From: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
To: paul@paul-moore.com
Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de, brauner@kernel.org, demiobenour@gmail.com,
fahimitahera@gmail.com, gnoack3000@gmail.com, hi@alyssa.is,
horms@kernel.org, ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com,
jannh@google.com, jmorris@namei.org, john.johansen@canonical.com,
konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com, kuniyu@google.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, m@maowtm.org,
matthieu@buffet.re, mic@digikod.net, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com, serge@hallyn.com,
utilityemal77@gmail.com, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Subject: [PATCH v7 1/9] lsm: Add LSM hook security_unix_find
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2026 19:20:41 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260317232041.330576-1-utilityemal77@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2697b9f672967b1318630f2ffa21914f@paul-moore.com>
Add a LSM hook security_unix_find.
This hook is called to check the path of a named unix socket before a
connection is initiated. The peer socket may be inspected as well.
Why existing hooks are unsuitable:
Existing socket hooks, security_unix_stream_connect(),
security_unix_may_send(), and security_socket_connect() don't provide
TOCTOU-free / namespace independent access to the paths of sockets.
(1) We cannot resolve the path from the struct sockaddr in existing hooks.
This requires another path lookup. A change in the path between the
two lookups will cause a TOCTOU bug.
(2) We cannot use the struct path from the listening socket, because it
may be bound to a path in a different namespace than the caller,
resulting in a path that cannot be referenced at policy creation time.
Consumers of the hook wishing to reference @other are responsible
for acquiring the unix_state_lock and checking for the SOCK_DEAD flag
therein, ensuring the socket hasn't died since lookup.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Cc: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
---
Paul,
I updated the hook placement as per your suggestions. Moving the hook into
the block does require duplicate stubs, but I don't see another way to move the
stub into that block and properly handle the case where CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is
defined but CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK isn't. If the stub is moved into that #else
block it will never be defined in that case.
I removed the self-evident comment as well from security_unix_find and added
the whitespace.
I also updated the comments and commit message with respect to locking.
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 6 ++++++
include/linux/security.h | 13 +++++++++++++
net/unix/af_unix.c | 10 +++++++---
security/security.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 8c42b4bde09c..0017a540c2fb 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -321,6 +321,12 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, watch_key, struct key *key)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_stream_connect, struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
struct sock *newsk)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_may_send, struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_find, const struct path *path, struct sock *other,
+ int flags)
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
+
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_create, int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_post_create, struct socket *sock, int family, int type,
int protocol, int kern)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 83a646d72f6f..3f8c23ad1199 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1641,6 +1641,14 @@ static inline int security_watch_key(struct key *key)
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk);
int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+int security_unix_find(const struct path *path, struct sock *other, int flags);
+#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
+static inline int security_unix_find(const struct path *path, struct sock *other, int flags)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern);
int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
int type, int protocol, int kern);
@@ -1712,6 +1720,11 @@ static inline int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_unix_find(const struct path *path, struct sock *other, int flags)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_socket_create(int family, int type,
int protocol, int kern)
{
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 3756a93dc63a..5ef3c2e31757 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1231,11 +1231,15 @@ static struct sock *unix_find_bsd(struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr, int addr_len,
goto path_put;
err = -EPROTOTYPE;
- if (sk->sk_type == type)
- touch_atime(&path);
- else
+ if (sk->sk_type != type)
goto sock_put;
+ err = security_unix_find(&path, sk, flags);
+ if (err)
+ goto sock_put;
+
+ touch_atime(&path);
+
path_put(&path);
return sk;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 67af9228c4e9..f8df5e1b55e6 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -4073,6 +4073,25 @@ int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+/**
+ * security_unix_find() - Check if a named AF_UNIX socket can connect
+ * @path: path of the socket being connected to
+ * @other: peer sock
+ * @flags: flags associated with the socket
+ *
+ * This hook is called to check permissions before connecting to a named
+ * AF_UNIX socket. The caller does not hold any locks on @other.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_unix_find(const struct path *path, struct sock *other, int flags)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(unix_find, path, other, flags);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_find);
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
+
/**
* security_socket_create() - Check if creating a new socket is allowed
* @family: protocol family
--
2.51.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-17 23:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-15 22:21 [PATCH v6 0/9] landlock: UNIX connect() control by pathname and scope Günther Noack
2026-03-15 22:21 ` [PATCH v6 1/9] lsm: Add LSM hook security_unix_find Günther Noack
2026-03-17 21:14 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-17 21:34 ` Paul Moore
2026-03-17 23:20 ` Justin Suess [this message]
2026-03-18 1:28 ` [PATCH v7 " Paul Moore
2026-03-18 8:48 ` [PATCH v6 " Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-18 14:44 ` Paul Moore
2026-03-18 16:22 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-18 16:43 ` Paul Moore
2026-03-23 14:37 ` Georgia Garcia
2026-03-23 20:26 ` Paul Moore
2026-03-18 16:51 ` Mickaël Salaün
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