From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C2EF7356A08; Thu, 5 Mar 2026 21:14:08 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1772745248; cv=none; b=KxHnfoMi8p1GOuLhzBkaxP7RS3lUZKyafGfMjaLsYUOfhTfLJ+kVAib0vW/HNY24Vbk4zeJD6M0/4neBFjn6W+8bDpQ3UTpE+8aAWx6xRxT1u6HHDKPZy68S9CXxWaGthiFxWQ9EqiuHGxvl6NpZsVOYaeUXUL/8gpMt+EDfYJg= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1772745248; c=relaxed/simple; bh=dJL6USRU5wnCOsxC7h8IONJZQxuC/kDbIuSIjffRJpk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=irSCBzKbC1AHPLD/lPqDbCq2n3xNEUUxY8WTqX5C0aMqB1nZQNtpEFK7MlgZymHfJHCWneiBlM25vbhj+unBKXCwlTHIfc0tocW3Iy55t2ft2NG/4jUAD886XCaGsTEcO0uU3E7iF5opP1Ozd4NHtIsvf59V4iu1ihET9kQ/cE0= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=NoKh7Z0U; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="NoKh7Z0U" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 08C8AC2BC9E; Thu, 5 Mar 2026 21:14:07 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1772745248; bh=dJL6USRU5wnCOsxC7h8IONJZQxuC/kDbIuSIjffRJpk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=NoKh7Z0UDlKdnX3UbRsDgM7FlJ+KAVSR+fpT8JNesCgwThS2UDn9bpaNzTyqdqDLY K8Tq9GdJugW2YmCbQYDNRnac7gimho2iiU4zQVbH0jw5RMWbWjzKurLIlRhqoMXQkR bKyTOxufGN/uZFjsRkBnM/JRld+2HaJvBqW/GVa20IIRQml5HUEjN/q1Rqb7I396Hv r3+9BTULeoGzhER/uCKdlhm5nKj/RnXKpOGe3a6SSW4FIt5R4xcKMEv+h69vQWDZtL icGG6XTG/5z2k1N8wrkYrw2f1gg6ddWVyLXcqWxSuFl5xbVjjvrLZYF6l1ozlAsq1Q sOisMkVNbu5YQ== From: Chuck Lever To: john.fastabend@gmail.com, kuba@kernel.org, sd@queasysnail.net Cc: , , Chuck Lever , Alistair Francis , Hannes Reinecke Subject: [PATCH v1 3/6] tls: Suppress spurious saved_data_ready during read_sock Date: Thu, 5 Mar 2026 16:13:59 -0500 Message-ID: <20260305211402.39408-4-cel@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <20260305211402.39408-1-cel@kernel.org> References: <20260305211402.39408-1-cel@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Chuck Lever During tls_sw_read_sock(), each record release triggers tls_strp_msg_done(), which calls back through the strparser into saved_data_ready(). For a batch of N records, the first N-1 wakeups are pure overhead: the read_sock callback is already running and will pick up subsequent records on the next iteration. Remove the per-record wakeup from the record-release path by introducing tls_rx_rec_release(), which calls tls_strp_msg_release() instead of tls_strp_msg_done(). Factor tls_rx_msg_ready() out of tls_strp_read_sock() so that parsing a record no longer fires the callback directly, and introduce tls_strp_check_rcv_quiet() for use in tls_rx_rec_wait(), which parses queued data without notifying. A single tls_strp_check_rcv() at the read_sock_end exit point fires at most one notification, and only when data remains after the loop exits. Acked-by: Alistair Francis Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever --- net/tls/tls.h | 1 + net/tls/tls_strp.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++-- net/tls/tls_sw.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/tls/tls.h b/net/tls/tls.h index a97f1acef31d..d58d86e8e43e 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls.h +++ b/net/tls/tls.h @@ -193,6 +193,7 @@ int tls_strp_init(struct tls_strparser *strp, struct sock *sk); void tls_strp_data_ready(struct tls_strparser *strp); void tls_strp_check_rcv(struct tls_strparser *strp); +void tls_strp_check_rcv_quiet(struct tls_strparser *strp); void tls_strp_msg_release(struct tls_strparser *strp); void tls_strp_msg_done(struct tls_strparser *strp); diff --git a/net/tls/tls_strp.c b/net/tls/tls_strp.c index a7648ebde162..7b9f5051becb 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_strp.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_strp.c @@ -368,7 +368,6 @@ static int tls_strp_copyin(read_descriptor_t *desc, struct sk_buff *in_skb, desc->count = 0; WRITE_ONCE(strp->msg_ready, 1); - tls_rx_msg_ready(strp); } return ret; @@ -539,11 +538,27 @@ static int tls_strp_read_sock(struct tls_strparser *strp) return tls_strp_read_copy(strp, false); WRITE_ONCE(strp->msg_ready, 1); - tls_rx_msg_ready(strp); return 0; } +/** + * tls_strp_check_rcv_quiet - parse without consumer notification + * @strp: TLS stream parser instance + * + * Parse queued data without firing the consumer notification. A subsequent + * tls_strp_check_rcv() is required before the socket lock is released; + * otherwise queued data stalls until the next tls_strp_data_ready() event. + */ +void tls_strp_check_rcv_quiet(struct tls_strparser *strp) +{ + if (unlikely(strp->stopped) || strp->msg_ready) + return; + + if (tls_strp_read_sock(strp) == -ENOMEM) + queue_work(tls_strp_wq, &strp->work); +} + void tls_strp_check_rcv(struct tls_strparser *strp) { if (unlikely(strp->stopped) || strp->msg_ready) @@ -551,6 +566,8 @@ void tls_strp_check_rcv(struct tls_strparser *strp) if (tls_strp_read_sock(strp) == -ENOMEM) queue_work(tls_strp_wq, &strp->work); + else if (strp->msg_ready) + tls_rx_msg_ready(strp); } /* Lower sock lock held */ diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c index 108d417dcfb7..a5905f4c1ae2 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c @@ -1372,7 +1372,10 @@ tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool nonblock, return ret; if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) { - tls_strp_check_rcv(&ctx->strp); + /* tls_strp_check_rcv() is called on the read_sock_end + * path before the socket lock is released. + */ + tls_strp_check_rcv_quiet(&ctx->strp); if (tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx)) break; } @@ -1853,6 +1856,11 @@ static int tls_record_content_type(struct msghdr *msg, struct tls_msg *tlm, return 1; } +static void tls_rx_rec_release(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx) +{ + tls_strp_msg_release(&ctx->strp); +} + static void tls_rx_rec_done(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx) { tls_strp_msg_done(&ctx->strp); @@ -2383,7 +2391,7 @@ int tls_sw_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc, tlm = tls_msg(skb); decrypted += rxm->full_len; - tls_rx_rec_done(ctx); + tls_rx_rec_release(ctx); } /* read_sock does not support reading control messages */ @@ -2413,6 +2421,7 @@ int tls_sw_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc, } read_sock_end: + tls_strp_check_rcv(&ctx->strp); tls_rx_reader_release(sk, ctx); return copied ? : err; -- 2.53.0