From: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
To: doruk@0sec.ai
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
chandrashekar.devegowda@intel.com,
ricardo.martinez@linux.intel.com, haijun.liu@mediatek.com,
loic.poulain@oss.qualcomm.com, ryazanov.s.a@gmail.com,
johannes@sipsolutions.net, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: wwan: t7xx: validate control-message data_length against the skb
Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2026 18:17:38 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260716171737.372991-2-horms@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260711071338.58345-1-doruk@0sec.ai>
This is an AI-generated review of your patch. The human sending this
email has considered the AI review valid, or at least plausible.
Full review at: https://sashiko.dev
---
--- Patch [1]: [PATCH] net: wwan: t7xx: validate control-message data_length against the skb ---
commit d01ff7bcea9777a110312cfd4a96824ff782a70a
Author: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
net: wwan: t7xx: validate control-message data_length against the skb
control_msg_handler() handles a CTL_ID_HS2_MSG control message by pulling
the ctrl_msg_header and passing the modem-supplied data_length as the
length of the handshake-2 payload to t7xx_fsm_append_event(). This commit
rejects a data_length that exceeds the received payload.
> diff --git a/drivers/net/wwan/t7xx/t7xx_port_ctrl_msg.c b/drivers/net/wwan/t7xx/t7xx_port_ctrl_msg.c
> index f869e4ed9ee9a..871ed63d3c4d2 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/wwan/t7xx/t7xx_port_ctrl_msg.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/wwan/t7xx/t7xx_port_ctrl_msg.c
> @@ -186,10 +186,15 @@ static int control_msg_handler(struct t7xx_port *port, struct sk_buff *skb)
> int event = port_conf->rx_ch == PORT_CH_CONTROL_RX ?
> FSM_EVENT_MD_HS2 : FSM_EVENT_AP_HS2;
>
> - ret = t7xx_fsm_append_event(ctl, event, skb->data,
> - le32_to_cpu(ctrl_msg_h->data_length));
> - if (ret)
> - dev_err(port->dev, "Failed to append Handshake 2 event");
> + if (le32_to_cpu(ctrl_msg_h->data_length) > skb->len) {
> + dev_err(port->dev, "Invalid Handshake 2 data length\n");
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + } else {
> + ret = t7xx_fsm_append_event(ctl, event, skb->data,
> + le32_to_cpu(ctrl_msg_h->data_length));
> + if (ret)
> + dev_err(port->dev, "Failed to append Handshake 2 event");
> + }
> }
>
> dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but I noticed that earlier in this function
we call skb_pull() without validating the header size against skb->len:
drivers/net/wwan/t7xx/t7xx_port_ctrl_msg.c:control_msg_handler() {
...
ctrl_msg_h = (struct ctrl_msg_header *)skb->data;
switch (le32_to_cpu(ctrl_msg_h->ctrl_msg_id)) {
case CTL_ID_HS2_MSG:
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*ctrl_msg_h));
...
}
Because skb_pull() fails silently if the length is insufficient, could this
lead to out-of-bounds reads and processing of uninitialized memory if the
modem sends a packet smaller than sizeof(struct ctrl_msg_header)?
I found a similar pattern in t7xx_port_proxy_recv_skb() where we read
ccci_header and call skb_pull() without checking if skb->len is large enough:
drivers/net/wwan/t7xx/t7xx_port_proxy.c:t7xx_port_proxy_recv_skb() {
...
struct ccci_header *ccci_h = (struct ccci_header *)skb->data;
...
channel = FIELD_GET(CCCI_H_CHN_FLD, le32_to_cpu(ccci_h->status));
...
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*ccci_h));
...
}
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but I found an issue in the
HIF CLDMA receive path where an unchecked modem-provided length is passed
directly to skb_put():
drivers/net/wwan/t7xx/t7xx_hif_cldma.c:t7xx_cldma_gpd_rx_from_q() {
...
skb_put(skb, le16_to_cpu(gpd->data_buff_len));
...
}
If the modem provides a gpd->data_buff_len larger than the dynamically
allocated SKB's tailroom, wouldn't this trigger an skb_over_panic() and
cause a system denial of service?
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but it looks like we might be missing a read
memory barrier in the same receive path:
drivers/net/wwan/t7xx/t7xx_hif_cldma.c:t7xx_cldma_gpd_rx_from_q() {
...
if ((gpd->flags & GPD_FLAGS_HWO) || !req->skb) {
...
}
...
skb_put(skb, le16_to_cpu(gpd->data_buff_len));
...
}
Since we poll for the hardware ownership flag (GPD_FLAGS_HWO) and then
read the data_buff_len without an intervening dma_rmb(), could the CPU
speculatively reorder the read of the descriptor's payload fields to occur
before the ownership flag check is globally visible?
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but I noticed a missing write
memory barrier in the transmission path when setting the ownership flag:
drivers/net/wwan/t7xx/t7xx_hif_cldma.c:t7xx_cldma_gpd_handle_tx_request() {
...
gpd->data_buff_len = cpu_to_le16(skb->len);
spin_lock_irqsave(&md_ctrl->cldma_lock, flags);
if (md_ctrl->txq_active & BIT(queue->index))
gpd->flags |= GPD_FLAGS_HWO;
...
}
Because spin_lock_irqsave() only provides ACQUIRE semantics, could the
memory writes for data_buff_len be delayed past the lock and become
visible to the hardware after the GPD_FLAGS_HWO flag is set?
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-16 17:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-11 7:13 [PATCH] net: wwan: t7xx: validate control-message data_length against the skb Doruk Tan Ozturk
2026-07-16 17:17 ` Simon Horman [this message]
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