From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
linux-afs@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>,
Luxiao Xu <rakukuip@gmail.com>, Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>,
Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
stable@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH net v5 15/21] rxrpc: Fix key/keyring checks in setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY/KEYRING)
Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2026 13:12:43 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260408121252.2249051-16-dhowells@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260408121252.2249051-1-dhowells@redhat.com>
An AF_RXRPC socket can be both client and server at the same time. When
sending new calls (ie. it's acting as a client), it uses rx->key to set the
security, and when accepting incoming calls (ie. it's acting as a server),
it uses rx->securities.
setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY) sets rx->key to point to an rxrpc-type key
and setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING) sets rx->securities to point to a
keyring of rxrpc_s-type keys.
Now, it should be possible to use both rx->key and rx->securities on the
same socket - but for userspace AF_RXRPC sockets rxrpc_setsockopt()
prevents that.
Fix this by:
(1) Remove the incorrect check rxrpc_setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING)
makes on rx->key.
(2) Move the check that rxrpc_setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY) makes on
rx->key down into rxrpc_request_key().
(3) Remove rxrpc_request_key()'s check on rx->securities.
This (in combination with a previous patch) pushes the checks down into the
functions that set those pointers and removes the cross-checks that prevent
both key and keyring being set.
Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>
cc: Luxiao Xu <rakukuip@gmail.com>
cc: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
---
net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c | 6 ------
net/rxrpc/key.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c b/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c
index 0f90272ac254..32ec91fa938f 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c
@@ -654,9 +654,6 @@ static int rxrpc_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
goto success;
case RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY:
- ret = -EINVAL;
- if (rx->key)
- goto error;
ret = -EISCONN;
if (rx->sk.sk_state != RXRPC_UNBOUND)
goto error;
@@ -664,9 +661,6 @@ static int rxrpc_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
goto error;
case RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING:
- ret = -EINVAL;
- if (rx->key)
- goto error;
ret = -EISCONN;
if (rx->sk.sk_state != RXRPC_UNBOUND)
goto error;
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/key.c b/net/rxrpc/key.c
index 77237a82be3b..6301d79ee35a 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/key.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/key.c
@@ -622,7 +622,7 @@ int rxrpc_request_key(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, sockptr_t optval, int optlen)
_enter("");
- if (optlen <= 0 || optlen > PAGE_SIZE - 1 || rx->securities)
+ if (optlen <= 0 || optlen > PAGE_SIZE - 1 || rx->key)
return -EINVAL;
description = memdup_sockptr_nul(optval, optlen);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-08 12:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-08 12:12 [PATCH net v5 00/21] rxrpc: Miscellaneous fixes David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 01/21] rxrpc: Fix key quota calculation for multitoken keys David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 02/21] rxrpc: Fix key parsing memleak David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 03/21] rxrpc: Fix anonymous key handling David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 04/21] rxrpc: Fix call removal to use RCU safe deletion David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 05/21] rxrpc: Fix RxGK token loading to check bounds David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 06/21] rxrpc: Fix use of wrong skb when comparing queued RESP challenge serial David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 07/21] rxrpc: Fix rack timer warning to report unexpected mode David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 08/21] rxrpc: Fix key reference count leak from call->key David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 09/21] rxrpc: Fix to request an ack if window is limited David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 10/21] rxrpc: Only put the call ref if one was acquired David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 11/21] rxrpc: reject undecryptable rxkad response tickets David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 12/21] rxrpc: fix RESPONSE authenticator parser OOB read David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 13/21] rxrpc: fix oversized RESPONSE authenticator length check David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 14/21] rxrpc: fix reference count leak in rxrpc_server_keyring() David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` David Howells [this message]
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 16/21] rxrpc: Fix missing error checks for rxkad encryption/decryption failure David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 17/21] rxrpc: Fix integer overflow in rxgk_verify_response() David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 18/21] rxrpc: Fix leak of rxgk context " David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 19/21] rxrpc: Fix buffer overread in rxgk_do_verify_authenticator() David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 20/21] rxrpc: only handle RESPONSE during service challenge David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 21/21] rxrpc: proc: size address buffers for %pISpc output David Howells
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