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From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	David Laight <david.laight.linux@gmail.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>,
	Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
	Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>, Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
	Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
	Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me>, Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
	Tao Zhang <tao1.zhang@intel.com>,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v7 07/10] x86/vmscape: Use static_call() for predictor flush
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2026 08:41:54 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260319-vmscape-bhb-v7-7-b76a777a98af@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260319-vmscape-bhb-v7-0-b76a777a98af@linux.intel.com>

Adding more mitigation options at exit-to-userspace for VMSCAPE would
usually require a series of checks to decide which mitigation to use. In
this case, the mitigation is done by calling a function, which is decided
at boot. So, adding more feature flags and multiple checks can be avoided
by using static_call() to the mitigating function.

Replace the flag-based mitigation selector with a static_call(). This also
frees the existing X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER.

Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                     |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h   |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h  |  7 +++----
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           | 13 ++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                   |  2 +-
 6 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index e2df1b147184..5b8def9ddb98 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2720,6 +2720,7 @@ config MITIGATION_TSA
 config MITIGATION_VMSCAPE
 	bool "Mitigate VMSCAPE"
 	depends on KVM
+	depends on HAVE_STATIC_CALL
 	default y
 	help
 	  Enable mitigation for VMSCAPE attacks. VMSCAPE is a hardware security
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index dbe104df339b..b4d529dd6d30 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO		(21*32+11) /* AMD CPU not vulnerable to TSA-SQ */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO		(21*32+12) /* AMD CPU not vulnerable to TSA-L1 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM	(21*32+13) /* Clear CPU buffers using VERW before VMRUN */
-#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER	(21*32+14) /* Use IBPB on exit-to-userspace, see VMSCAPE bug */
+/* Free */
 #define X86_FEATURE_ABMC		(21*32+15) /* Assignable Bandwidth Monitoring Counters */
 #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_IMM		(21*32+16) /* MSR immediate form instructions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SGX_EUPDATESVN	(21*32+17) /* Support for ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] instruction */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
index 78b143673ca7..783e7cb50cae 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/randomize_kstack.h>
 #include <linux/user-return-notifier.h>
+#include <linux/static_call_types.h>
 
 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 #include <asm/io_bitmap.h>
@@ -94,10 +95,8 @@ static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs,
 	 */
 	choose_random_kstack_offset(rdtsc());
 
-	/* Avoid unnecessary reads of 'x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user' */
-	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER) &&
-	    this_cpu_read(x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user)) {
-		write_ibpb();
+	if (unlikely(this_cpu_read(x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user))) {
+		static_call_cond(vmscape_predictor_flush)();
 		this_cpu_write(x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user, false);
 	}
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 0a55b1c64741..e45e49f1e0c9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -542,6 +542,9 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
 			    :: "rax", "rcx", "rdx", "memory");
 }
 
+#include <linux/static_call_types.h>
+DECLARE_STATIC_CALL(vmscape_predictor_flush, write_ibpb);
+
 /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
 extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 68e2df3e3bf5..b75eda114503 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -144,6 +144,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_buf_idle_clear);
  */
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);
 
+/*
+ * Controls CPU Fill buffer clear before VMenter. This is a subset of
+ * X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF, and should only be enabled when KVM-only
+ * mitigation is required.
+ */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(cpu_buf_vm_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_buf_vm_clear);
+
+DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(vmscape_predictor_flush, write_ibpb);
+EXPORT_STATIC_CALL_GPL(vmscape_predictor_flush);
+
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)	"mitigations: " fmt
 
@@ -3129,7 +3140,7 @@ static void __init vmscape_update_mitigation(void)
 static void __init vmscape_apply_mitigation(void)
 {
 	if (vmscape_mitigation == VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER)
-		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER);
+		static_call_update(vmscape_predictor_flush, write_ibpb);
 }
 
 #undef pr_fmt
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 45d7cfedc507..5582056b2fa1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -11463,7 +11463,7 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	 * set for the CPU that actually ran the guest, and not the CPU that it
 	 * may migrate to.
 	 */
-	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER))
+	if (static_call_query(vmscape_predictor_flush))
 		this_cpu_write(x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user, true);
 
 	/*

-- 
2.34.1



  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-03-19 15:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-03-19 15:40 [PATCH v7 00/10] VMSCAPE optimization for BHI variant Pawan Gupta
2026-03-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v7 01/10] x86/bhi: x86/vmscape: Move LFENCE out of clear_bhb_loop() Pawan Gupta
2026-03-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v7 02/10] x86/bhi: Make clear_bhb_loop() effective on newer CPUs Pawan Gupta
2026-03-19 15:40 ` [PATCH v7 03/10] x86/bhi: Rename clear_bhb_loop() to clear_bhb_loop_nofence() Pawan Gupta
2026-03-23 14:44   ` Nikolay Borisov
2026-03-23 17:07     ` Pawan Gupta
2026-03-19 15:41 ` [PATCH v7 04/10] x86/vmscape: Rename x86_ibpb_exit_to_user to x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user Pawan Gupta
2026-03-19 15:41 ` [PATCH v7 05/10] x86/vmscape: Move mitigation selection to a switch() Pawan Gupta
2026-03-19 15:41 ` [PATCH v7 06/10] x86/vmscape: Use write_ibpb() instead of indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() Pawan Gupta
2026-03-19 15:41 ` Pawan Gupta [this message]
2026-03-19 16:56   ` [PATCH v7 07/10] x86/vmscape: Use static_call() for predictor flush bot+bpf-ci
2026-03-19 18:05     ` Pawan Gupta
2026-03-19 20:58   ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-03-19 21:34     ` Pawan Gupta
2026-03-19 21:44       ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-03-19 22:06         ` Pawan Gupta
2026-03-20  6:22         ` Pawan Gupta
2026-03-20  9:03           ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-03-20 11:31             ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-20 18:23               ` Pawan Gupta
2026-03-24 20:00                 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-24 20:14                   ` Pawan Gupta
2026-03-19 15:42 ` [PATCH v7 08/10] x86/vmscape: Deploy BHB clearing mitigation Pawan Gupta
2026-03-19 15:42 ` [PATCH v7 09/10] x86/vmscape: Fix conflicting attack-vector controls with =force Pawan Gupta
2026-03-19 15:42 ` [PATCH v7 10/10] x86/vmscape: Add cmdline vmscape=on to override attack vector controls Pawan Gupta
2026-03-19 16:40   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-03-19 17:57     ` Pawan Gupta

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