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From: Alexander Martyniuk <alexevgmart@gmail.com>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Martyniuk <alexevgmart@gmail.com>,
	Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>,
	Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@netfilter.org>,
	Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>,
	Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>,
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
	Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>,
	netfilter-devel@vger.kernel, coreteam@netfilter.org,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>, Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
Subject: [PATCH 5.10] netfilter: nf_log: validate MAC header was set before dumping it
Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 14:01:15 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260624140117.19799-1-alexevgmart@gmail.com> (raw)

From: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>

commit a84b6fedbc97078788be78dbdd7517d143ad1a77 upstream

The fallback path of dump_mac_header() guards the MAC header access
only with "skb->mac_header != skb->network_header", without checking
skb_mac_header_was_set(). When the MAC header is unset, mac_header is
0xffff, so the test passes and skb_mac_header(skb) returns
skb->head + 0xffff, ~64 KiB past the buffer; the loop then reads
dev->hard_header_len bytes out of bounds into the kernel log.

This is reachable via the netdev logger: nf_log_unknown_packet() calls
dump_mac_header() unconditionally, and an skb sent through AF_PACKET
with PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS reaches the egress hook with mac_header still
unset (__dev_queue_xmit(), which would reset it, is bypassed).

Add the skb_mac_header_was_set() check the ARPHRD_ETHER path already
uses, and replace the open-coded MAC header length test with
skb_mac_header_len(). Only skbs with an unset MAC header are affected;
valid ones are dumped as before.

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dump_mac_header (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:831)
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800ea49d3f by task exploit/148
 Call Trace:
  kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
  dump_mac_header (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:831)
  nf_log_netdev_packet (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:938 net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:963)
  nf_log_packet (net/netfilter/nf_log.c:260)
  nft_log_eval (net/netfilter/nft_log.c:60)
  nft_do_chain (net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:285)
  nft_do_chain_netdev (net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:307)
  nf_hook_slow (net/netfilter/core.c:619)
  nf_hook_direct_egress (net/packet/af_packet.c:257)
  packet_xmit (net/packet/af_packet.c:280)
  packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3114)
  __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2265)

Fixes: 7eb9282cd0ef ("netfilter: ipt_LOG/ip6t_LOG: add option to print decoded MAC header")
Reported-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Martyniuk <alexevgmart@gmail.com>
---
Backport fix for CVE-2026-52942
 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_log_ipv4.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_log_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_log_ipv4.c
index d07583fac8f8..d6164e8e2c73 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_log_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_log_ipv4.c
@@ -296,8 +296,8 @@ static void dump_ipv4_mac_header(struct nf_log_buf *m,
 
 fallback:
 	nf_log_buf_add(m, "MAC=");
-	if (dev->hard_header_len &&
-	    skb->mac_header != skb->network_header) {
+	if (dev->hard_header_len && skb_mac_header_was_set(skb) &&
+	    skb_mac_header_len(skb) != 0) {
 		const unsigned char *p = skb_mac_header(skb);
 		unsigned int i;
 
-- 
2.43.0


             reply	other threads:[~2026-06-24 11:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-24 14:01 Alexander Martyniuk [this message]
2026-06-24 11:48 ` [PATCH 5.10] netfilter: nf_log: validate MAC header was set before dumping it Pablo Neira Ayuso
2026-06-24 11:51   ` Pablo Neira Ayuso
2026-06-24 11:57   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman

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