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From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
To: <netdev@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
	<netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org>,
	pablo@netfilter.org
Subject: [PATCH net 3/9] netfilter: ipset: fix race between dump and ip_set_list resize
Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 06:52:37 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260630045243.2657-4-fw@strlen.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260630045243.2657-1-fw@strlen.de>

From: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>

The release path of ip_set_dump_do() and ip_set_dump_done() read
inst->ip_set_list via ip_set_ref_netlink(), a plain rcu_dereference_raw()
of the array pointer. These run from netlink_recvmsg() without the nfnl
mutex and without an RCU read-side critical section.

A concurrent ip_set_create() can grow the array: it publishes the new
array, calls synchronize_net() and then kvfree()s the old one. Since the
dump paths read the array outside any RCU reader, synchronize_net() does
not wait for them and the old array can be freed while they still index
into it, causing a use-after-free.

The dumped set itself stays pinned via set->ref_netlink, so only the
array load needs protecting. Take rcu_read_lock() around it, matching
ip_set_get_byname() and __ip_set_put_byindex().

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1697)
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b5c4018 by task exploit/150
  Call Trace:
   ...
   kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
   ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1697)
   netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2325)
   netlink_recvmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1976)
   sock_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1159)
   __sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2315)
   ...
  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ... KASAN NOPTI
  KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x02d6...d0-0x02d6...d7]
  RIP: 0010:ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1698)
  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

Fixes: 8a02bdd50b2e ("netfilter: ipset: Fix calling ip_set() macro at dumping")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
---
 net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c
index a531b654b8d9..6cfad152d7d1 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c
@@ -1480,7 +1480,11 @@ ip_set_dump_done(struct netlink_callback *cb)
 		struct ip_set_net *inst =
 			(struct ip_set_net *)cb->args[IPSET_CB_NET];
 		ip_set_id_t index = (ip_set_id_t)cb->args[IPSET_CB_INDEX];
-		struct ip_set *set = ip_set_ref_netlink(inst, index);
+		struct ip_set *set;
+
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		set = ip_set_ref_netlink(inst, index);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
 
 		if (set->variant->uref)
 			set->variant->uref(set, cb, false);
@@ -1686,7 +1690,9 @@ ip_set_dump_do(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
 release_refcount:
 	/* If there was an error or set is done, release set */
 	if (ret || !cb->args[IPSET_CB_ARG0]) {
+		rcu_read_lock();
 		set = ip_set_ref_netlink(inst, index);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
 		if (set->variant->uref)
 			set->variant->uref(set, cb, false);
 		pr_debug("release set %s\n", set->name);
-- 
2.53.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-06-30  4:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-30  4:52 [PATCH net 0/9] netfilter: updates for net Florian Westphal
2026-06-30  4:52 ` [PATCH net 1/9] netfilter: nf_conntrack_expect: zero at allocation time Florian Westphal
2026-06-30  4:52 ` [PATCH net 2/9] netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: don't leak bad clone into future transaction Florian Westphal
2026-06-30  4:52 ` Florian Westphal [this message]
2026-06-30  4:52 ` [PATCH net 4/9] netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: validate skb_dst() before accessing it Florian Westphal
2026-06-30  4:52 ` [PATCH net 5/9] netfilter: nfnetlink_cthelper: cap to maximum number of expectation per master Florian Westphal
2026-06-30  4:52 ` [PATCH net 6/9] netfilter: nft_fib: reject fib expression on the netdev egress hook Florian Westphal
2026-06-30  4:52 ` [PATCH net 7/9] netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: restrict writes to network header Florian Westphal
2026-06-30  4:52 ` [PATCH net 8/9] netfilter: nftables: restrict linklayer and network header writes Florian Westphal
2026-06-30  4:52 ` [PATCH net 9/9] netfilter: nftables: restrict checkum update offset Florian Westphal

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