From: Matthieu Buffet <matthieu@buffet.re>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: "Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
"Mikhail Ivanov" <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>,
konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com, "Tingmao Wang" <m@maowtm.org>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, "Matthieu Buffet" <matthieu@buffet.re>
Subject: [PATCH v4 1/7] landlock: Add UDP bind() access control
Date: Sat, 2 May 2026 14:43:00 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260502124306.3975990-2-matthieu@buffet.re> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260502124306.3975990-1-matthieu@buffet.re>
Add support for a first fine-grained UDP access right.
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP controls the ability to set the local port
of a UDP socket (via bind()). It will be useful for servers (to start
receiving datagrams), and for some clients that need to use a specific
source port (e.g. mDNS requires to use port 5353)
For obvious performance concerns, access control is only enforced when
configuring sockets, not when using them for common send/recv
operations.
Bump ABI to allow userspace to detect and use this new right.
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Buffet <matthieu@buffet.re>
---
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 12 +++++++++---
security/landlock/audit.c | 1 +
security/landlock/limits.h | 2 +-
security/landlock/net.c | 18 ++++++++++++------
security/landlock/syscalls.c | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 4 ++--
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c | 5 +++--
7 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
index 10a346e55e95..045b251ff1b4 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
@@ -201,9 +201,9 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr {
* with ``setsockopt(IP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE)``.
*
* A Landlock rule with port 0 and the %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP
- * right means that requesting to bind on port 0 is allowed and it will
- * automatically translate to binding on a kernel-assigned ephemeral
- * port.
+ * or %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP right means that requesting to bind
+ * on port 0 is allowed and it will automatically translate to binding
+ * on a kernel-assigned ephemeral port.
*/
__u64 port;
};
@@ -373,10 +373,16 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr {
* port. Support added in Landlock ABI version 4.
* - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP: Connect TCP sockets to the given
* remote port. Support added in Landlock ABI version 4.
+ *
+ * And similarly for UDP port numbers:
+ *
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP: Bind UDP sockets to the given local
+ * port. Support added in Landlock ABI version 10.
*/
/* clang-format off */
#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP (1ULL << 0)
#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP (1ULL << 1)
+#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP (1ULL << 2)
/* clang-format on */
/**
diff --git a/security/landlock/audit.c b/security/landlock/audit.c
index 8d0edf94037d..e676ebffeebe 100644
--- a/security/landlock/audit.c
+++ b/security/landlock/audit.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(fs_access_strings) == LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS);
static const char *const net_access_strings[] = {
[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP)] = "net.bind_tcp",
[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)] = "net.connect_tcp",
+ [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP)] = "net.bind_udp",
};
static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(net_access_strings) == LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET);
diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h
index b454ad73b15e..c0f30a4591b8 100644
--- a/security/landlock/limits.h
+++ b/security/landlock/limits.h
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
#define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS << 1) - 1)
#define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS)
-#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP
+#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP
#define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET << 1) - 1)
#define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET)
diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
index c368649985c5..f9ccb52e7d45 100644
--- a/security/landlock/net.c
+++ b/security/landlock/net.c
@@ -81,15 +81,17 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
* inconsistencies and return -EINVAL if needed.
*/
return 0;
- } else if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
+ } else if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP ||
+ access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP) {
/*
* Binding to an AF_UNSPEC address is treated
* differently by IPv4 and IPv6 sockets. The socket's
* family may change under our feet due to
* setsockopt(IPV6_ADDRFORM), but that's ok: we either
- * reject entirely or require
- * %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP for the given port, so
- * it cannot be used to bypass the policy.
+ * reject entirely for IPv6 or require
+ * %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP or
+ * %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP for IPv4,
+ * so it cannot be used to bypass the policy.
*
* IPv4 sockets map AF_UNSPEC to AF_INET for
* retrocompatibility for bind accesses, only if the
@@ -135,7 +137,8 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP) {
audit_net.dport = port;
audit_net.v4info.daddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
- } else if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
+ } else if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP ||
+ access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP) {
audit_net.sport = port;
audit_net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
} else {
@@ -157,7 +160,8 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP) {
audit_net.dport = port;
audit_net.v6info.daddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
- } else if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
+ } else if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP ||
+ access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP) {
audit_net.sport = port;
audit_net.v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
} else {
@@ -216,6 +220,8 @@ static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *const sock,
if (sk_is_tcp(sock->sk))
access_request = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP;
+ else if (sk_is_udp(sock->sk))
+ access_request = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP;
else
return 0;
diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
index accfd2e5a0cd..d45469d5d464 100644
--- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
+++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = {
* If the change involves a fix that requires userspace awareness, also update
* the errata documentation in Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst .
*/
-const int landlock_abi_version = 9;
+const int landlock_abi_version = 10;
/**
* sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
index 30d37234086c..6c8113c2ded1 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
@@ -76,8 +76,8 @@ TEST(abi_version)
const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
};
- ASSERT_EQ(9, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0,
- LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION));
+ ASSERT_EQ(10, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0,
+ LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION));
ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, 0,
LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION));
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
index 4c528154ea92..ec392d971ea3 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
@@ -1326,11 +1326,12 @@ FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(mini)
/* clang-format off */
-#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP
+#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP
#define ACCESS_ALL ( \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP | \
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP)
/* clang-format on */
--
2.39.5
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-02 12:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-02 12:42 [PATCH v4 0/7] landlock: Add UDP access control support Matthieu Buffet
2026-05-02 12:43 ` Matthieu Buffet [this message]
2026-05-02 12:43 ` [PATCH v4 2/7] landlock: Add UDP connect() access control Matthieu Buffet
2026-05-02 12:43 ` [PATCH v4 3/7] landlock: Add UDP send " Matthieu Buffet
2026-05-02 12:43 ` [PATCH v4 4/7] selftests/landlock: Add UDP bind/connect tests Matthieu Buffet
2026-05-02 12:43 ` [PATCH v4 5/7] selftests/landlock: Add tests for sendmsg() Matthieu Buffet
2026-05-02 12:43 ` [PATCH v4 6/7] samples/landlock: Add sandboxer UDP access control Matthieu Buffet
2026-05-02 12:43 ` [PATCH v4 7/7] landlock: Add documentation for UDP support Matthieu Buffet
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260502124306.3975990-2-matthieu@buffet.re \
--to=matthieu@buffet.re \
--cc=gnoack@google.com \
--cc=ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com \
--cc=konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=m@maowtm.org \
--cc=mic@digikod.net \
--cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox