From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AE79556E052; Wed, 14 Oct 2026 18:28:58 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1792002541; cv=none; b=kZ7tQNFFqRbbhopSPZXQUK4YGPPBfB6ovhlPty8SnmeI3a3mYfN7oS8mIttN4PsZ4ur1Y4gapbVVt/Lecqy4AgmSG8tM6g1J0DyhOyMlzwaVDgLFHQotT3wBDYiARslphh5dizMGjsq9sQq8ZZDzxeL4tZnBXN0UU2OVP5/X/VY= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1792002541; c=relaxed/simple; bh=78Z8/4OGtTSSgFQW8yOyyyrOmUsT9sMsyDl389sQ5WE=; h=From:Date:Subject:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Message-Id:References: In-Reply-To:To:Cc; b=migy5jJxJscGf2taCZd8QNJPk98NAtV2QjKah53f6RL2Oz4jONbcoTq5uTKSKAT8iRT95nJtUK4j1pDg/cDCZFCqfgBeZhWKQEshwi61EQ816RftE8tBRAdKUDe7I24UWUUPo+939uoRfwWCLj9GR7ggYwD1A2+Tc2EMTyCohiw= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=MbStaw+U; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="MbStaw+U" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id ED1751F000C6; Wed, 14 Oct 2026 18:28:56 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1792002538; bh=jw8eOMJT0PO00iCG8j19BieCP71AeNu1dzFnwJ6S190=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc; b=MbStaw+UwAIuPFgnas1vtJJodl+tIQdyVwbOECSrmcj7caHha6Unn3Dmhg/LfUPLV ajziiUQ7ApgZoGRYvaTVqShKrLQsM31pFHhEAVHpXZ8JTsaNaFj0l7/LXmjiQnnDyF L7lZzzDhzUzvIQ8a2lhS/yY8ffXrm9NhuEUuSiqhd6IPOg1iwk0OvXffix156EkGvX qxGhYlt/YKeDPaxn2RAvOF4vo12g8ZX+8gSrWbaAB+BQRBvTuz/OzjxqxHFmzDsgzu C5HA2F8SwDXY29h4b9jmpViIHNm7IblVgDpyD9H63ZNJFZwwVGnKle6ex8ETmFfQYp vKfbs/CwzSLuw== From: Chuck Lever Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2026 14:28:38 -0400 Subject: [PATCH net-next v5 08/10] selftests: tls: Extend coverage for zero-length records Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <20261014-tls-follow-on-v5-8-e76c301d4f05@kernel.org> References: <20261014-tls-follow-on-v5-0-e76c301d4f05@kernel.org> In-Reply-To: <20261014-tls-follow-on-v5-0-e76c301d4f05@kernel.org> To: John Fastabend , Jakub Kicinski , Sabrina Dubroca , "David S. Miller" , Paolo Abeni , Simon Horman , Chuck Lever , Dave Watson , Shuah Khan , Qingfang Deng , Eric Dumazet Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org X-Mailer: b4 0.17-dev-9c833 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openpgp-sha256; l=8342; i=cel@kernel.org; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=78Z8/4OGtTSSgFQW8yOyyyrOmUsT9sMsyDl389sQ5WE=; b=owEBbQKS/ZANAwAKATNqszNvZn+XAcsmYgBqz8ndETJoafy05RLTXNgaO+okbW7oU6pSth99F Lp+lgwskPaJAjMEAAEKAB0WIQQosuWwEobfJDzyPv4zarMzb2Z/lwUCas/J3QAKCRAzarMzb2Z/ l/3qD/9ABNa20uLgFctzXEHdOo3Y8iwJ7m2yRcxnePQJwEyemKbDi2FpfuHZtPLtDMHY3jso38Y 8ymTT460KoBPUs99O0DIxPNWCKoDc5UH9j3QQ/E3sgRxkFsUKiarthRrW7sb2+f8uhrIFSez5El yvzSKb7qmY6HqoIjjZB4fRMo14uhp07YWyOxVRNjcUipROIfntLKhcG+Py5q0RBd8mqw41Shgbc o7JQeEWbOOdr2Iv1AwcrZ/SLM/ibcjn9hjSg/SI1qrYPp9V9I2nhuA3KZiDbYdF1KFSfa3TTDxF LCo3vapIz26SpTAHJ9hpZdtbDlV3DlkJrPv1psNeVi5QHCb/FKpTmyms86TrFGO3uGrguhVTbKc ldRSGCixxhd50a3mFjGXvQMNDl/xxn2aOo+OemFeObd2OezQlK+NfKN9aLQ3kFANCjtsvym5LDp ZeRUIrtE8sUwN1TazFSbdBN0R9KcKvKByQVd+oOC8186n0P3owMhHRO8AeSwQhjVWT1iGlMEcZW OIpZf9ttg/x/lLTNsHWbRHBKELvxP5GU1g0LvUuyhW87ZxX4gJwUBQfyDbqmmkRr1n4alc2/ITB szxl8eWBYpiILHaIj553f4Atx79IK12U9GqU5IIhqduL7ynxkzkiTEIUGGi2zAJK3Zy34z3Lo2B ftTjv7DS6hKnYqQ== X-Developer-Key: i=cel@kernel.org; a=openpgp; fpr=28B2E5B01286DF243CF23EFE336AB3336F667F97 The zero_len fixture injects raw pre-encrypted records over a socket carrying a TLS_RX key only, and some of those records are zero-length application_data records. Every variant reads the records back with a plain recv(), so neither splice nor MSG_PEEK is tested against an empty record. No variant places an empty record between two data records, the one sequence where returning copied data ahead of a run of empty records changes what recv() reports. Add zero_len_splice and zero_len_peek. A zero return from splice() means EOF, so zero_len_splice checks that a run of empty data records does not end a live connection. zero_len_peek checks that a peek reaches the payload behind a run of empty records and leaves the payload in place for the read that follows. When a payload does not follow the run, the peek must leave the socket unreadable. An unfixed kernel returns 0 from splice(), and after the peek poll() reports the socket readable. Add data_0data_data to zero_len. The first recv() returns the first record alone and leaves the second for the next call. A kernel that reads through the empty record returns both payloads from the first call and fails the variant. Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever --- tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c | 232 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 215 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c index 0bc43728262e..8ce5a9032960 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c @@ -2549,6 +2549,42 @@ static const struct raw_rec id2_data_l0 = { }, }; +static void zero_len_sock_pair(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, + int *fd, int *cfd, bool *notls) +{ + struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12; + int ret; + + tls_crypto_info_init(TLS_1_2_VERSION, TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128, + &tls12, 0); + + ulp_sock_pair(_metadata, fd, cfd, notls); + if (*notls) + return; + + /* fd stays keyless; these fixtures send raw records over it */ + ret = setsockopt(*cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12, tls12.len); + ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0); +} + +/* Send a variant's records; return the last one carrying payload */ +static const struct raw_rec * +zero_len_send_recs(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, int fd, + const struct raw_rec *const *recs) +{ + const struct raw_rec *payload = NULL; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < 4 && recs[i]; i++) { + EXPECT_EQ(send(fd, recs[i]->cipher_data, recs[i]->cipher_len, 0), + recs[i]->cipher_len); + if (recs[i]->plain_len) + payload = recs[i]; + } + + return payload; +} + FIXTURE(zero_len) { int fd, cfd; @@ -2609,21 +2645,15 @@ FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len, data_0data_0data) .recv_ret = { 11, -EAGAIN, }, }; +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len, data_0data_data) +{ + .recs = { &id0_data_l11, &id1_data_l0, &id2_data_l11, }, + .recv_ret = { 11, 11, -EAGAIN, }, +}; + FIXTURE_SETUP(zero_len) { - struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12; - int ret; - - tls_crypto_info_init(TLS_1_2_VERSION, TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128, - &tls12, 0); - - ulp_sock_pair(_metadata, &self->fd, &self->cfd, &self->notls); - if (self->notls) - return; - - /* Don't install keys on fd, we'll send raw records */ - ret = setsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12, tls12.len); - ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0); + zero_len_sock_pair(_metadata, &self->fd, &self->cfd, &self->notls); } FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(zero_len) @@ -2642,10 +2672,7 @@ TEST_F(zero_len, test) if (self->notls) SKIP(return, "no TLS support"); - for (i = 0; i < 4 && variant->recs[i]; i++) - EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, variant->recs[i]->cipher_data, - variant->recs[i]->cipher_len, 0), - variant->recs[i]->cipher_len); + zero_len_send_recs(_metadata, self->fd, variant->recs); rec = &variant->recs[0]; rec_off = 0; @@ -2671,6 +2698,177 @@ TEST_F(zero_len, test) } }; +FIXTURE(zero_len_peek) +{ + int fd, cfd; + bool notls; +}; + +FIXTURE_VARIANT(zero_len_peek) +{ + const struct raw_rec *recs[4]; + ssize_t peek_ret; +}; + +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len_peek, 0data_0data_data) +{ + .recs = { &id0_data_l0, &id1_data_l0, &id2_data_l11, }, + .peek_ret = 11, +}; + +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len_peek, 0data_0data_0data) +{ + .recs = { &id0_data_l0, &id1_data_l0, &id2_data_l0, }, + .peek_ret = -EAGAIN, +}; + +FIXTURE_SETUP(zero_len_peek) +{ + zero_len_sock_pair(_metadata, &self->fd, &self->cfd, &self->notls); +} + +FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(zero_len_peek) +{ + close(self->fd); + close(self->cfd); +} + +/* Peeking past a run of empty data records must reach the payload + * behind them, and a run with no payload behind it must report EAGAIN + * and leave no record queued. + */ +TEST_F(zero_len_peek, test) +{ + struct pollfd pfd = { .fd = self->cfd, .events = POLLIN }; + const struct raw_rec *payload; + unsigned char buf[128]; + ssize_t ret; + + if (self->notls) + SKIP(return, "no TLS support"); + + payload = zero_len_send_recs(_metadata, self->fd, variant->recs); + + if (variant->peek_ret < 0) { + ret = recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf), + MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_PEEK); + EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1); + EXPECT_EQ(errno, -variant->peek_ret); + + /* A record left on rx_list keeps the socket readable */ + EXPECT_EQ(poll(&pfd, 1, 0), 0); + return; + } + + ret = recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_PEEK); + EXPECT_EQ(ret, variant->peek_ret); + if (ret == variant->peek_ret) + EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, payload->plain_data, + variant->peek_ret), 0); + + ret = recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_DONTWAIT); + EXPECT_EQ(ret, variant->peek_ret); + if (ret == variant->peek_ret) + EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, payload->plain_data, + variant->peek_ret), 0); + + ret = recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_DONTWAIT); + EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1); + EXPECT_EQ(errno, EAGAIN); +} + +FIXTURE(zero_len_splice) +{ + int fd, cfd; + bool notls; +}; + +FIXTURE_VARIANT(zero_len_splice) +{ + const struct raw_rec *recs[4]; + ssize_t splice_ret; +}; + +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len_splice, 0data_data) +{ + .recs = { &id0_data_l0, &id1_data_l11, }, + .splice_ret = 11, +}; + +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len_splice, 0data_0data_data) +{ + .recs = { &id0_data_l0, &id1_data_l0, &id2_data_l11, }, + .splice_ret = 11, +}; + +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len_splice, 0data_0data_0data) +{ + .recs = { &id0_data_l0, &id1_data_l0, &id2_data_l0, }, + .splice_ret = -EAGAIN, +}; + +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len_splice, 0data_0ctrl) +{ + .recs = { &id0_data_l0, &id1_ctrl_l0, }, + .splice_ret = -EINVAL, +}; + +FIXTURE_SETUP(zero_len_splice) +{ + zero_len_sock_pair(_metadata, &self->fd, &self->cfd, &self->notls); +} + +FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(zero_len_splice) +{ + close(self->fd); + close(self->cfd); +} + +/* Splicing must skip a run of empty data records to reach the payload + * behind it, since a zero-byte splice reads as EOF. Splice reports + * EAGAIN for a run with no payload behind it, and EINVAL for a control + * record behind the run. + */ +TEST_F(zero_len_splice, test) +{ + struct pollfd pfd = { .fd = self->cfd, .events = POLLIN }; + const struct raw_rec *payload; + unsigned char buf[128]; + ssize_t ret; + int p[2]; + + if (self->notls) + SKIP(return, "no TLS support"); + + ASSERT_GE(pipe(p), 0); + + payload = zero_len_send_recs(_metadata, self->fd, variant->recs); + + if (variant->splice_ret < 0) { + ret = splice(self->cfd, NULL, p[1], NULL, sizeof(buf), + SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK); + EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1); + EXPECT_EQ(errno, -variant->splice_ret); + } else { + /* ASSERT so a zero return stops the test here; the read + * below would block until the harness timeout. + */ + ASSERT_EQ(splice(self->cfd, NULL, p[1], NULL, sizeof(buf), + SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK), variant->splice_ret); + ret = read(p[0], buf, sizeof(buf)); + EXPECT_EQ(ret, variant->splice_ret); + if (ret == variant->splice_ret) + EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, payload->plain_data, + variant->splice_ret), 0); + + /* The empty records were consumed, not left queued */ + EXPECT_EQ(poll(&pfd, 1, 0), 0); + } + + close(p[0]); + close(p[1]); +} + FIXTURE(tls_err) { int fd, cfd; -- 2.55.0