From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
linux-afs@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Wang Jie <jiewang2024@lzu.edu.cn>, Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>,
Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>,
Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>, Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>,
Yang Yang <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>,
Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>,
Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
stable@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH net v5 20/21] rxrpc: only handle RESPONSE during service challenge
Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2026 13:12:48 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260408121252.2249051-21-dhowells@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260408121252.2249051-1-dhowells@redhat.com>
From: Wang Jie <jiewang2024@lzu.edu.cn>
Only process RESPONSE packets while the service connection is still in
RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING. Check that state under state_lock before
running response verification and security initialization, then use a local
secured flag to decide whether to queue the secured-connection work after
the state transition. This keeps duplicate or late RESPONSE packets from
re-running the setup path and removes the unlocked post-transition state
test.
Fixes: 17926a79320a ("net: AF_RXRPC: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jie Wang <jiewang2024@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yang <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
---
net/rxrpc/conn_event.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c b/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c
index c50cbfc5a313..9a41ec708aeb 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c
@@ -247,6 +247,7 @@ static int rxrpc_process_event(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
+ bool secured = false;
int ret;
if (conn->state == RXRPC_CONN_ABORTED)
@@ -262,6 +263,13 @@ static int rxrpc_process_event(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
return ret;
case RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_RESPONSE:
+ spin_lock_irq(&conn->state_lock);
+ if (conn->state != RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING) {
+ spin_unlock_irq(&conn->state_lock);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irq(&conn->state_lock);
+
ret = conn->security->verify_response(conn, skb);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -272,11 +280,13 @@ static int rxrpc_process_event(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
return ret;
spin_lock_irq(&conn->state_lock);
- if (conn->state == RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING)
+ if (conn->state == RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING) {
conn->state = RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE;
+ secured = true;
+ }
spin_unlock_irq(&conn->state_lock);
- if (conn->state == RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE) {
+ if (secured) {
/* Offload call state flipping to the I/O thread. As
* we've already received the packet, put it on the
* front of the queue.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-08 12:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-08 12:12 [PATCH net v5 00/21] rxrpc: Miscellaneous fixes David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 01/21] rxrpc: Fix key quota calculation for multitoken keys David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 02/21] rxrpc: Fix key parsing memleak David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 03/21] rxrpc: Fix anonymous key handling David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 04/21] rxrpc: Fix call removal to use RCU safe deletion David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 05/21] rxrpc: Fix RxGK token loading to check bounds David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 06/21] rxrpc: Fix use of wrong skb when comparing queued RESP challenge serial David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 07/21] rxrpc: Fix rack timer warning to report unexpected mode David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 08/21] rxrpc: Fix key reference count leak from call->key David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 09/21] rxrpc: Fix to request an ack if window is limited David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 10/21] rxrpc: Only put the call ref if one was acquired David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 11/21] rxrpc: reject undecryptable rxkad response tickets David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 12/21] rxrpc: fix RESPONSE authenticator parser OOB read David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 13/21] rxrpc: fix oversized RESPONSE authenticator length check David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 14/21] rxrpc: fix reference count leak in rxrpc_server_keyring() David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 15/21] rxrpc: Fix key/keyring checks in setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY/KEYRING) David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 16/21] rxrpc: Fix missing error checks for rxkad encryption/decryption failure David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 17/21] rxrpc: Fix integer overflow in rxgk_verify_response() David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 18/21] rxrpc: Fix leak of rxgk context " David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 19/21] rxrpc: Fix buffer overread in rxgk_do_verify_authenticator() David Howells
2026-04-08 12:12 ` David Howells [this message]
2026-04-08 12:12 ` [PATCH net v5 21/21] rxrpc: proc: size address buffers for %pISpc output David Howells
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