From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
To: michael.chan@broadcom.com
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
davem@davemloft.net, netdev@vger.kernel.org, edumazet@google.com,
pabeni@redhat.com, andrew+netdev@lunn.ch,
pavan.chebbi@broadcom.com, andrew.gospodarek@broadcom.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v2 08/15] bnxt_en: Reserve crypto RX and TX key contexts on a PF
Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 18:10:15 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260516011015.1857549-1-kuba@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260512212105.3488258-9-michael.chan@broadcom.com>
This is an AI-generated review of your patch. The human sending this
email has considered the AI review valid, or at least plausible.
---
bnxt_en: Reserve crypto RX and TX key contexts on a PF
This patch teaches the bnxt_en PF reservation path to populate
num_ktls_tx_key_ctxs / num_ktls_rx_key_ctxs in the HWRM_FUNC_CFG request
and to record the reserved counts returned by HWRM_FUNC_QCFG, so kTLS
keys can later be allocated at run-time.
> diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
> index e2b5f81b36a6..926665c8bb79 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -7915,8 +7920,9 @@ __bnxt_hwrm_reserve_pf_rings(struct bnxt *bp, struct bnxt_hw_rings *hwr)
> }
> req->num_stat_ctxs = cpu_to_le16(hwr->stat);
> req->num_vnics = cpu_to_le16(hwr->vnic);
> + bnxt_hwrm_reserve_pf_key_ctxs(bp, req);
> }
> - req->enables = cpu_to_le32(enables);
> + req->enables |= cpu_to_le32(enables);
> return req;
> }
[Medium]
After this change, every caller of __bnxt_hwrm_reserve_pf_rings() that
takes the BNXT_NEW_RM(bp) path picks up a kTLS key reservation. One of
those callers is bnxt_hwrm_check_pf_rings(), which is the feasibility
check used by bnxt_check_rings() (ethtool -L, ethtool -G, channel
resize, etc.):
static int bnxt_hwrm_check_pf_rings(struct bnxt *bp,
struct bnxt_hw_rings *hwr)
{
struct hwrm_func_cfg_input *req;
u32 flags;
req = __bnxt_hwrm_reserve_pf_rings(bp, hwr);
flags = FUNC_CFG_REQ_FLAGS_TX_ASSETS_TEST;
if (BNXT_NEW_RM(bp)) {
flags |= FUNC_CFG_REQ_FLAGS_RX_ASSETS_TEST |
FUNC_CFG_REQ_FLAGS_CMPL_ASSETS_TEST |
FUNC_CFG_REQ_FLAGS_STAT_CTX_ASSETS_TEST |
FUNC_CFG_REQ_FLAGS_VNIC_ASSETS_TEST;
...
}
req->flags = cpu_to_le32(flags);
return hwrm_req_send_silent(bp, req);
}
This sets the *_ASSETS_TEST bits in req->flags, but it never sets
FUNC_CFG_REQ_FLAGS2_KTLS_KEY_CTX_ASSETS_TEST in req->flags2 (a grep of
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt confirms that flag is not set
anywhere in the driver).
Does that mean firmware will treat the tx/rx/cmpl/stat/vnic resources as
test-only while still committing the kTLS key reservation as a side
effect of every bnxt_check_rings() call?
If so, would this also cause an ethtool ring/channel resize to be
rejected on a chip whose kTLS key pool is currently exhausted, even
though the user only intended to probe the ring resources?
Should bnxt_hwrm_check_pf_rings() either skip
bnxt_hwrm_reserve_pf_key_ctxs(), or set
FUNC_CFG_REQ_FLAGS2_KTLS_KEY_CTX_ASSETS_TEST in req->flags2 so the kTLS
portion of the request is also evaluated as test-only?
[Low]
On a kTLS-capable PF (bp->crypto_info != NULL),
bnxt_hwrm_reserve_pf_key_ctxs() unconditionally sets
FUNC_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_KTLS_TX_KEY_CTXS |
FUNC_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_KTLS_RX_KEY_CTXS in req->enables, and the change
from "=" to "|=" on the final assignment preserves them.
That makes the early-return short-circuit in bnxt_hwrm_reserve_pf_rings()
unreachable on such PFs:
req = __bnxt_hwrm_reserve_pf_rings(bp, hwr);
if (!req)
return -ENOMEM;
if (!req->enables) {
hwrm_req_drop(bp, req);
return 0;
}
rc = hwrm_req_send(bp, req);
...
return bnxt_hwrm_get_rings(bp);
Is it intended that every previously-no-op call now performs an HWRM
round-trip plus a follow-up bnxt_hwrm_get_rings() on kTLS-capable PFs?
If not, would it be appropriate to also gate the kTLS enables/values on
whether any of the original "enables" bits were going to be set, so the
no-op path is preserved?
[ ... ]
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-16 1:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-12 21:20 [PATCH net-next v2 00/15] bnxt_en: Add kTLS TX offload support Michael Chan
2026-05-12 21:20 ` [PATCH net-next v2 01/15] bnxt_en: Add Midpath channel information Michael Chan
2026-05-12 21:20 ` [PATCH net-next v2 02/15] bnxt_en: Account for the MPC TX and CP rings Michael Chan
2026-05-12 21:20 ` [PATCH net-next v2 03/15] bnxt_en: Set default MPC ring count Michael Chan
2026-05-16 1:10 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-05-12 21:20 ` [PATCH net-next v2 04/15] bnxt_en: Rename xdp_tx_lock to tx_lock Michael Chan
2026-05-12 21:20 ` [PATCH net-next v2 05/15] bnxt_en: Allocate and free MPC software structures Michael Chan
2026-05-12 21:20 ` [PATCH net-next v2 06/15] bnxt_en: Allocate and free MPC channels from firmware Michael Chan
2026-05-12 21:20 ` [PATCH net-next v2 07/15] bnxt_en: Allocate crypto structure and backing store Michael Chan
2026-05-16 1:10 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-05-12 21:20 ` [PATCH net-next v2 08/15] bnxt_en: Reserve crypto RX and TX key contexts on a PF Michael Chan
2026-05-16 1:10 ` Jakub Kicinski [this message]
2026-05-12 21:20 ` [PATCH net-next v2 09/15] bnxt_en: Add infrastructure for crypto key context IDs Michael Chan
2026-05-16 1:10 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-05-12 21:21 ` [PATCH net-next v2 10/15] bnxt_en: Add MPC transmit and completion functions Michael Chan
2026-05-16 1:10 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-05-12 21:21 ` [PATCH net-next v2 11/15] bnxt_en: Add crypto MPC transmit/completion infrastructure Michael Chan
2026-05-16 1:10 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-05-12 21:21 ` [PATCH net-next v2 12/15] bnxt_en: Support kTLS TX offload by implementing .tls_dev_add/del() Michael Chan
2026-05-16 1:10 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-05-12 21:21 ` [PATCH net-next v2 13/15] bnxt_en: Implement kTLS TX normal path Michael Chan
2026-05-16 1:10 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-05-12 21:21 ` [PATCH net-next v2 14/15] bnxt_en: Add support for inline transmit BDs Michael Chan
2026-05-12 21:21 ` [PATCH net-next v2 15/15] bnxt_en: Add kTLS retransmission support Michael Chan
2026-05-16 1:10 ` Jakub Kicinski
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