From: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
To: shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
kuba@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, davem@davemloft.net,
andrew+netdev@lunn.ch, pabeni@redhat.com, edumazet@google.com
Subject: Re: [net,v2,1/1] serial: caif: fix remaining ser->tty UAF in TX path
Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2026 13:43:40 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260216134340.68496-1-horms@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260215025141.1106576-2-shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com>
This is an AI-generated review of your patch. The human sending this
email has considered the AI review valid, or at least plausible.
For local reproduction steps see https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/ai-local.html
---
serial: caif: fix remaining ser->tty UAF in TX path
This patch addresses a KASAN use-after-free in the caif_serial TX path
by adding a spinlock to serialize access to ser->tty. The TX path now
takes a tty kref under the lock, and ser_release() clears ser->tty under
the same lock before dropping the reference.
Link: https://groups.google.com/g/syzkaller/c/usNe0oKtoXw/m/x8qUc3yUAQAJ
> diff --git a/drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c b/drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c
> --- a/drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c
> @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ struct ser_device {
> struct net_device *dev;
> struct sk_buff_head head;
> struct tty_struct *tty;
> + spinlock_t tty_lock; /* protects ser->tty */
> bool tx_started;
> unsigned long state;
> #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
> @@ -197,12 +198,21 @@ static int handle_tx(struct ser_device *ser)
> struct sk_buff *skb;
> int tty_wr, len, room;
>
> + spin_lock(&ser->tty_lock);
> tty = ser->tty;
> + tty_kref_get(tty);
> + spin_unlock(&ser->tty_lock);
handle_tx() is called from caif_xmit(), which is the ndo_start_xmit
handler. This can run in softirq context (NET_TX softirq). ser_release()
runs in process context (workqueue). If ser_release() holds tty_lock in
process context and a softirq fires on the same CPU, calling caif_xmit()
-> handle_tx() -> spin_lock(&ser->tty_lock), won't this deadlock?
Should this use spin_lock_bh()/spin_unlock_bh() instead?
> +
> + if (!tty)
> + return 0;
> +
> ser->tx_started = true;
>
> /* Enter critical section */
> - if (test_and_set_bit(CAIF_SENDING, &ser->state))
> + if (test_and_set_bit(CAIF_SENDING, &ser->state)) {
> + tty_kref_put(tty);
> return 0;
> + }
>
> /* skb_peek is safe because handle_tx is called after skb_queue_tail */
> while ((skb = skb_peek(&ser->head)) != NULL) {
[ ... ]
> if (!ser_loop) {
> tty_wr = tty->ops->write(tty, skb->data, len);
> update_tty_status(ser);
> } else {
After ser_release() sets ser->tty = NULL (the new code from this patch),
a concurrent handle_tx() that already passed the NULL check above can
reach update_tty_status(ser) here. Looking at update_tty_status(), it
dereferences ser->tty directly:
drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c:update_tty_status() {
inline_decode(ser->common.flowctrl,
ser->tty->flow.stopped << 5 |
ser->tty->flow.tco_stopped << 3 |
ser->tty->ctrl.packet << 2);
}
Won't this cause a NULL pointer dereference? Should update_tty_status()
take the local tty pointer as a parameter instead of reading ser->tty?
> @@ -245,9 +255,11 @@
> ser->common.flowctrl != NULL)
> ser->common.flowctrl(ser->dev, ON);
> clear_bit(CAIF_SENDING, &ser->state);
> + tty_kref_put(tty);
> return 0;
> error:
> clear_bit(CAIF_SENDING, &ser->state);
> + tty_kref_put(tty);
> return tty_wr;
> }
>
> @@ -293,7 +305,10 @@ static void ser_release(struct work_struct *work)
> if (!list_empty(&list)) {
> rtnl_lock();
> list_for_each_entry_safe(ser, tmp, &list, node) {
> + spin_lock(&ser->tty_lock);
> tty = ser->tty;
> + ser->tty = NULL;
> + spin_unlock(&ser->tty_lock);
> dev_close(ser->dev);
> unregister_netdevice(ser->dev);
> debugfs_deinit(ser);
[ ... ]
Jakub Kicinski's review of v1 (commit 308e7e4d0a84) pointed out that
moving tty_kref_put() to ser_release() doesn't fully prevent the UAF
because handle_tx() can still fetch ser->tty while ser_release() is
dropping the last tty reference. The current patch addresses this by
adding the tty_lock synchronization. While the v1/v2 review thread
didn't explicitly mark this as blocking, it represents a legitimate
race window that this patch fixes.
Reference: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20260206022526.3191971-1-kuba@kernel.org/
--
pw-bot: changes-requested
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-16 13:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-15 2:51 [PATCH net v2 0/1] serial: caif: fix remaining ser->tty UAF in TX Shuangpeng Bai
2026-02-15 2:51 ` [PATCH net v2 1/1] serial: caif: fix remaining ser->tty UAF in TX path Shuangpeng Bai
2026-02-15 8:55 ` Hillf Danton
2026-02-15 19:22 ` Shuangpeng
2026-02-16 0:24 ` Hillf Danton
2026-02-16 23:59 ` Hillf Danton
2026-02-16 13:43 ` Simon Horman [this message]
2026-02-18 14:25 ` Vadim Fedorenko
2026-02-19 21:47 ` Shuangpeng
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