From: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: davem@davemloft.net, kuba@kernel.org, linux-can@vger.kernel.org,
kernel@pengutronix.de, Cunhao Lu <1579567540@qq.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org>,
Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Subject: [PATCH net-next 05/11] can: dev: can_put_echo_skb(): free skb on invalid echo index
Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 19:01:10 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261019170834.1727150-6-mkl@pengutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261019170834.1727150-1-mkl@pengutronix.de>
From: Cunhao Lu <1579567540@qq.com>
can_put_echo_skb() consumes the skb on all paths except when the echo
index is out of bounds. This leaves ownership with the caller on -EINVAL,
unlike the other error paths, and can leak the skb if the caller expects
consistent semantics.
Free the skb before returning -EINVAL so that all return paths consume it.
Fixes: 6411959c10fe ("can: dev: can_put_echo_skb(): don't crash kernel if can_priv::echo_skb is accessed out of bounds")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Cunhao Lu <1579567540@qq.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/tencent_683AA16E643DE00211CD2FB62991264DC605@qq.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
---
FAQ:
Q: `can_skb_init_valid()` directly modifies `skb->data` without checking if
the SKB is cloned or shared. Is this violating SKB shared buffer rules and
causing data corruption?
A: The finding about can_skb_init_valid() modifying skb->data on a
potentially shared buffer is not relevant for this (correct) patch.
The FDF-flag write in can_skb_init_valid() only matters for PF_PACKET
use: PF_CAN allocators already set CANFD_FDF. The write exists to
normalize frames for PF_PACKET observers (tcpdump/Wireshark) so they can
distinguish classic CAN from CAN FD at the netdev level, and to
compensate for PF_PACKET senders that omit the bit. That normalization
is functionally required.
The shared-buffer concern only becomes realistic through a specific
chain: a PF_PACKET sender injects a CANFD-sized frame, the CAN driver's
loopback puts an echo skb back into can_rcv(), and cgw (without
modfuncs) clones it for forwarding to another interface. Only on that
second can_skb_init_valid() call is the skb cloned. By then the bit was
already set on the exclusive skb during the initial xmit path, so the
flags |= CANFD_FDF write is strictly idempotent for any parallel
consumer of the shared buffer - no memory-safety or
information-disclosure consequence. It's a formal violation of the skb
sharing rules without an observable effect, so the current code can stay
as-is.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/54a3cc01-abcf-4a33-b932-39bb1f68cdd5@hartkopp.net/
[mkl: convert Oliver's mail to FAQ section]
---
drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c b/drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c
index 3e36c0368bae..738d5968dfa6 100644
--- a/drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ int can_put_echo_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
if (idx >= priv->echo_skb_max) {
netdev_err(dev, "%s: BUG! Trying to access can_priv::echo_skb out of bounds (%u/max %u)\n",
__func__, idx, priv->echo_skb_max);
+ dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
return -EINVAL;
}
--
2.53.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-19 17:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-19 17:01 [PATCH net-next 0/11] pull-request: can-next 2026-10-19 Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-10-19 17:01 ` [PATCH net-next 01/11] can: dev: can_dropped_invalid_skb: drop CAN XL frames on non-CAN XL devices Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-10-19 17:13 ` netdev-bot+sinfo
2026-10-19 17:01 ` [PATCH net-next 02/11] can: raw: remove redundant NULL check before netdev_hold() Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-10-19 17:01 ` [PATCH net-next 03/11] can: skb: make echo skb freeing safe in any IRQ context Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-10-19 17:01 ` [PATCH net-next 04/11] can: skb: make CAN skb allocation failure paths IRQ-safe Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-10-19 17:01 ` Marc Kleine-Budde [this message]
2026-10-19 17:01 ` [PATCH net-next 06/11] can: isotp: check the frame type, not just the length Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-10-19 17:01 ` [PATCH net-next 07/11] can: proc: reset pkg_stats atomics individually Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-10-19 17:01 ` [PATCH net-next 08/11] can: proc: skip stats calculation after reset in can_stat_update() Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-10-19 17:01 ` [PATCH net-next 09/11] can: proc: remove pointers from CAN specific proc output Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-10-19 17:01 ` [PATCH net-next 10/11] can: replace ARPHRD_CAN type checks with can_get_ml_priv() Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-10-20 17:11 ` netdev-bot+sashiko
2026-10-20 17:50 ` Oliver Hartkopp
2026-10-19 17:01 ` [PATCH net-next 11/11] can: protect the receive lists with a per-device lock Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-10-20 17:11 ` netdev-bot+sashiko
2026-10-20 19:00 ` Oliver Hartkopp
2026-10-20 20:48 ` Oliver Hartkopp
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