From: Wei Fang <wei.fang@nxp.com>
To: claudiu.manoil@nxp.com, vladimir.oltean@nxp.com,
xiaoning.wang@nxp.com, andrew+netdev@lunn.ch,
davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com, kuba@kernel.org,
pabeni@redhat.com
Cc: imx@lists.linux.dev, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, catalin.horghidan@nxp.com
Subject: [PATCH v2 net 4/9] net: enetc: fix TOCTOU race and validate VF MAC address
Date: Mon, 18 May 2026 11:05:30 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260518030535.1057228-5-wei.fang@nxp.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260518030535.1057228-1-wei.fang@nxp.com>
Sashiko reported that the PF driver accepts arbitrary MAC address from
from VF mailbox messages without proper validation, creating a security
vulnerability [1].
In enetc_msg_pf_set_vf_primary_mac_addr(), the MAC address is extracted
directly from the message buffer (cmd->mac.sa_data) and programmed into
hardware via pf->ops->set_si_primary_mac() without any validity checks.
A malicious VF can configure a multicast, broadcast, or all-zero MAC
address. Therefore, a validation to check the MAC address provided by VF
is required.
However, simply checking the MAC address is not enough, because it also
has the potential TOCTOU race [2]: The code reads the MAC address from
the DMA buffer to validate it via is_valid_ether_addr(), if validation
passes, reads the same DMA buffer a second time when calling
enetc_pf_set_primary_mac_addr() to program the hardware. A malicious VF
can exploit this window by overwriting the MAC address in the DMA buffer
between the validation check and the hardware programming, bypassing the
validation entirely.
Therefore, allocate a local buffer in enetc_msg_handle_rxmsg() and copy
the message content from the DMA buffer via memcpy() before processing.
This ensures the PF operates on a stable snapshot that the VF cannot
modify.
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260511080805.2052495-1-wei.fang%40nxp.com #1
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260513103021.2190593-1-wei.fang%40nxp.com #2
Fixes: beb74ac878c8 ("enetc: Add vf to pf messaging support")
Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <wei.fang@nxp.com>
---
.../net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc_pf.c | 39 ++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc_pf.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc_pf.c
index dea3a92c4722..09c642040892 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc_pf.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc_pf.c
@@ -478,21 +478,24 @@ static void enetc_configure_port(struct enetc_pf *pf)
/* Messaging */
static u16 enetc_msg_pf_set_vf_primary_mac_addr(struct enetc_pf *pf,
- int vf_id)
+ int vf_id, void *msg)
{
struct enetc_vf_state *vf_state = &pf->vf_state[vf_id];
- struct enetc_msg_swbd *msg = &pf->rxmsg[vf_id];
- struct enetc_msg_cmd_set_primary_mac *cmd;
+ struct enetc_msg_cmd_set_primary_mac *cmd = msg;
struct device *dev = &pf->si->pdev->dev;
- u16 cmd_id;
+ u16 cmd_id = cmd->header.id;
char *addr;
- cmd = (struct enetc_msg_cmd_set_primary_mac *)msg->vaddr;
- cmd_id = cmd->header.id;
if (cmd_id != ENETC_MSG_CMD_MNG_ADD)
return ENETC_MSG_CMD_STATUS_FAIL;
addr = cmd->mac.sa_data;
+ if (!is_valid_ether_addr(addr)) {
+ dev_err_ratelimited(dev, "VF%d attempted to set invalid MAC\n",
+ vf_id);
+ return ENETC_MSG_CMD_STATUS_FAIL;
+ }
+
if (vf_state->flags & ENETC_VF_FLAG_PF_SET_MAC) {
dev_err_ratelimited(dev,
"VF%d attempted to override PF set MAC\n",
@@ -507,17 +510,33 @@ static u16 enetc_msg_pf_set_vf_primary_mac_addr(struct enetc_pf *pf,
void enetc_msg_handle_rxmsg(struct enetc_pf *pf, int vf_id, u16 *status)
{
- struct enetc_msg_swbd *msg = &pf->rxmsg[vf_id];
+ struct enetc_msg_swbd *msg_swbd = &pf->rxmsg[vf_id];
struct device *dev = &pf->si->pdev->dev;
struct enetc_msg_cmd_header *cmd_hdr;
u16 cmd_type;
+ u8 *msg;
- cmd_hdr = (struct enetc_msg_cmd_header *)msg->vaddr;
+ msg = kzalloc_objs(*msg, msg_swbd->size);
+ if (!msg) {
+ dev_err_ratelimited(dev,
+ "Failed to allocate message buffer\n");
+ *status = ENETC_MSG_CMD_STATUS_FAIL;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Currently, only ENETC_MSG_CMD_MNG_MAC command is supported, so
+ * only sizeof(struct enetc_msg_cmd_set_primary_mac) bytes need to
+ * be copied. This data already includes the cmd_type field, so it
+ * can correctly return an error code.
+ */
+ memcpy(msg, msg_swbd->vaddr,
+ sizeof(struct enetc_msg_cmd_set_primary_mac));
+ cmd_hdr = (struct enetc_msg_cmd_header *)msg;
cmd_type = cmd_hdr->type;
switch (cmd_type) {
case ENETC_MSG_CMD_MNG_MAC:
- *status = enetc_msg_pf_set_vf_primary_mac_addr(pf, vf_id);
+ *status = enetc_msg_pf_set_vf_primary_mac_addr(pf, vf_id, msg);
break;
default:
*status = ENETC_MSG_CMD_STATUS_FAIL;
@@ -525,6 +544,8 @@ void enetc_msg_handle_rxmsg(struct enetc_pf *pf, int vf_id, u16 *status)
"command not supported (cmd_type: 0x%x)\n",
cmd_type);
}
+
+ kfree(msg);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_IOV
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-18 3:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-18 3:05 [PATCH v2 net 0/9] net: enetc: SR-IOV robustness and security fixes Wei Fang
2026-05-18 3:05 ` [PATCH v2 net 1/9] net: enetc: fix incorrect mailbox message status returned to VFs Wei Fang
2026-05-18 3:05 ` [PATCH v2 net 2/9] net: enetc: fix missing error code when pf->vf_state allocation fails Wei Fang
2026-05-18 3:05 ` [PATCH v2 net 3/9] net: enetc: add ratelimiting to VF mailbox error messages Wei Fang
2026-05-18 3:05 ` Wei Fang [this message]
2026-05-18 3:05 ` [PATCH v2 net 5/9] net: enetc: fix race condition in VF MAC address configuration Wei Fang
2026-05-18 3:05 ` [PATCH v2 net 6/9] net: enetc: fix DMA write to freed memory in enetc_msg_free_mbx() Wei Fang
2026-05-18 3:05 ` [PATCH v2 net 7/9] net: enetc: fix VF-to-PF message handler unbounded loop DoS Wei Fang
2026-05-18 3:05 ` [PATCH v2 net 8/9] net: enetc: fix initialization order to prevent use of uninitialized resources Wei Fang
2026-05-19 17:15 ` Harshitha Ramamurthy
2026-05-20 1:42 ` Wei Fang
2026-05-18 3:05 ` [PATCH v2 net 9/9] net: enetc: avoid VF->PF mailbox timeout during SR-IOV teardown Wei Fang
2026-05-19 17:25 ` [PATCH v2 net 0/9] net: enetc: SR-IOV robustness and security fixes Harshitha Ramamurthy
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