From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
To: "David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>,
Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, eric.dumazet@gmail.com,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH net] tcp: fix stale per-CPU tcp_tw_isn leak enabling ISN prediction
Date: Mon, 11 May 2026 15:15:59 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260511151559.1916614-1-edumazet@google.com> (raw)
Blamed commit moved the TIME_WAIT-derived ISN from the skb control
block to a per-CPU variable, assuming the value would always be consumed
by tcp_conn_request() for the same packet that wrote it. That assumption
is violated by multiple drop paths between the producer
(__this_cpu_write(tcp_tw_isn, isn) in tcp_v{4,6}_rcv()) and the consumer
(tcp_conn_request()):
- min_ttl / min_hopcount check
- xfrm policy check
- tcp_inbound_hash() MD5/AO mismatch
- tcp_filter() eBPF/SO_ATTACH_FILTER drop
- th->syn && th->fin discard in tcp_rcv_state_process() TCP_LISTEN
- psp_sk_rx_policy_check() in tcp_v{4,6}_do_rcv()
- tcp_checksum_complete() in tcp_v{4,6}_do_rcv()
- tcp_v{4,6}_cookie_check() returning NULL
When a packet is dropped on any of these paths, tcp_tw_isn is left set.
The next SYN processed on the same CPU then consumes the non zero value in
tcp_conn_request(), receiving a predictable ISN.
We could fix this by clearing tcp_tw_isn at tcp_v{4,6}_do_rcv() start,
at the expense of slower fast path.
This patch clears tcp_tw_isn only when drops are happening.
It also adds two DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE() to detect if any drop paths
are missed in the future, as they check the state of tcp_tw_isn at
the beginning of processing a packet that could potentially be a new SYN.
Fixes: 41eecbd712b7 ("tcp: replace TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_tw_isn with a per-cpu field")
Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 3 +++
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 3 +++
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index c0526cc0398049fb34b5de20a1175d54942e80cd..529f10a768183f74b85fcfdbee94d35c88c55122 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -1878,6 +1878,7 @@ int tcp_v4_do_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
reset:
tcp_v4_send_reset(sk, skb, sk_rst_convert_drop_reason(reason));
discard:
+ __this_cpu_write(tcp_tw_isn, 0);
sk_skb_reason_drop(sk, skb, reason);
/* Be careful here. If this function gets more complicated and
* gcc suffers from register pressure on the x86, sk (in %ebx)
@@ -2198,6 +2199,7 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
}
}
+ DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(__this_cpu_read(tcp_tw_isn));
process:
if (static_branch_unlikely(&ip4_min_ttl)) {
/* min_ttl can be changed concurrently from do_ip_setsockopt() */
@@ -2274,6 +2276,7 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
}
discard_it:
+ __this_cpu_write(tcp_tw_isn, 0);
SKB_DR_OR(drop_reason, NOT_SPECIFIED);
/* Discard frame. */
sk_skb_reason_drop(sk, skb, drop_reason);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
index d13d49bfef19457cc5902cb556605a80f4c0ab2c..079f2324a3a777cfe30dd59777c9d3d6d9a6bae0 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -1641,6 +1641,7 @@ int tcp_v6_do_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
reset:
tcp_v6_send_reset(sk, skb, sk_rst_convert_drop_reason(reason));
discard:
+ __this_cpu_write(tcp_tw_isn, 0);
if (opt_skb)
__kfree_skb(opt_skb);
sk_skb_reason_drop(sk, skb, reason);
@@ -1839,6 +1840,7 @@ INDIRECT_CALLABLE_SCOPE int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
}
}
+ DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(__this_cpu_read(tcp_tw_isn));
process:
if (static_branch_unlikely(&ip6_min_hopcount)) {
/* min_hopcount can be changed concurrently from do_ipv6_setsockopt() */
@@ -1913,6 +1915,7 @@ INDIRECT_CALLABLE_SCOPE int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
}
discard_it:
+ __this_cpu_write(tcp_tw_isn, 0);
SKB_DR_OR(drop_reason, NOT_SPECIFIED);
sk_skb_reason_drop(sk, skb, drop_reason);
return 0;
--
2.54.0.563.g4f69b47b94-goog
next reply other threads:[~2026-05-11 15:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-11 15:15 Eric Dumazet [this message]
2026-05-11 20:23 ` [PATCH net] tcp: fix stale per-CPU tcp_tw_isn leak enabling ISN prediction Jakub Kicinski
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