From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
linux-afs@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>,
Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>,
Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
stable@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH net 4/5] rxrpc: Fix keyring reference count leak in rxrpc_setsockopt()
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2026 15:01:44 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260319150150.4189381-5-dhowells@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260319150150.4189381-1-dhowells@redhat.com>
From: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>
In rxrpc_setsockopt(), the code checks 'rx->key' when handling the
RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING option. However, this appears to be a logic error.
The code should be checking 'rx->securities' to determine if a keyring has
already been defined for the socket.
Currently, if a user calls setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING) multiple
times on the same socket, the check 'if (rx->key)' fails to block
subsequent calls because 'rx->key' has not been defined by the function.
This results in a reference count leak on the keyring.
This patch changes the check to 'rx->securities' to correctly identify if
the socket security keyring has already been configured, returning -EINVAL
on subsequent attempts.
Before the patch:
It shows the keyring reference counter elevated.
$ cat /proc/keys | grep AFSkeys1
27aca8ae I--Q--- 24469721 perm 3f010000 1000 1000 keyring AFSkeys1: empty
$
After the patch:
The keyring reference counter remains stable and subsequent calls return an
error:
$ ./poc
setsockopt: Invalid argument
$
Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Signed-off-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
---
net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c b/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c
index 0f90272ac254..0b7ed99a3025 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c
@@ -665,7 +665,7 @@ static int rxrpc_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
case RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING:
ret = -EINVAL;
- if (rx->key)
+ if (rx->securities)
goto error;
ret = -EISCONN;
if (rx->sk.sk_state != RXRPC_UNBOUND)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-19 15:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-19 15:01 [PATCH net 0/5] rxrpc: Miscellaneous fixes David Howells
2026-03-19 15:01 ` [PATCH net 1/5] rxrpc: Fix RxGK token loading to check bounds David Howells
2026-03-19 15:01 ` [PATCH net 2/5] rxrpc: Fix use of wrong skb when comparing queued RESP challenge serial David Howells
2026-03-21 1:45 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-03-21 8:15 ` David Howells
2026-03-23 21:45 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-03-23 21:51 ` David Howells
2026-03-23 22:11 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-03-19 15:01 ` [PATCH net 3/5] rxrpc: Fix rack timer warning to report unexpected mode David Howells
2026-03-19 15:01 ` David Howells [this message]
2026-03-19 15:01 ` [PATCH net 5/5] rxrpc: Fix key reference count leak from call->key David Howells
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