From: Mashiro Chen <mashiro.chen@mailbox.org>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com, kuba@kernel.org,
pabeni@redhat.com, horms@kernel.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
ben@decadent.org.uk, linux-hams@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
Mashiro Chen <mashiro.chen@mailbox.org>
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] net: netrom: validate source address in nr_find_socket()
Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2026 01:15:59 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260407171600.102988-3-mashiro.chen@mailbox.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260407171600.102988-1-mashiro.chen@mailbox.org>
nr_find_socket() dispatches incoming NR_INFO frames into a connected
socket by matching the frame's circuit index/id pair (bytes[15-16])
against the socket's my_index/my_id. It performs no validation of
the frame's source callsign against the socket's dest_addr.
This means any node on the network can craft an NR_INFO frame with
a guessed or brute-forced circuit index/id pair and have it accepted
into an arbitrary STATE_3 connection as if it came from the legitimate
peer. Circuit IDs are assigned sequentially starting at (1,1), making
them predictable in practice.
This is exploited in concert with CVE-XXXX-XXXXX (nr_queue_rx_frame
fraglen overflow): an attacker can inject NR_INFO | NR_MORE_FLAG frames
into an existing connection without owning a connection themselves,
driving the victim socket's fraglen to wrap and triggering the heap
overflow entirely unauthenticated (CVSS PR:N).
Fix by adding a source address parameter to nr_find_socket() and
requiring it to match the socket's recorded dest_addr for all
frame-dispatch lookups. The internal nr_find_next_circuit() caller,
which only checks for circuit ID availability, passes NULL to skip
the source check.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mashiro Chen <mashiro.chen@mailbox.org>
---
net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 11 +++++++----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c
index b605891bf86e4..73742cc9e9e42 100644
--- a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c
+++ b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c
@@ -162,7 +162,8 @@ static struct sock *nr_find_listener(ax25_address *addr)
/*
* Find a connected NET/ROM socket given my circuit IDs.
*/
-static struct sock *nr_find_socket(unsigned char index, unsigned char id)
+static struct sock *nr_find_socket(unsigned char index, unsigned char id,
+ const ax25_address *src)
{
struct sock *s;
@@ -170,7 +171,8 @@ static struct sock *nr_find_socket(unsigned char index, unsigned char id)
sk_for_each(s, &nr_list) {
struct nr_sock *nr = nr_sk(s);
- if (nr->my_index == index && nr->my_id == id) {
+ if (nr->my_index == index && nr->my_id == id &&
+ (!src || !ax25cmp(&nr->dest_addr, src))) {
sock_hold(s);
goto found;
}
@@ -219,7 +221,8 @@ static unsigned short nr_find_next_circuit(void)
j = id % 256;
if (i != 0 && j != 0) {
- if ((sk=nr_find_socket(i, j)) == NULL)
+ sk = nr_find_socket(i, j, NULL);
+ if (!sk)
break;
sock_put(sk);
}
@@ -926,7 +929,7 @@ int nr_rx_frame(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
if (frametype == NR_CONNREQ)
sk = nr_find_peer(circuit_index, circuit_id, src);
else
- sk = nr_find_socket(circuit_index, circuit_id);
+ sk = nr_find_socket(circuit_index, circuit_id, src);
}
if (sk != NULL) {
--
2.53.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-07 17:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-07 17:15 [PATCH 0/3] net: fix three security bugs in NET/ROM and ROSE stacks Mashiro Chen
2026-04-07 17:15 ` [PATCH 1/3] net: netrom: fix integer overflow in nr_queue_rx_frame() Mashiro Chen
2026-04-07 17:15 ` Mashiro Chen [this message]
2026-04-07 17:16 ` [PATCH 3/3] net: rose: fix out-of-bounds read in rose_parse_ccitt() Mashiro Chen
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