From: Matthieu Buffet <matthieu@buffet.re>
To: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
"Mikhail Ivanov" <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Eric Dumazet" <edumazet@google.com>,
"Neal Cardwell" <ncardwell@google.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
"Matthieu Buffet" <matthieu@buffet.re>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 2/2] selftests/landlock: Add test for TCP fast open
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 20:05:24 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260617180526.15627-3-matthieu@buffet.re> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260617180526.15627-1-matthieu@buffet.re>
Enforce that TCP Fast Open is controlled by
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP. Semantics of connect() and
sendmsg(MSG_FASTOPEN) should be identical from Landlock's perspective.
Also enforce error code consistency, since UDP sockets ignore
the MSG_FASTOPEN flag while Unix sockets reject it.
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Buffet <matthieu@buffet.re>
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c | 155 ++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 155 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
index 0c256e7c8675..177ed28e70f6 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
@@ -258,6 +258,64 @@ static int connect_variant(const int sock_fd,
return connect_variant_addrlen(sock_fd, srv, get_addrlen(srv, false));
}
+static int sendto_variant_addrlen(const int sock_fd,
+ const struct service_fixture *const srv,
+ const socklen_t addrlen, void *buf,
+ size_t len, size_t flags)
+{
+ const struct sockaddr *dst = NULL;
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ /*
+ * We never want our processes to be killed by SIGPIPE: we check return
+ * codes and errno, so that we have actual error messages.
+ */
+ flags |= MSG_NOSIGNAL;
+
+ if (srv != NULL) {
+ switch (srv->protocol.domain) {
+ case AF_UNSPEC:
+ case AF_INET:
+ dst = (const struct sockaddr *)&srv->ipv4_addr;
+ break;
+
+ case AF_INET6:
+ dst = (const struct sockaddr *)&srv->ipv6_addr;
+ break;
+
+ case AF_UNIX:
+ dst = (const struct sockaddr *)&srv->unix_addr;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ errno = EAFNOSUPPORT;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = sendto(sock_fd, buf, len, flags, dst, addrlen);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ /* errno is not set in cases of partial writes. */
+ if (ret != len)
+ return -EINTR;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sendto_variant(const int sock_fd,
+ const struct service_fixture *const srv, void *buf,
+ size_t len, size_t flags)
+{
+ socklen_t addrlen = 0;
+
+ if (srv != NULL)
+ addrlen = get_addrlen(srv, false);
+
+ return sendto_variant_addrlen(sock_fd, srv, addrlen, buf, len, flags);
+}
+
FIXTURE(protocol)
{
struct service_fixture srv0, srv1, srv2, unspec_any0, unspec_srv0;
@@ -950,6 +1008,103 @@ TEST_F(protocol, connect_unspec)
EXPECT_EQ(0, close(bind_fd));
}
+TEST_F(protocol, tcp_fastopen)
+{
+ const bool restricted = variant->sandbox == TCP_SANDBOX &&
+ variant->prot.type == SOCK_STREAM &&
+ (variant->prot.protocol == IPPROTO_TCP ||
+ variant->prot.protocol == IPPROTO_IP) &&
+ (variant->prot.domain == AF_INET ||
+ variant->prot.domain == AF_INET6);
+ const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+ int bind_fd, client_fd, status;
+ char buf;
+ pid_t child;
+
+ bind_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, bind_fd);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, bind_variant(bind_fd, &self->srv0));
+ if (self->srv0.protocol.type == SOCK_STREAM)
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, listen(bind_fd, backlog));
+
+ child = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child);
+ if (child == 0) {
+ int connect_fd, ret;
+
+ /* Closes listening socket for the child. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(bind_fd));
+
+ connect_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, connect_fd);
+
+ if (variant->sandbox == TCP_SANDBOX) {
+ const int ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(
+ &ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ }
+
+ /* Fast Open with no address. */
+ ret = sendto_variant(connect_fd, NULL, NULL, 0, MSG_FASTOPEN);
+ if (self->srv0.protocol.domain == AF_UNIX) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(-ENOTCONN, ret);
+ } else if (self->srv0.protocol.type == SOCK_DGRAM) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(-EDESTADDRREQ, ret);
+ } else {
+ ASSERT_EQ(-EINVAL, ret);
+ }
+
+ /* Fast Open to a denied address. */
+ ret = sendto_variant(connect_fd, &self->srv0, "A", 1,
+ MSG_FASTOPEN);
+ if (restricted) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(-EACCES, ret);
+ } else if (self->srv0.protocol.domain == AF_UNIX &&
+ self->srv0.protocol.type == SOCK_STREAM) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(-EOPNOTSUPP, ret);
+ } else {
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(connect_fd));
+ _exit(_metadata->exit_code);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ client_fd = bind_fd;
+ if (!restricted && self->srv0.protocol.type == SOCK_STREAM &&
+ self->srv0.protocol.domain != AF_UNIX) {
+ client_fd = accept(bind_fd, NULL, 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, client_fd);
+ }
+
+ if (restricted) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, read(client_fd, &buf, 1));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENOTCONN, errno);
+ } else if (self->srv0.protocol.domain == AF_UNIX &&
+ self->srv0.protocol.type == SOCK_STREAM) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, read(client_fd, &buf, 1));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, read(client_fd, &buf, 1));
+ EXPECT_EQ('A', buf);
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+
+ if (client_fd != bind_fd)
+ EXPECT_LE(0, close(client_fd));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(bind_fd));
+}
+
FIXTURE(ipv4)
{
struct service_fixture srv0, srv1;
--
2.47.3
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-17 18:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-16 20:16 Landlock: LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP bypass via TCP Fast Open Bryam Vargas
2026-06-17 14:22 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-06-17 18:05 ` Matthieu Buffet
2026-06-17 18:05 ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] landlock: fix TCP Fast Open connection bypass Matthieu Buffet
2026-06-17 18:05 ` Matthieu Buffet [this message]
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