public inbox for netdev@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>,
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
	Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>, Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
	Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>,
	linux-afs@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>,
	stable@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH net v2 2/6] rxrpc: Fix rxkad crypto unalignment handling
Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2026 17:14:31 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260422161438.2593376-3-dhowells@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260422161438.2593376-1-dhowells@redhat.com>

Fix handling of a packet with a misaligned crypto length.  Also handle
non-ENOMEM errors from decryption by aborting.  Further, remove the
WARN_ON_ONCE() so that it can't be remotely triggered (a trace line can
still be emitted).

Fixes: f93af41b9f5f ("rxrpc: Fix missing error checks for rxkad encryption/decryption failure")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260408121252.2249051-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
---
 include/trace/events/rxrpc.h | 1 +
 net/rxrpc/rxkad.c            | 9 +++++++--
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h b/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h
index 578b8038b211..5820d7e41ea0 100644
--- a/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h
+++ b/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 	EM(rxkad_abort_1_short_encdata,		"rxkad1-short-encdata")	\
 	EM(rxkad_abort_1_short_header,		"rxkad1-short-hdr")	\
 	EM(rxkad_abort_2_short_check,		"rxkad2-short-check")	\
+	EM(rxkad_abort_2_crypto_unaligned,	"rxkad2-crypto-unaligned") \
 	EM(rxkad_abort_2_short_data,		"rxkad2-short-data")	\
 	EM(rxkad_abort_2_short_header,		"rxkad2-short-hdr")	\
 	EM(rxkad_abort_2_short_len,		"rxkad2-short-len")	\
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
index 5a720222854f..cba7935977f0 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
@@ -510,6 +510,9 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON,
 					  rxkad_abort_2_short_header);
 
+	/* Don't let the crypto algo see a misaligned length. */
+	sp->len = round_down(sp->len, 8);
+
 	/* Decrypt the skbuff in-place.  TODO: We really want to decrypt
 	 * directly into the target buffer.
 	 */
@@ -543,8 +546,10 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	if (sg != _sg)
 		kfree(sg);
 	if (ret < 0) {
-		WARN_ON_ONCE(ret != -ENOMEM);
-		return ret;
+		if (ret == -ENOMEM)
+			return ret;
+		return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON,
+					  rxkad_abort_2_crypto_unaligned);
 	}
 
 	/* Extract the decrypted packet length */


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-04-22 16:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-04-22 16:14 [PATCH net v2 0/6] rxrpc: Miscellaneous fixes David Howells
2026-04-22 16:14 ` [PATCH net v2 1/6] rxrpc: Fix memory leaks in rxkad_verify_response() David Howells
2026-04-22 16:14 ` David Howells [this message]
2026-04-22 16:14 ` [PATCH net v2 3/6] rxrpc: Fix potential UAF after skb_unshare() failure David Howells
2026-04-22 16:14 ` [PATCH net v2 4/6] rxrpc: Fix conn-level packet handling to unshare RESPONSE packets David Howells
2026-04-22 16:14 ` [PATCH net v2 5/6] rxgk: Fix potential integer overflow in length check David Howells
2026-04-22 16:14 ` [PATCH net v2 6/6] rxrpc: Fix missing validation of ticket length in non-XDR key preparsing David Howells

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20260422161438.2593376-3-dhowells@redhat.com \
    --to=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=anderson@allelesecurity.com \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=edumazet@google.com \
    --cc=horms@kernel.org \
    --cc=jaltman@auristor.com \
    --cc=kuba@kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-afs@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=marc.dionne@auristor.com \
    --cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=pabeni@redhat.com \
    --cc=stable@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox