From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Kai Zen <kai.aizen.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, edwin.peer@broadcom.com,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
davem@davemloft.net, kuba@kernel.org, pabeni@redhat.com,
horms@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org, security@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] net: rtnetlink: zero ifla_vf_broadcast to avoid stack infoleak in rtnl_fill_vfinfo
Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2026 12:42:44 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026040759-whiny-tinker-c321@gregkh> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALynFi7k1Z7Vgr4p2=KH2-uWVntBRE5R+8uP=cds9_ihGqzOdQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Apr 07, 2026 at 01:21:57PM +0300, Kai Zen wrote:
> rtnl_fill_vfinfo() declares struct ifla_vf_broadcast on the stack
> without initialisation:
>
> struct ifla_vf_broadcast vf_broadcast;
>
> The struct contains a single fixed 32-byte field:
>
> /* include/uapi/linux/if_link.h */
> struct ifla_vf_broadcast {
> __u8 broadcast[32];
> };
>
> The function then copies dev->broadcast into it using dev->addr_len
> as the length:
>
> memcpy(vf_broadcast.broadcast, dev->broadcast, dev->addr_len);
>
> On Ethernet devices (the overwhelming majority of SR-IOV NICs)
> dev->addr_len is 6, so only the first 6 bytes of broadcast[] are
> written. The remaining 26 bytes retain whatever was previously on
> the kernel stack. The full struct is then handed to userspace via:
>
> nla_put(skb, IFLA_VF_BROADCAST,
> sizeof(vf_broadcast), &vf_broadcast)
>
> leaking up to 26 bytes of uninitialised kernel stack per VF per
> RTM_GETLINK request, repeatable.
>
> The other vf_* structs in the same function are explicitly zeroed
> for exactly this reason - see the memset() calls for ivi,
> vf_vlan_info, node_guid and port_guid a few lines above.
> vf_broadcast was simply missed when it was added.
>
> The pattern used elsewhere in this file for the regular IFLA_BROADCAST
> attribute also avoids the issue by sending only dev->addr_len bytes
> rather than a fixed-size struct, but for IFLA_VF_BROADCAST the wire
> format is the fixed 32-byte struct, so the right fix is to zero the
> struct before the partial memcpy.
>
> Reachability and impact
> -----------------------
>
> The leak is reachable by any unprivileged local process. AF_NETLINK
> with NETLINK_ROUTE requires no capabilities. The only environmental
> requirement is that the host has at least one SR-IOV-capable
> interface present (a parent device with VFs), which is the common
> case for cloud, datacenter and HPC hosts.
>
> Trigger: send RTM_GETLINK with an IFLA_EXT_MASK attribute whose
> value has the RTEXT_FILTER_VF bit set. The kernel will then walk
> each VF and emit IFLA_VFINFO_LIST, including IFLA_VF_BROADCAST,
> which carries the 26 bytes of uninitialised stack per VF.
>
> Stack residue at this call site can include return addresses
> (useful as a KASLR / function-pointer disclosure primitive) and
> transient sensitive data left over by whatever ran on the same
> kernel stack just prior. KASAN with stack instrumentation, or
> KMSAN, will flag the nla_put() when reproduced.
>
> Reproducer (unprivileged):
>
> import socket, struct
> IFLA_EXT_MASK = 29
> RTEXT_FILTER_VF = 1
> s = socket.socket(socket.AF_NETLINK, socket.SOCK_RAW,
> socket.NETLINK_ROUTE)
> s.bind((0, 0))
> hdr = struct.pack('=IHHII', 0, 18, 0x301, 0, 0)
> ifi = struct.pack('=BxHiII', 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
> attr = (struct.pack('=HH', 8, IFLA_EXT_MASK) +
> struct.pack('=I', RTEXT_FILTER_VF))
> msg = hdr + ifi + attr
> msg = struct.pack('=I', len(msg)) + msg[4:]
> s.send(msg)
> data = s.recv(65536)
> # Parse IFLA_VF_BROADCAST from the response. Bytes 7..32 of the
> # broadcast[] field are uninitialised kernel stack on Ethernet.
>
> Fix
> ---
>
> Zero the on-stack struct before the partial memcpy, matching the
> existing pattern used for the other vf_* structs in the same
> function.
>
> Reported-by: Kai Aizen <kai.aizen.dev@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Kai Aizen <kai.aizen.dev@gmail.com>
> ---
>
> Note for reviewers: this is v1. I have not yet identified the
> exact introducing commit for the Fixes: tag and would appreciate
> a pointer, or I will resend as v2 once I have run git blame on a
> local checkout. The bug is present at least as far back as the
> introduction of struct ifla_vf_broadcast in net-next.
>
> net/core/rtnetlink.c | 1 +
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
>
> diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
> --- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c
> +++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
> @@ -1572,6 +1572,7 @@ static noinline_for_stack int
> rtnl_fill_vfinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
> port_guid.vf = ivi.vf;
>
> memcpy(vf_mac.mac, ivi.mac, sizeof(ivi.mac));
> + memset(&vf_broadcast, 0, sizeof(vf_broadcast));
> memcpy(vf_broadcast.broadcast, dev->broadcast, dev->addr_len);
> vf_vlan.vlan = ivi.vlan;
> vf_vlan.qos = ivi.qos;
Nice catch, but your patch is corrupted and can't be applied as the tabs
were converted to spaces and the commit is line-wrapped :(
With that fixed, feel free to resubmit and add:
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
thanks,
greg k-h
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-07 10:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-07 10:21 [PATCH net] net: rtnetlink: zero ifla_vf_broadcast to avoid stack infoleak in rtnl_fill_vfinfo Kai Zen
2026-04-07 10:26 ` Eric Dumazet
2026-04-07 10:42 ` Greg KH [this message]
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-04-07 11:31 Kai Zen
2026-04-07 11:39 ` Eric Dumazet
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