From: David Laight <david.laight.linux@gmail.com>
To: Rajat Gupta <rajat.gupta@oss.qualcomm.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com,
kuba@kernel.org, pabeni@redhat.com, horms@kernel.org,
jhs@mojatatu.com, jiri@resnulli.us, yimingqian591@gmail.com,
keenanat2000@gmail.com, 2045gemini@gmail.com,
rollkingzzc@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] net/sched: fix pedit partial COW leading to page cache corruption
Date: Tue, 26 May 2026 10:53:06 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260526105306.48a2bee7@pumpkin> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260519033950.2037-1-rajat.gupta@oss.qualcomm.com>
On Mon, 18 May 2026 20:39:50 -0700
Rajat Gupta <rajat.gupta@oss.qualcomm.com> wrote:
> tcf_pedit_act() computes the COW range for skb_ensure_writable()
> once before the key loop using tcfp_off_max_hint, but the hint does
> not account for the runtime header offset added by typed keys. This
> can leave part of the write region un-COW'd.
>
> Fix by moving skb_ensure_writable() inside the per-key loop where
> the actual write offset is known, and add overflow checking on the
> offset arithmetic. For negative offsets (e.g. Ethernet header edits
> at ingress), use skb_cow() to COW the headroom instead. Guard
> offset_valid() against INT_MIN, where negation is undefined.
>
> Additionally, linearize skbs with shared frags upfront to prevent
> silent data corruption when pedit operates on zero-copy pages
> (e.g. from sendfile).
>
> Fixes: 8b796475fd78 ("net/sched: act_pedit: really ensure the skb is writable")
> Reported-by: Rajat Gupta <rajat.gupta@oss.qualcomm.com>
> Reported-by: Yiming Qian <yimingqian591@gmail.com>
> Reported-by: Keenan Dong <keenanat2000@gmail.com>
> Reported-by: Han Guidong <2045gemini@gmail.com>
> Reported-by: Zhang Cen <rollkingzzc@gmail.com>
> Tested-by: Han Guidong <2045gemini@gmail.com>
> Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
> Signed-off-by: Rajat Gupta <rajat.gupta@oss.qualcomm.com>
> ---
> net/sched/act_pedit.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
> 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/sched/act_pedit.c b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
> index bc20f08a2..79921b8d8 100644
> --- a/net/sched/act_pedit.c
> +++ b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
> @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
> #include <linux/ip.h>
> #include <linux/ipv6.h>
> #include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/overflow.h>
> #include <net/ipv6.h>
> #include <net/netlink.h>
> #include <net/pkt_sched.h>
> @@ -323,8 +324,10 @@ static bool offset_valid(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset)
> if (offset > 0 && offset > skb->len)
> return false;
>
> - if (offset < 0 && -offset > skb_headroom(skb))
> - return false;
> + if (offset < 0) {
> + if (offset == INT_MIN || -offset > skb_headroom(skb))
> + return false;
> + }
Can't you negate skb_headroom() instead - that cannot be INT_MIN.
So:
if (offset < 0 && offset < -skb_headroom(skb))
>
> return true;
> }
> @@ -393,17 +396,21 @@ TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb,
> struct tcf_pedit_key_ex *tkey_ex;
> struct tcf_pedit_parms *parms;
> struct tc_pedit_key *tkey;
> - u32 max_offset;
> int i;
>
> parms = rcu_dereference_bh(p->parms);
>
> - max_offset = (skb_transport_header_was_set(skb) ?
> - skb_transport_offset(skb) :
> - skb_network_offset(skb)) +
> - parms->tcfp_off_max_hint;
> - if (skb_ensure_writable(skb, min(skb->len, max_offset)))
> - goto done;
> + /*
> + * If the skb has shared frags the user is likely using zero-copy
> + * (e.g. sendfile). Those page frags may point to page-cache pages;
> + * writing into them would silently corrupt the page cache.
> + * Linearize so pedit operates on a private copy.
> + * TL;DR: if you want zero-copy, don't use pedit.
> + */
> + if (skb_has_shared_frag(skb)) {
> + if (__skb_linearize(skb))
> + goto bad;
> + }
Should there be a way of 'unsharing' frags by just copying the frags
rather than doing a full linearize?
That would be much less likely to fail for big skb.
-- David
>
> tcf_lastuse_update(&p->tcf_tm);
> tcf_action_update_bstats(&p->common, skb);
> @@ -412,6 +419,7 @@ TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb,
> tkey_ex = parms->tcfp_keys_ex;
>
> for (i = parms->tcfp_nkeys; i > 0; i--, tkey++) {
> + int write_offset, write_len;
> int offset = tkey->off;
> int hoffset = 0;
> u32 *ptr, hdata;
> @@ -451,12 +459,32 @@ TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb,
> }
> }
>
> - if (!offset_valid(skb, hoffset + offset)) {
> - pr_info_ratelimited("tc action pedit offset %d out of bounds\n", hoffset + offset);
> + if (unlikely(check_add_overflow(hoffset, offset,
> + &write_offset))) {
> + pr_info_ratelimited("tc action pedit offset overflow\n");
> + goto bad;
> + }
> +
> + if (!offset_valid(skb, write_offset)) {
> + pr_info_ratelimited("tc action pedit offset %d out of bounds\n",
> + write_offset);
> goto bad;
> }
>
> - ptr = skb_header_pointer(skb, hoffset + offset,
> + if (write_offset < 0) {
> + if (skb_cow(skb, -write_offset))
> + goto bad;
> + } else {
> + if (unlikely(check_add_overflow(write_offset,
> + (int)sizeof(hdata),
> + &write_len)))
> + goto bad;
> + if (skb_ensure_writable(skb, min_t(int, skb->len,
> + write_len)))
> + goto bad;
> + }
> +
> + ptr = skb_header_pointer(skb, write_offset,
> sizeof(hdata), &hdata);
> if (!ptr)
> goto bad;
> @@ -475,7 +503,7 @@ TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb,
>
> *ptr = ((*ptr & tkey->mask) ^ val);
> if (ptr == &hdata)
> - skb_store_bits(skb, hoffset + offset, ptr, 4);
> + skb_store_bits(skb, write_offset, ptr, sizeof(hdata));
> }
>
> goto done;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-26 9:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-18 1:30 [PATCH net] net/sched: fix pedit partial COW leading to page cache Rajat Gupta
2026-05-18 13:10 ` Han Guidong
2026-05-18 13:31 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-05-19 3:39 ` [PATCH net] net/sched: fix pedit partial COW leading to page cache corruption Rajat Gupta
2026-05-19 11:18 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2026-05-19 15:10 ` Han Guidong
2026-05-20 9:12 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-05-20 10:04 ` Han Guidong
2026-05-20 10:36 ` Han Guidong
2026-05-20 11:40 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-05-20 9:23 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-05-20 20:00 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-05-21 9:53 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-05-21 10:15 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-05-21 14:35 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-05-21 15:16 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-05-21 15:46 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-05-22 11:47 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-05-22 15:46 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-05-22 16:37 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-05-22 17:01 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-05-23 0:55 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-05-23 12:07 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-05-23 12:13 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-05-23 16:46 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-05-23 16:57 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-05-25 15:39 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-05-25 16:22 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-05-25 17:34 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-05-25 19:03 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-05-26 2:06 ` Rajat Gupta
2026-05-26 9:48 ` David Laight
2026-05-26 11:57 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-05-26 13:08 ` David Laight
2026-05-26 14:22 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
[not found] ` <CAKa-r6soz=iMBiYG0Grhhc12yhdw9vMNV+XjjEPCmtgKK6+rhA@mail.gmail.com>
2026-05-21 15:56 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-05-22 11:49 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-05-22 12:00 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2026-05-22 14:49 ` Davide Caratti
2026-05-22 7:49 ` Han Guidong
2026-05-26 9:53 ` David Laight [this message]
2026-05-26 12:01 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-05-26 12:47 ` David Laight
2026-05-26 12:48 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
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