From: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com, kuba@kernel.org,
pabeni@redhat.com, horms@kernel.org, jiri@resnulli.us,
zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com, security@kernel.org,
Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>,
Victor Nogueira <victor@mojatatu.com>
Subject: [PATCH net 1/1] net/sched: act_ct: Only release RCU read lock after ct_ft
Date: Fri, 10 Apr 2026 07:16:27 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260410111627.46611-1-jhs@mojatatu.com> (raw)
When looking up a flow table in act_ct in tcf_ct_flow_table_get(),
rhashtable_lookup_fast() internally opens and closes an RCU read critical
section before returning ct_ft.
The tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work() can complete before refcount_inc_not_zero()
is invoked on the returned ct_ft resulting in a UAF on the already freed ct_ft
object. This vulnerability can lead to privilege escalation.
Analysis from zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com:
When initializing act_ct, tcf_ct_init() is called, which internally triggers
tcf_ct_flow_table_get().
static int tcf_ct_flow_table_get(struct net *net, struct tcf_ct_params *params)
{
struct zones_ht_key key = { .net = net, .zone = params->zone };
struct tcf_ct_flow_table *ct_ft;
int err = -ENOMEM;
mutex_lock(&zones_mutex);
ct_ft = rhashtable_lookup_fast(&zones_ht, &key, zones_params); // [1]
if (ct_ft && refcount_inc_not_zero(&ct_ft->ref)) // [2]
goto out_unlock;
...
}
static __always_inline void *rhashtable_lookup_fast(
struct rhashtable *ht, const void *key,
const struct rhashtable_params params)
{
void *obj;
rcu_read_lock();
obj = rhashtable_lookup(ht, key, params);
rcu_read_unlock();
return obj;
}
At [1], rhashtable_lookup_fast() looks up and returns the corresponding ct_ft
from zones_ht . The lookup is performed within an RCU read critical section
through rcu_read_lock() / rcu_read_unlock(), which prevents the object from
being freed. However, at the point of function return, rcu_read_unlock() has
already been called, and there is nothing preventing ct_ft from being freed
before reaching refcount_inc_not_zero(&ct_ft->ref) at [2]. This interval becomes
the race window, during which ct_ft can be freed.
Free Process:
tcf_ct_flow_table_put() is executed through the path tcf_ct_cleanup() call_rcu()
tcf_ct_params_free_rcu() tcf_ct_params_free() tcf_ct_flow_table_put().
static void tcf_ct_flow_table_put(struct tcf_ct_flow_table *ct_ft)
{
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&ct_ft->ref)) {
rhashtable_remove_fast(&zones_ht, &ct_ft->node, zones_params);
INIT_RCU_WORK(&ct_ft->rwork, tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work); // [3]
queue_rcu_work(act_ct_wq, &ct_ft->rwork);
}
}
At [3], tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work() is scheduled as RCU work
static void tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct tcf_ct_flow_table *ct_ft;
struct flow_block *block;
ct_ft = container_of(to_rcu_work(work), struct tcf_ct_flow_table,
rwork);
nf_flow_table_free(&ct_ft->nf_ft);
block = &ct_ft->nf_ft.flow_block;
down_write(&ct_ft->nf_ft.flow_block_lock);
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&block->cb_list));
up_write(&ct_ft->nf_ft.flow_block_lock);
kfree(ct_ft); // [4]
module_put(THIS_MODULE);
}
tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work() frees ct_ft at [4]. When this function executes
between [1] and [2], UAF occurs.
This race condition has a very short race window, making it generally
difficult to trigger. Therefore, to trigger the vulnerability an msleep(100) was
inserted after[1]
Fixes: 138470a9b2cc2 ("net/sched: act_ct: fix lockdep splat in tcf_ct_flow_table_get")
Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com
Tested-by: Victor Nogueira <victor@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
---
net/sched/act_ct.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/sched/act_ct.c b/net/sched/act_ct.c
index 7d5e50c921a0..6158e13c98d3 100644
--- a/net/sched/act_ct.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_ct.c
@@ -328,9 +328,13 @@ static int tcf_ct_flow_table_get(struct net *net, struct tcf_ct_params *params)
int err = -ENOMEM;
mutex_lock(&zones_mutex);
- ct_ft = rhashtable_lookup_fast(&zones_ht, &key, zones_params);
- if (ct_ft && refcount_inc_not_zero(&ct_ft->ref))
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ ct_ft = rhashtable_lookup(&zones_ht, &key, zones_params);
+ if (ct_ft && refcount_inc_not_zero(&ct_ft->ref)) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
ct_ft = kzalloc_obj(*ct_ft);
if (!ct_ft)
--
2.34.1
reply other threads:[~2026-04-10 11:16 UTC|newest]
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