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From: "Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: "Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>,
	"Tingmao Wang" <m@maowtm.org>,
	"Justin Suess" <utilityemal77@gmail.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Samasth Norway Ananda" <samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com>,
	"Matthieu Buffet" <matthieu@buffet.re>,
	"Mikhail Ivanov" <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>,
	konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com,
	"Demi Marie Obenour" <demiobenour@gmail.com>,
	"Alyssa Ross" <hi@alyssa.is>, "Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
	"Tahera Fahimi" <fahimitahera@gmail.com>,
	"Sebastian Andrzej Siewior" <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
	"Kuniyuki Iwashima" <kuniyu@google.com>,
	"Simon Horman" <horms@kernel.org>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v6 1/9] lsm: Add LSM hook security_unix_find
Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2026 23:21:42 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260315222150.121952-2-gnoack3000@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260315222150.121952-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com>

From: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>

Add a LSM hook security_unix_find.

This hook is called to check the path of a named unix socket before a
connection is initiated. The peer socket may be inspected as well.

Why existing hooks are unsuitable:

Existing socket hooks, security_unix_stream_connect(),
security_unix_may_send(), and security_socket_connect() don't provide
TOCTOU-free / namespace independent access to the paths of sockets.

(1) We cannot resolve the path from the struct sockaddr in existing hooks.
This requires another path lookup. A change in the path between the
two lookups will cause a TOCTOU bug.

(2) We cannot use the struct path from the listening socket, because it
may be bound to a path in a different namespace than the caller,
resulting in a path that cannot be referenced at policy creation time.

Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Cc: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
Signed-off-by: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  5 +++++
 include/linux/security.h      | 11 +++++++++++
 net/unix/af_unix.c            | 13 ++++++++++---
 security/security.c           | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 8c42b4bde09c..7a0fd3dbfa29 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -317,6 +317,11 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, post_notification, const struct cred *w_cred,
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, watch_key, struct key *key)
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY && CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_find, const struct path *path, struct sock *other,
+	 int flags)
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_stream_connect, struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
 	 struct sock *newsk)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 83a646d72f6f..99a33d8eb28d 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1931,6 +1931,17 @@ static inline int security_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
 }
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH)
+
+int security_unix_find(const struct path *path, struct sock *other, int flags);
+
+#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
+static inline int security_unix_find(const struct path *path, struct sock *other, int flags)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
 int security_ib_pkey_access(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey);
 int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec, const char *name, u8 port_num);
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 3756a93dc63a..aced28179bac 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1231,11 +1231,18 @@ static struct sock *unix_find_bsd(struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr, int addr_len,
 		goto path_put;
 
 	err = -EPROTOTYPE;
-	if (sk->sk_type == type)
-		touch_atime(&path);
-	else
+	if (sk->sk_type != type)
 		goto sock_put;
 
+	/*
+	 * We call the hook because we know that the inode is a socket and we
+	 * hold a valid reference to it via the path.
+	 */
+	err = security_unix_find(&path, sk, flags);
+	if (err)
+		goto sock_put;
+	touch_atime(&path);
+
 	path_put(&path);
 
 	return sk;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 67af9228c4e9..c73196b8db4b 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -4731,6 +4731,26 @@ int security_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
 
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH)
+/**
+ * security_unix_find() - Check if a named AF_UNIX socket can connect
+ * @path: path of the socket being connected to
+ * @other: peer sock
+ * @flags: flags associated with the socket
+ *
+ * This hook is called to check permissions before connecting to a named
+ * AF_UNIX socket.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_unix_find(const struct path *path, struct sock *other, int flags)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(unix_find, path, other, flags);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_find);
+
+#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
 /**
  * security_ib_pkey_access() - Check if access to an IB pkey is allowed
-- 
2.53.0


  reply	other threads:[~2026-03-15 22:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-03-15 22:21 [PATCH v6 0/9] landlock: UNIX connect() control by pathname and scope Günther Noack
2026-03-15 22:21 ` Günther Noack [this message]
2026-03-17 21:14   ` [PATCH v6 1/9] lsm: Add LSM hook security_unix_find Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-17 21:34   ` Paul Moore
2026-03-17 23:20     ` [PATCH v7 " Justin Suess
2026-03-18  1:28       ` Paul Moore
2026-03-18  8:48     ` [PATCH v6 " Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-18 14:44       ` Paul Moore
2026-03-18 16:22         ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-18 16:43           ` Paul Moore
2026-03-23 14:37       ` Georgia Garcia
2026-03-23 20:26         ` Paul Moore
2026-03-18 16:51   ` Mickaël Salaün

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