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From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
To: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>, Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>,
	<netdev@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 05/20] xfrm: iptfs: validate inner IPv4 header length in IPTFS payload
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2026 09:33:46 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260323083440.2741292-6-steffen.klassert@secunet.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260323083440.2741292-1-steffen.klassert@secunet.com>

From: Roshan Kumar <roshaen09@gmail.com>

Add validation of the inner IPv4 packet tot_len and ihl fields parsed
from decrypted IPTFS payloads in __input_process_payload(). A crafted
ESP packet containing an inner IPv4 header with tot_len=0 causes an
infinite loop: iplen=0 leads to capturelen=min(0, remaining)=0, so the
data offset never advances and the while(data < tail) loop never
terminates, spinning forever in softirq context.

Reject inner IPv4 packets where tot_len < ihl*4 or ihl*4 < sizeof(struct
iphdr), which catches both the tot_len=0 case and malformed ihl values.
The normal IP stack performs this validation in ip_rcv_core(), but IPTFS
extracts and processes inner packets before they reach that layer.

Reported-by: Roshan Kumar <roshaen09@gmail.com>
Fixes: 6c82d2433671 ("xfrm: iptfs: add basic receive packet (tunnel egress) handling")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Roshan Kumar <roshaen09@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c
index 3b6d7284fc70..0747d1cfa333 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c
@@ -991,6 +991,11 @@ static bool __input_process_payload(struct xfrm_state *x, u32 data,
 
 			iplen = be16_to_cpu(iph->tot_len);
 			iphlen = iph->ihl << 2;
+			if (iplen < iphlen || iphlen < sizeof(*iph)) {
+				XFRM_INC_STATS(net,
+					       LINUX_MIB_XFRMINHDRERROR);
+				goto done;
+			}
 			protocol = cpu_to_be16(ETH_P_IP);
 			XFRM_MODE_SKB_CB(skbseq->root_skb)->tos = iph->tos;
 		} else if (iph->version == 0x6) {
-- 
2.43.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-03-23  8:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-03-23  8:33 [PATCH 0/20] pull request (net): ipsec 2026-03-23 Steffen Klassert
2026-03-23  8:33 ` [PATCH 01/20] xfrm: add missing extack for XFRMA_SA_PCPU in add_acquire and allocspi Steffen Klassert
2026-03-24 14:30   ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
2026-03-23  8:33 ` [PATCH 02/20] xfrm: fix the condition on x->pcpu_num in xfrm_sa_len Steffen Klassert
2026-03-23  8:33 ` [PATCH 03/20] xfrm: call xdo_dev_state_delete during state update Steffen Klassert
2026-03-23  8:33 ` [PATCH 04/20] esp: fix skb leak with espintcp and async crypto Steffen Klassert
2026-03-23  8:33 ` Steffen Klassert [this message]
2026-03-23  8:33 ` [PATCH 06/20] xfrm: iptfs: fix skb_put() panic on non-linear skb during reassembly Steffen Klassert
2026-03-23  8:33 ` [PATCH 07/20] xfrm: state: fix sparse warnings on xfrm_state_hold_rcu Steffen Klassert
2026-03-23  8:33 ` [PATCH 08/20] xfrm: state: fix sparse warnings in xfrm_state_init Steffen Klassert
2026-03-23  8:33 ` [PATCH 09/20] xfrm: state: fix sparse warnings around XFRM_STATE_INSERT Steffen Klassert
2026-03-23  8:33 ` [PATCH 10/20] xfrm: state: add xfrm_state_deref_prot to state_by* walk under lock Steffen Klassert
2026-03-23  8:33 ` [PATCH 11/20] xfrm: remove rcu/state_hold from xfrm_state_lookup_spi_proto Steffen Klassert
2026-03-23  8:33 ` [PATCH 12/20] xfrm: state: silence sparse warnings during netns exit Steffen Klassert
2026-03-23  8:33 ` [PATCH 13/20] xfrm: policy: fix sparse warnings in xfrm_policy_{init,fini} Steffen Klassert
2026-03-23  8:33 ` [PATCH 14/20] xfrm: policy: silence sparse warning in xfrm_policy_unregister_afinfo Steffen Klassert
2026-03-23  8:33 ` [PATCH 15/20] xfrm: add rcu_access_pointer to silence sparse warning for xfrm_input_afinfo Steffen Klassert
2026-03-23  8:33 ` [PATCH 16/20] xfrm: avoid RCU warnings around the per-netns netlink socket Steffen Klassert
2026-03-23  8:33 ` [PATCH 17/20] xfrm: Fix work re-schedule after cancel in xfrm_nat_keepalive_net_fini() Steffen Klassert
2026-03-23  8:33 ` [PATCH 18/20] xfrm: prevent policy_hthresh.work from racing with netns teardown Steffen Klassert
2026-03-23  8:34 ` [PATCH 19/20] af_key: validate families in pfkey_send_migrate() Steffen Klassert
2026-03-23  8:34 ` [PATCH 20/20] xfrm: iptfs: only publish mode_data after clone setup Steffen Klassert
2026-03-24 11:33   ` Paolo Abeni
2026-03-24 11:52     ` Steffen Klassert
2026-03-24 12:35       ` Paolo Abeni
2026-03-24 12:40         ` Steffen Klassert
2026-03-24 14:22           ` Paolo Abeni

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