From: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: davem@davemloft.net, kuba@kernel.org, linux-can@vger.kernel.org,
kernel@pengutronix.de, Cunhao Lu <1579567540@qq.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org>,
Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Subject: [PATCH net 04/22] can: dev: can_put_echo_skb(): free skb on invalid echo index
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2026 20:45:11 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260928193312.553632-5-mkl@pengutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260928193312.553632-1-mkl@pengutronix.de>
From: Cunhao Lu <1579567540@qq.com>
can_put_echo_skb() consumes the skb on all paths except when the echo
index is out of bounds. This leaves ownership with the caller on -EINVAL,
unlike the other error paths, and can leak the skb if the caller expects
consistent semantics.
Free the skb before returning -EINVAL so that all return paths consume it.
Fixes: 6411959c10fe ("can: dev: can_put_echo_skb(): don't crash kernel if can_priv::echo_skb is accessed out of bounds")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Cunhao Lu <1579567540@qq.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/tencent_683AA16E643DE00211CD2FB62991264DC605@qq.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
---
FAQ:
Q: `can_skb_init_valid()` directly modifies `skb->data` without checking if
the SKB is cloned or shared. Is this violating SKB shared buffer rules and
causing data corruption?
A: The finding about can_skb_init_valid() modifying skb->data on a
potentially shared buffer is not relevant for this (correct) patch.
The FDF-flag write in can_skb_init_valid() only matters for PF_PACKET
use: PF_CAN allocators already set CANFD_FDF. The write exists to
normalize frames for PF_PACKET observers (tcpdump/Wireshark) so they can
distinguish classic CAN from CAN FD at the netdev level, and to
compensate for PF_PACKET senders that omit the bit. That normalization
is functionally required.
The shared-buffer concern only becomes realistic through a specific
chain: a PF_PACKET sender injects a CANFD-sized frame, the CAN driver's
loopback puts an echo skb back into can_rcv(), and cgw (without
modfuncs) clones it for forwarding to another interface. Only on that
second can_skb_init_valid() call is the skb cloned. By then the bit was
already set on the exclusive skb during the initial xmit path, so the
flags |= CANFD_FDF write is strictly idempotent for any parallel
consumer of the shared buffer - no memory-safety or
information-disclosure consequence. It's a formal violation of the skb
sharing rules without an observable effect, so the current code can stay
as-is.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/54a3cc01-abcf-4a33-b932-39bb1f68cdd5@hartkopp.net/
[mkl: convert Oliver's mail to FAQ section]
---
drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c b/drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c
index d1f797d3778d..f414b75b5c0d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ int can_put_echo_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
if (idx >= priv->echo_skb_max) {
netdev_err(dev, "%s: BUG! Trying to access can_priv::echo_skb out of bounds (%u/max %u)\n",
__func__, idx, priv->echo_skb_max);
+ dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
return -EINVAL;
}
--
2.53.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-28 19:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-28 18:45 [PATCH net 0/22] pull-request: can 2026-09-28 Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-09-28 18:45 ` [PATCH net 01/22] can: dev: can_dropped_invalid_skb: drop CAN XL frames on non-CAN XL devices Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-09-28 19:36 ` netdev-bot+sinfo
2026-09-28 18:45 ` [PATCH net 02/22] can: skb: make echo skb freeing safe in any IRQ context Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-09-28 18:45 ` [PATCH net 03/22] can: skb: make CAN skb allocation failure paths IRQ-safe Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-09-28 18:45 ` Marc Kleine-Budde [this message]
2026-09-28 18:45 ` [PATCH net 05/22] can: dev: init_can_skb(): restore skb header initialization Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-09-28 18:45 ` [PATCH net 06/22] can: j1939: j1939_sk_bind(): fix j1939_ecu leak when re-bind failed Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-09-28 18:45 ` [PATCH net 07/22] can: isotp: check the frame type, not just the length Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-09-28 18:45 ` [PATCH net 08/22] can: cc770: platform_get_irq(): propagate the error Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-09-28 18:45 ` [PATCH net 09/22] can: cc770: fix the clock divider check on the platform bus Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-09-28 18:45 ` [PATCH net 10/22] can: kvaser_pciefd: fix use-after-free in bec poll timer Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-09-28 18:45 ` [PATCH net 11/22] can: m_can: pci: add missing pm_runtime_dont_use_autosuspend() call Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-09-28 18:45 ` [PATCH net 12/22] can: m_can: m_can_class_suspend(): fix suspend deinit() error path Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-09-28 18:45 ` [PATCH net 13/22] can: sun4i_can: sun4ican_probe(): fix clk leak Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-09-28 18:45 ` [PATCH net 14/22] can: xilinx_can: set CAN FD flags on received frames Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-09-28 18:45 ` [PATCH net 15/22] can: mcp251xfd: mcp251xfd_probe(): reject devices without match data Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-09-28 18:45 ` [PATCH net 16/22] can: hi311x: drop hi3110_lock before free_irq() on open failure Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-09-28 18:45 ` [PATCH net 17/22] can: ems_usb: use usb_kill_urb() to stop the intr URB Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-09-28 18:45 ` [PATCH net 18/22] usb: f81604: fix struct f81604_int_data size mismatch Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-09-28 18:45 ` [PATCH net 19/22] can: gs_usb: kill RX URBs before destroying the netdevs Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-09-28 18:45 ` [PATCH net 20/22] can: gs_usb: add workarounds for HScanT USB to CAN adapter Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-09-28 18:45 ` [PATCH net 21/22] can: kvaser_usb: validate command format before parsing in hydra receive path Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-09-28 18:45 ` [PATCH net 22/22] can: peak_usb: fix missing CAN_ERR_FLAG when reporting error counters Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-09-29 1:09 ` [PATCH net 0/22] pull-request: can 2026-09-28 Jakub Kicinski
2026-09-29 21:12 ` Marc Kleine-Budde
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