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From: Chuck Lever <cel@kernel.org>
To: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
	 Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
	Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>,
	 "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
	 Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>, Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
	 Chuck Lever <cel@kernel.org>, Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>,
	 Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH net 2/9] net/tls: Consume empty data records in tls_sw_splice_read()
Date: Sun, 26 Jul 2026 20:33:30 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260726-tls-follow-on-v1-2-99bf4cc1c729@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260726-tls-follow-on-v1-0-99bf4cc1c729@kernel.org>

A peer may send a zero-length application_data record. After
decryption such a record has full_len == 0, so tls_sw_splice_read()
splices zero bytes and returns zero. A zero return from a splice
read signals EOF, and the caller tears down a connection that is
still live.

Consume such a record and fetch the next one, as tls_sw_recvmsg()
already does. A peer that streams empty records can hold the
splicing task in that loop, so test for a pending signal where the
record is consumed.

Where an empty record precedes a close_notify, splice(2) now returns
-EINVAL from the control-record test rather than the zero it
returned before. That zero was the false EOF this patch removes, and
a splice that reaches an alert record has always reported -EINVAL.

The open-coded test in tls_sw_read_sock() becomes
tls_rx_empty_data_rec(); the tls_sw_recvmsg() paths reuse it and
tls_rx_intr_errno() in the patches that follow.

Fixes: c46234ebb4d1 ("tls: RX path for ktls")
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <cel@kernel.org>
---
 net/tls/tls_sw.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index d45c945a3d1d..44ae0fad780d 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -1788,6 +1788,24 @@ static void tls_rx_reader_unlock(struct sock *sk, struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx)
 	release_sock(sk);
 }
 
+/* TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 both permit a zero-length application_data
+ * record as a traffic-analysis countermeasure (RFC 5246, Section
+ * 6.2.1; RFC 8446, Section 5.1).
+ */
+static bool tls_rx_empty_data_rec(int len, unsigned char control)
+{
+	return !len && control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA;
+}
+
+/* sock_intr_errno() maps the zero timeo of a reader that cannot wait
+ * to -EINTR, but such a reader has no blocking to interrupt. The rest
+ * of the receive side reports that case as -EAGAIN.
+ */
+static int tls_rx_intr_errno(long timeo)
+{
+	return timeo ? sock_intr_errno(timeo) : -EAGAIN;
+}
+
 int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
 		   struct msghdr *msg,
 		   size_t len,
@@ -1991,6 +2009,7 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock,  loff_t *ppos,
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	struct tls_msg *tlm;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
+	bool released = true;
 	ssize_t copied = 0;
 	int chunk;
 	int err;
@@ -1999,13 +2018,14 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock,  loff_t *ppos,
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
 
+retry:
 	if (!skb_queue_empty(&ctx->rx_list)) {
 		skb = __skb_dequeue(&ctx->rx_list);
 	} else {
 		struct tls_decrypt_arg darg;
 
 		err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK,
-				      true, false);
+				      released, false);
 		if (err <= 0)
 			goto splice_read_end;
 
@@ -2017,6 +2037,11 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock,  loff_t *ppos,
 
 		tls_rx_rec_done(ctx);
 		skb = darg.skb;
+
+		/* The socket lock stays held to the retry, so the
+		 * anchor this wait loaded survives it.
+		 */
+		released = false;
 	}
 
 	rxm = strp_msg(skb);
@@ -2028,6 +2053,21 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock,  loff_t *ppos,
 		goto splice_requeue;
 	}
 
+	/* Splicing an empty data record delivers zero bytes, which the
+	 * caller reads as EOF. tls_rx_rec_wait() skips its signal check
+	 * while a record is parsed, so test for a signal here.
+	 */
+	if (tls_rx_empty_data_rec(rxm->full_len, tlm->control)) {
+		long timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK);
+
+		consume_skb(skb);
+		if (signal_pending(current)) {
+			err = tls_rx_intr_errno(timeo);
+			goto splice_read_end;
+		}
+		goto retry;
+	}
+
 	chunk = min_t(unsigned int, rxm->full_len, len);
 	copied = skb_splice_bits(skb, sk, rxm->offset, pipe, chunk, flags);
 	if (copied < 0)
@@ -2122,13 +2162,12 @@ int tls_sw_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc,
 			goto read_sock_requeue;
 		}
 
-		/* An empty data record (legal in TLS 1.3) gives a zero
-		 * read_actor return, indistinguishable from the consumer
-		 * stalling; the used <= 0 path would requeue it at the
-		 * head of rx_list and block all later records. Consume it
-		 * here instead.
+		/* An empty data record gives a zero read_actor return,
+		 * indistinguishable from the consumer stalling; the
+		 * used <= 0 path would requeue it at the head of rx_list
+		 * and block all later records. Consume it here instead.
 		 */
-		if (rxm->full_len == 0) {
+		if (tls_rx_empty_data_rec(rxm->full_len, tlm->control)) {
 			err = 0;
 			consume_skb(skb);
 			if (!nodata_deadline) {

-- 
2.54.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-07-27  0:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-27  0:33 [PATCH net 0/9] net/tls: Receive-path fixes for zero-length data records Chuck Lever
2026-07-27  0:33 ` [PATCH net 1/9] net/tls: Bound time spent on no-data records in tls_sw_read_sock() Chuck Lever
2026-07-27  0:33 ` Chuck Lever [this message]
2026-07-27  0:33 ` [PATCH net 3/9] net/tls: Fail tls_sw_splice_read() after a failed async decrypt Chuck Lever
2026-07-27  0:33 ` [PATCH net 4/9] net/tls: Honor O_NONBLOCK in tls_sw_splice_read() Chuck Lever
2026-07-27  0:33 ` [PATCH net 5/9] net/tls: Consume empty data records in tls_sw_recvmsg() Chuck Lever
2026-07-27  0:33 ` [PATCH net 6/9] selftests: tls: add peek and splice coverage for zero-length records Chuck Lever
2026-07-27 14:07   ` Sabrina Dubroca
2026-07-27  0:33 ` [PATCH net 7/9] selftests: tls: skip the zero_len tests when TLS is unavailable Chuck Lever
2026-07-27  0:33 ` [PATCH net 8/9] selftests: tls: cover splice on a nonblocking socket Chuck Lever
2026-07-27  0:33 ` [PATCH net 9/9] selftests: tls: cover splice after a failed decrypt Chuck Lever
2026-07-27 15:19   ` Sabrina Dubroca

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