Netdev List
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: David Laight <david.laight.linux@gmail.com>
To: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
Cc: oe-linux-nfc@lists.linux.dev, david+nfc@ixit.cz,
	security@kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] nfc: llcp: fix integer underflow and missing bounds checks in TLV parsing
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2026 13:58:55 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260602135610.5f79ed10@pumpkin> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260525202427.67768-1-doruk@0sec.ai>

On Mon, 25 May 2026 22:24:27 +0200
Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai> wrote:

> Multiple out-of-bounds read vulnerabilities exist in the NFC LLCP TLV
> parsers:
> 
> 1. In nfc_llcp_recv_snl(), when an SDREQ TLV has length == 0,
>    service_name_len = length - 1 underflows to SIZE_MAX (size_t is
>    unsigned). The subsequent strncmp() and nfc_llcp_sock_from_sn()
>    calls then read unbounded kernel heap memory.
> 
> 2. All LLCP TLV parsing loops (nfc_llcp_recv_snl, nfc_llcp_connect_sn,
>    nfc_llcp_parse_gb_tlv, nfc_llcp_parse_connection_tlv) read tlv[0]
>    and tlv[1] without first verifying that at least 2 bytes remain in
>    the buffer.
> 
> A nearby malicious NFC device can trigger these without authentication --
> LLCP link activation happens automatically after NFC-DEP.
> 
> Fix by adding a minimum length check before the subtraction in the
> SDREQ case, and adding bounds validation at the top of each TLV loop
> iteration.

Why not fix it properly so that it doesn't read beyond the end of the skb.
1) Change offset and tlv_len to be 32bit - no point trying to do 16bit mathx.
2) Worry about non-linear skb - perhaps just process skb_header_len() bytes.
3) Allow for very short frames.
4) Don't read beyond the end of the skb data.

Something like:
	tlv = skb->data + LLCP_HEADER_SIZE;
	tlv_end = skb_tail_pointer(skb);
	for (; tlv + 2 < tlv_end; tlv += 2 + length) {
		type = tlv[0];
		length = tlv[1];
		if (tlv + 2 + length > tlv_end)
			break;

Then as well as the check for length >= 1 in SDREQ (even 1 doesn't make sense),
the SDRES path is missing a check for length >= 2.

-- David

> 
> Found by pwnkit (https://github.com/0sec-labs/pwnkit), an automated
> kernel source review tool by 0sec (https://0sec.ai).
> 
> Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
> ---
>  net/nfc/llcp_core.c | 6 ++++++
>  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/net/nfc/llcp_core.c b/net/nfc/llcp_core.c
> index XXXXXXX..YYYYYYY 100644
> --- a/net/nfc/llcp_core.c
> +++ b/net/nfc/llcp_core.c
> @@ -1300,6 +1300,9 @@ static void nfc_llcp_recv_snl(struct nfc_llcp_local *local,
>  
>  	while (offset < tlv_len) {
> +		if (offset + 2 > tlv_len)
> +			break;
> +
>  		type = tlv[0];
>  		length = tlv[1];
>  
> @@ -1307,6 +1310,9 @@ static void nfc_llcp_recv_snl(struct nfc_llcp_local *local,
>  		switch (type) {
>  		case LLCP_TLV_SDREQ:
> +			if (length < 1)
> +				break;
> +
>  			tid = tlv[2];
>  			service_name = (char *) &tlv[3];
>  			service_name_len = length - 1;
> 


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-06-02 12:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-05-25 20:24 [PATCH] nfc: llcp: fix integer underflow and missing bounds checks in TLV parsing Doruk Tan Ozturk
2026-06-02 11:12 ` David Heidelberg
2026-06-02 12:58 ` David Laight [this message]
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-05-25 20:21 Doruk Tan Ozturk

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20260602135610.5f79ed10@pumpkin \
    --to=david.laight.linux@gmail.com \
    --cc=david+nfc@ixit.cz \
    --cc=doruk@0sec.ai \
    --cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=oe-linux-nfc@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=security@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox