From: Jason Xing <kerneljasonxing@gmail.com>
To: davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com, kuba@kernel.org,
pabeni@redhat.com, bjorn@kernel.org, magnus.karlsson@intel.com,
maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com, jonathan.lemon@gmail.com,
sdf@fomichev.me, ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net,
hawk@kernel.org, john.fastabend@gmail.com, horms@kernel.org,
andrew+netdev@lunn.ch
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
Jason Xing <kernelxing@tencent.com>
Subject: [PATCH net v5] xsk: cache csum_start/csum_offset to fix TOCTOU in xsk_skb_metadata()
Date: Sat, 30 May 2026 12:26:30 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260530042630.80626-1-kerneljasonxing@gmail.com> (raw)
From: Jason Xing <kernelxing@tencent.com>
The TX metadata area resides in the UMEM buffer which is memory-mapped
and concurrently writable by userspace. In xsk_skb_metadata(),
csum_start and csum_offset are read from shared memory for bounds
validation, then read again for skb assignment. A malicious userspace
application can race to overwrite these values between the two reads,
bypassing the bounds check and causing out-of-bounds memory access
during checksum computation in the transmit path.
Fix this by reading csum_start and csum_offset into local variables
once, then using the local copies for both validation and assignment.
Note that other metadata fields (flags, launch_time) and the cached
csum fields may be mutually inconsistent due to concurrent userspace
writes, but this is benign: the only security-critical invariant is
that each field's validated value is the same one used, which local
caching guarantees.
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260503200927.73EA1C2BCB4@smtp.kernel.org/
Fixes: 48eb03dd2630 ("xsk: Add TX timestamp and TX checksum offload support")
Reviewed-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kernelxing@tencent.com>
---
V5
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260520004244.55663-1-kerneljasonxing@gmail.com/
1. send this patch only and wait for Maciej to come up with a solution
to adjust the selftests. I believe he will send it out along with the
rest of patches.
2. add reviewed-by tag.
V4
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260517063311.28921-1-kerneljasonxing@gmail.com/
1. correct the description of xmit path in patch 3 (sashiko)
2. move set logic into xmit path in patch 3 (Stan)
V3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260515123018.80147-1-kerneljasonxing@gmail.com/
1. avoid breaking previous usage of sendto, and siliently handle
overflow case (Stan, sashiko)
2. add one particular exception process in patch 4 (sashiko)
3. adjust the selftest to make sure it passes in either virutal or
physical machines, which includes add usleep to support physical machine.
V2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260510012310.88570-1-kerneljasonxing@gmail.com/
1. adjust selftests (Jakub)
2. add READ_ONCE in patch 1 (Stan)
---
net/xdp/xsk.c | 11 +++++++----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/xdp/xsk.c b/net/xdp/xsk.c
index 5e5786cd9af5..f8c8a8c9dfba 100644
--- a/net/xdp/xsk.c
+++ b/net/xdp/xsk.c
@@ -802,6 +802,7 @@ static int xsk_skb_metadata(struct sk_buff *skb, void *buffer,
u32 hr)
{
struct xsk_tx_metadata *meta = NULL;
+ u16 csum_start, csum_offset;
if (unlikely(pool->tx_metadata_len == 0))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -811,13 +812,15 @@ static int xsk_skb_metadata(struct sk_buff *skb, void *buffer,
return -EINVAL;
if (meta->flags & XDP_TXMD_FLAGS_CHECKSUM) {
- if (unlikely(meta->request.csum_start +
- meta->request.csum_offset +
+ csum_start = READ_ONCE(meta->request.csum_start);
+ csum_offset = READ_ONCE(meta->request.csum_offset);
+
+ if (unlikely(csum_start + csum_offset +
sizeof(__sum16) > desc->len))
return -EINVAL;
- skb->csum_start = hr + meta->request.csum_start;
- skb->csum_offset = meta->request.csum_offset;
+ skb->csum_start = hr + csum_start;
+ skb->csum_offset = csum_offset;
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
if (unlikely(pool->tx_sw_csum)) {
--
2.43.7
reply other threads:[~2026-05-30 4:27 UTC|newest]
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