-02-11 22:39 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2026-02-11 23:01 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-02-07 23:07 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima [this message]
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