From: "Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
To: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
Cc: brauner@kernel.org, demiobenour@gmail.com,
fahimitahera@gmail.com, hi@alyssa.is, horms@kernel.org,
ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com, jannh@google.com,
jmorris@namei.org, john.johansen@canonical.com,
konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, m@maowtm.org,
matthieu@buffet.re, mic@digikod.net, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
paul@paul-moore.com, samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com,
serge@hallyn.com, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6] lsm: Add LSM hook security_unix_find
Date: Thu, 19 Feb 2026 21:26:10 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260219.de5dc35ec231@gnoack.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260219200459.1474232-1-utilityemal77@gmail.com>
On Thu, Feb 19, 2026 at 03:04:59PM -0500, Justin Suess wrote:
> Add a LSM hook security_unix_find.
>
> This hook is called to check the path of a named unix socket before a
> connection is initiated. The peer socket may be inspected as well.
>
> Why existing hooks are unsuitable:
>
> Existing socket hooks, security_unix_stream_connect(),
> security_unix_may_send(), and security_socket_connect() don't provide
> TOCTOU-free / namespace independent access to the paths of sockets.
>
> (1) We cannot resolve the path from the struct sockaddr in existing hooks.
> This requires another path lookup. A change in the path between the
> two lookups will cause a TOCTOU bug.
>
> (2) We cannot use the struct path from the listening socket, because it
> may be bound to a path in a different namespace than the caller,
> resulting in a path that cannot be referenced at policy creation time.
>
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
> Cc: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
> Signed-off-by: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 5 +++++
> include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++
> net/unix/af_unix.c | 13 ++++++++++---
> security/security.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index 8c42b4bde09c..7a0fd3dbfa29 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -317,6 +317,11 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, post_notification, const struct cred *w_cred,
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, watch_key, struct key *key)
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY && CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */
>
> +#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH)
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_find, const struct path *path, struct sock *other,
> + int flags)
> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_stream_connect, struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
> struct sock *newsk)
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 83a646d72f6f..99a33d8eb28d 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1931,6 +1931,17 @@ static inline int security_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
>
> +#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH)
> +
> +int security_unix_find(const struct path *path, struct sock *other, int flags);
> +
> +#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
> +static inline int security_unix_find(const struct path *path, struct sock *other, int flags)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
> int security_ib_pkey_access(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey);
> int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec, const char *name, u8 port_num);
> diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> index f6d56e70c7a2..41698460194b 100644
> --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
> +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> @@ -1231,10 +1231,17 @@ static struct sock *unix_find_bsd(struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr, int addr_len,
> goto path_put;
>
> err = -EPROTOTYPE;
> - if (sk->sk_type == type)
> - touch_atime(&path);
> - else
> + if (sk->sk_type != type)
> + goto sock_put;
> +
> + /*
> + * We call the hook because we know that the inode is a socket and we
> + * hold a valid reference to it via the path.
> + */
> + err = security_unix_find(&path, sk, flags);
> + if (err)
> goto sock_put;
> + touch_atime(&path);
>
> path_put(&path);
>
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 67af9228c4e9..c73196b8db4b 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -4731,6 +4731,26 @@ int security_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
>
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
>
> +#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH)
> +/**
> + * security_unix_find() - Check if a named AF_UNIX socket can connect
> + * @path: path of the socket being connected to
> + * @other: peer sock
> + * @flags: flags associated with the socket
> + *
> + * This hook is called to check permissions before connecting to a named
> + * AF_UNIX socket.
> + *
> + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
> + */
> +int security_unix_find(const struct path *path, struct sock *other, int flags)
> +{
> + return call_int_hook(unix_find, path, other, flags);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_find);
> +
> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
> /**
> * security_ib_pkey_access() - Check if access to an IB pkey is allowed
> --
> 2.52.0
>
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Thank you, this looks good. I'll include it in the next version of the
Unix connect patch set again.
–Günther
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-19 20:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-15 10:51 [PATCH v5 0/9] landlock: UNIX connect() control by pathname and scope Günther Noack
2026-02-15 10:51 ` [PATCH v5 1/9] lsm: Add LSM hook security_unix_find Günther Noack
2026-02-18 9:36 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-02-19 13:26 ` Justin Suess
2026-02-19 20:04 ` [PATCH v6] " Justin Suess
2026-02-19 20:26 ` Günther Noack [this message]
2026-03-10 22:39 ` Paul Moore
2026-03-11 12:34 ` Justin Suess
2026-03-11 16:08 ` Paul Moore
2026-03-12 11:57 ` Günther Noack
2026-02-20 15:49 ` Günther Noack
2026-02-21 13:22 ` Justin Suess
2026-02-23 16:09 ` Mickaël Salaün
[not found] ` <20260215105158.28132-3-gnoack3000@gmail.com>
[not found] ` <20260217.lievaS8eeng8@digikod.net>
2026-02-20 14:33 ` [PATCH v5 2/9] landlock: Control pathname UNIX domain socket resolution by path Günther Noack
2026-03-08 9:18 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-10 15:19 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2026-03-11 4:46 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
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