From: Chuck Lever <cel@kernel.org>
To: davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com, kuba@kernel.org,
pabeni@redhat.com
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Subject: [PATCH net-next] net: datagram: Bypass usercopy checks for kernel iterators
Date: Wed, 25 Feb 2026 11:25:32 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260225162532.30587-1-cel@kernel.org> (raw)
From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Profiling NFSD under an iozone workload showed that hardened
usercopy checks consume roughly 1.3% of CPU in the TCP receive path.
These checks validate memory regions during copies, but provide no
security benefit when both source (skb data) and destination (kernel
pages in BVEC/KVEC iterators) reside in kernel address space.
Modify simple_copy_to_iter() and crc32c_and_copy_to_iter() to call
_copy_to_iter() directly when the destination is a kernel-only
iterator, bypassing the usercopy hardening validation. User-backed
iterators (ITER_UBUF, ITER_IOVEC) continue to use copy_to_iter()
with full validation.
This benefits kernel consumers of TCP receive such as the NFS client
and server and NVMe-TCP, which use ITER_BVEC for their receive
buffers.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
---
net/core/datagram.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/core/datagram.c b/net/core/datagram.c
index c285c6465923..e83cf0125008 100644
--- a/net/core/datagram.c
+++ b/net/core/datagram.c
@@ -490,7 +490,10 @@ static size_t crc32c_and_copy_to_iter(const void *addr, size_t bytes,
u32 *crcp = _crcp;
size_t copied;
- copied = copy_to_iter(addr, bytes, i);
+ if (user_backed_iter(i))
+ copied = copy_to_iter(addr, bytes, i);
+ else
+ copied = _copy_to_iter(addr, bytes, i);
*crcp = crc32c(*crcp, addr, copied);
return copied;
}
@@ -515,10 +518,17 @@ int skb_copy_and_crc32c_datagram_iter(const struct sk_buff *skb, int offset,
EXPORT_SYMBOL(skb_copy_and_crc32c_datagram_iter);
#endif /* CONFIG_NET_CRC32C */
+/*
+ * Bypass usercopy hardening for kernel-only iterators: no data
+ * crosses the user/kernel boundary, so the slab whitelist check
+ * on the source buffer is unnecessary overhead.
+ */
static size_t simple_copy_to_iter(const void *addr, size_t bytes,
void *data __always_unused, struct iov_iter *i)
{
- return copy_to_iter(addr, bytes, i);
+ if (user_backed_iter(i))
+ return copy_to_iter(addr, bytes, i);
+ return _copy_to_iter(addr, bytes, i);
}
/**
--
2.52.0
next reply other threads:[~2026-02-25 16:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-25 16:25 Chuck Lever [this message]
2026-02-28 3:19 ` [PATCH net-next] net: datagram: Bypass usercopy checks for kernel iterators Jakub Kicinski
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-03-03 9:42 Paolo Abeni
2026-03-03 15:53 ` Chuck Lever
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