public inbox for netdev@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Matthieu Buffet <matthieu@buffet.re>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: "Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Mikhail Ivanov" <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>,
	konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com, "Tingmao Wang" <m@maowtm.org>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, "Matthieu Buffet" <matthieu@buffet.re>
Subject: [PATCH v4 1/7] landlock: Add UDP bind() access control
Date: Sat,  2 May 2026 14:43:00 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260502124306.3975990-2-matthieu@buffet.re> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260502124306.3975990-1-matthieu@buffet.re>

Add support for a first fine-grained UDP access right.
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP controls the ability to set the local port
of a UDP socket (via bind()). It will be useful for servers (to start
receiving datagrams), and for some clients that need to use a specific
source port (e.g. mDNS requires to use port 5353)

For obvious performance concerns, access control is only enforced when
configuring sockets, not when using them for common send/recv
operations.

Bump ABI to allow userspace to detect and use this new right.

Signed-off-by: Matthieu Buffet <matthieu@buffet.re>
---
 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h                | 12 +++++++++---
 security/landlock/audit.c                    |  1 +
 security/landlock/limits.h                   |  2 +-
 security/landlock/net.c                      | 18 ++++++++++++------
 security/landlock/syscalls.c                 |  2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c |  4 ++--
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c  |  5 +++--
 7 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
index 10a346e55e95..045b251ff1b4 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
@@ -201,9 +201,9 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr {
 	 * with ``setsockopt(IP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE)``.
 	 *
 	 * A Landlock rule with port 0 and the %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP
-	 * right means that requesting to bind on port 0 is allowed and it will
-	 * automatically translate to binding on a kernel-assigned ephemeral
-	 * port.
+	 * or %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP right means that requesting to bind
+	 * on port 0 is allowed and it will automatically translate to binding
+	 * on a kernel-assigned ephemeral port.
 	 */
 	__u64 port;
 };
@@ -373,10 +373,16 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr {
  *   port. Support added in Landlock ABI version 4.
  * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP: Connect TCP sockets to the given
  *   remote port. Support added in Landlock ABI version 4.
+ *
+ * And similarly for UDP port numbers:
+ *
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP: Bind UDP sockets to the given local
+ *   port. Support added in Landlock ABI version 10.
  */
 /* clang-format off */
 #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP			(1ULL << 0)
 #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP			(1ULL << 1)
+#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP			(1ULL << 2)
 /* clang-format on */
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/landlock/audit.c b/security/landlock/audit.c
index 8d0edf94037d..e676ebffeebe 100644
--- a/security/landlock/audit.c
+++ b/security/landlock/audit.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(fs_access_strings) == LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS);
 static const char *const net_access_strings[] = {
 	[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP)] = "net.bind_tcp",
 	[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)] = "net.connect_tcp",
+	[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP)] = "net.bind_udp",
 };
 
 static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(net_access_strings) == LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET);
diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h
index b454ad73b15e..c0f30a4591b8 100644
--- a/security/landlock/limits.h
+++ b/security/landlock/limits.h
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
 #define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS		((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS << 1) - 1)
 #define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS		__const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS)
 
-#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP
+#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP
 #define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET	((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET << 1) - 1)
 #define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET		__const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET)
 
diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
index c368649985c5..f9ccb52e7d45 100644
--- a/security/landlock/net.c
+++ b/security/landlock/net.c
@@ -81,15 +81,17 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
 			 * inconsistencies and return -EINVAL if needed.
 			 */
 			return 0;
-		} else if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
+		} else if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP ||
+			   access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP) {
 			/*
 			 * Binding to an AF_UNSPEC address is treated
 			 * differently by IPv4 and IPv6 sockets. The socket's
 			 * family may change under our feet due to
 			 * setsockopt(IPV6_ADDRFORM), but that's ok: we either
-			 * reject entirely or require
-			 * %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP for the given port, so
-			 * it cannot be used to bypass the policy.
+			 * reject entirely for IPv6 or require
+			 * %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP or
+			 * %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP for IPv4,
+			 * so it cannot be used to bypass the policy.
 			 *
 			 * IPv4 sockets map AF_UNSPEC to AF_INET for
 			 * retrocompatibility for bind accesses, only if the
@@ -135,7 +137,8 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
 		if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP) {
 			audit_net.dport = port;
 			audit_net.v4info.daddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
-		} else if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
+		} else if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP ||
+			   access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP) {
 			audit_net.sport = port;
 			audit_net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
 		} else {
@@ -157,7 +160,8 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
 		if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP) {
 			audit_net.dport = port;
 			audit_net.v6info.daddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
-		} else if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
+		} else if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP ||
+			   access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP) {
 			audit_net.sport = port;
 			audit_net.v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
 		} else {
@@ -216,6 +220,8 @@ static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *const sock,
 
 	if (sk_is_tcp(sock->sk))
 		access_request = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP;
+	else if (sk_is_udp(sock->sk))
+		access_request = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP;
 	else
 		return 0;
 
diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
index accfd2e5a0cd..d45469d5d464 100644
--- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
+++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = {
  * If the change involves a fix that requires userspace awareness, also update
  * the errata documentation in Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst .
  */
-const int landlock_abi_version = 9;
+const int landlock_abi_version = 10;
 
 /**
  * sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
index 30d37234086c..6c8113c2ded1 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
@@ -76,8 +76,8 @@ TEST(abi_version)
 	const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
 		.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
 	};
-	ASSERT_EQ(9, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0,
-					     LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION));
+	ASSERT_EQ(10, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0,
+					      LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION));
 
 	ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, 0,
 					      LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION));
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
index 4c528154ea92..ec392d971ea3 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
@@ -1326,11 +1326,12 @@ FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(mini)
 
 /* clang-format off */
 
-#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP
+#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP
 
 #define ACCESS_ALL ( \
 	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP | \
-	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP | \
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP)
 
 /* clang-format on */
 
-- 
2.39.5


  reply	other threads:[~2026-05-02 12:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-05-02 12:42 [PATCH v4 0/7] landlock: Add UDP access control support Matthieu Buffet
2026-05-02 12:43 ` Matthieu Buffet [this message]
2026-05-02 12:43 ` [PATCH v4 2/7] landlock: Add UDP connect() access control Matthieu Buffet
2026-05-02 12:43 ` [PATCH v4 3/7] landlock: Add UDP send " Matthieu Buffet
2026-05-02 12:43 ` [PATCH v4 4/7] selftests/landlock: Add UDP bind/connect tests Matthieu Buffet
2026-05-02 12:43 ` [PATCH v4 5/7] selftests/landlock: Add tests for sendmsg() Matthieu Buffet
2026-05-02 12:43 ` [PATCH v4 6/7] samples/landlock: Add sandboxer UDP access control Matthieu Buffet
2026-05-02 12:43 ` [PATCH v4 7/7] landlock: Add documentation for UDP support Matthieu Buffet

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20260502124306.3975990-2-matthieu@buffet.re \
    --to=matthieu@buffet.re \
    --cc=gnoack@google.com \
    --cc=ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com \
    --cc=konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=m@maowtm.org \
    --cc=mic@digikod.net \
    --cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox