From: David Laight <david.laight.linux@gmail.com>
To: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
Cc: oe-linux-nfc@lists.linux.dev, david+nfc@ixit.cz,
security@kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] nfc: llcp: fix integer underflow and missing bounds checks in TLV parsing
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2026 13:58:55 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260602135610.5f79ed10@pumpkin> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260525202427.67768-1-doruk@0sec.ai>
On Mon, 25 May 2026 22:24:27 +0200
Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai> wrote:
> Multiple out-of-bounds read vulnerabilities exist in the NFC LLCP TLV
> parsers:
>
> 1. In nfc_llcp_recv_snl(), when an SDREQ TLV has length == 0,
> service_name_len = length - 1 underflows to SIZE_MAX (size_t is
> unsigned). The subsequent strncmp() and nfc_llcp_sock_from_sn()
> calls then read unbounded kernel heap memory.
>
> 2. All LLCP TLV parsing loops (nfc_llcp_recv_snl, nfc_llcp_connect_sn,
> nfc_llcp_parse_gb_tlv, nfc_llcp_parse_connection_tlv) read tlv[0]
> and tlv[1] without first verifying that at least 2 bytes remain in
> the buffer.
>
> A nearby malicious NFC device can trigger these without authentication --
> LLCP link activation happens automatically after NFC-DEP.
>
> Fix by adding a minimum length check before the subtraction in the
> SDREQ case, and adding bounds validation at the top of each TLV loop
> iteration.
Why not fix it properly so that it doesn't read beyond the end of the skb.
1) Change offset and tlv_len to be 32bit - no point trying to do 16bit mathx.
2) Worry about non-linear skb - perhaps just process skb_header_len() bytes.
3) Allow for very short frames.
4) Don't read beyond the end of the skb data.
Something like:
tlv = skb->data + LLCP_HEADER_SIZE;
tlv_end = skb_tail_pointer(skb);
for (; tlv + 2 < tlv_end; tlv += 2 + length) {
type = tlv[0];
length = tlv[1];
if (tlv + 2 + length > tlv_end)
break;
Then as well as the check for length >= 1 in SDREQ (even 1 doesn't make sense),
the SDRES path is missing a check for length >= 2.
-- David
>
> Found by pwnkit (https://github.com/0sec-labs/pwnkit), an automated
> kernel source review tool by 0sec (https://0sec.ai).
>
> Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
> ---
> net/nfc/llcp_core.c | 6 ++++++
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/net/nfc/llcp_core.c b/net/nfc/llcp_core.c
> index XXXXXXX..YYYYYYY 100644
> --- a/net/nfc/llcp_core.c
> +++ b/net/nfc/llcp_core.c
> @@ -1300,6 +1300,9 @@ static void nfc_llcp_recv_snl(struct nfc_llcp_local *local,
>
> while (offset < tlv_len) {
> + if (offset + 2 > tlv_len)
> + break;
> +
> type = tlv[0];
> length = tlv[1];
>
> @@ -1307,6 +1310,9 @@ static void nfc_llcp_recv_snl(struct nfc_llcp_local *local,
> switch (type) {
> case LLCP_TLV_SDREQ:
> + if (length < 1)
> + break;
> +
> tid = tlv[2];
> service_name = (char *) &tlv[3];
> service_name_len = length - 1;
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-02 12:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-25 20:24 [PATCH] nfc: llcp: fix integer underflow and missing bounds checks in TLV parsing Doruk Tan Ozturk
2026-06-02 11:12 ` David Heidelberg
2026-06-02 12:58 ` David Laight [this message]
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-05-25 20:21 Doruk Tan Ozturk
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