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Miller" , Jakub Kicinski , Paolo Abeni Cc: Simon Horman , David Ahern , Ido Schimmel , netdev@vger.kernel.org, edumazet@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org, Kyle Zeng , Florian Westphal Subject: [PATCH v2 net] inet: frags: limit the truesize of a reassembly queue Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2026 09:12:25 +0100 Message-ID: <20261030081225.2575462-1-edumazet@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The truesize of fragments in a reassembly queue is only bounded by the per netns ipfrag_high_thresh sysctl, which has no upper limit. inet_frag_reasm_finish() sums the truesize of all fragments in an int. If this sum reaches 2^32, it wraps, and the final sk_wmem_alloc adjustment of the socket owning the reassembled skb can cancel its own reference, leading to a use-after-free of this socket. This can be triggered from an unprivileged user/network namespace, raising ipfrag_high_thresh and using padded TUN packets, which keep a large truesize after being trimmed by ip_rcv_core(). Track the sum of the truesize of fragments in each queue, and refuse a fragment that would make it bigger than INT_MAX / 2. Callers kill the queue on this error. This bound is far above the needs of legitimate traffic. Fixes: 18685451fc4e ("inet: inet_defrag: prevent sk release while still in use") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Kyle Zeng Cc: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet --- v2: reset q->truesize in inet_frag_queue_flush(), as ip_frag_reinit() can keep a queue alive after flushing its fragments (Wang Zhan, Sashiko). Document @truesize in struct inet_frag_queue kernel-doc (Sashiko). v1: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20261028182934.2236310-1-edumazet@kernel.org/ Kyle Zeng provided a more complicated patch, I wrote something much simpler. LLM was used to discover the bug, build a repro, and test the fix. --- include/net/inet_frag.h | 9 +++++++++ net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/net/inet_frag.h b/include/net/inet_frag.h index b02d2472b003ec6e7b8e391d56115e8f0578ca61..c1fb419a9cf03a346edd0424ca0ba5b06b6a20f0 100644 --- a/include/net/inet_frag.h +++ b/include/net/inet_frag.h @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ struct frag_v6_compare_key { * @tstamp_type: stamp has a mono delivery time (EDT) * @flags: fragment queue flags * @max_size: maximum received fragment size + * @truesize: sum of the truesize of queued fragments * @fqdir: pointer to struct fqdir * @rcu: rcu head for freeing deferall */ @@ -100,6 +101,7 @@ struct inet_frag_queue { u8 tstamp_type; __u8 flags; u16 max_size; + unsigned int truesize; struct fqdir *fqdir; struct rcu_head rcu; }; @@ -172,6 +174,13 @@ extern const u8 ip_frag_ecn_table[16]; #define IPFRAG_DUP 1 #define IPFRAG_OVERLAP 2 #define IPFRAG_MIXED_SECPATH 3 +#define IPFRAG_TOOBIG 4 + +/* Max sum of the truesize of fragments in a queue. This keeps the sums + * done in inet_frag_reasm_prepare() and inet_frag_reasm_finish() well + * below INT_MAX. Legitimate traffic stays far below this limit. + */ +#define INET_FRAG_MAX_TRUESIZE (INT_MAX / 2) int inet_frag_queue_insert(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, int end); void *inet_frag_reasm_prepare(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb, diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c b/net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c index c18da91c1f031ee0b97f9e072837d053380da2f2..0b8d22ffafca69b2bccd98eca3d4bda93ebb816a 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c @@ -336,6 +336,7 @@ void inet_frag_queue_flush(struct inet_frag_queue *q, q->rb_fragments = RB_ROOT; q->fragments_tail = NULL; q->last_run_head = NULL; + q->truesize = 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_frag_queue_flush); @@ -446,6 +447,9 @@ int inet_frag_queue_insert(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb, if (last && !secpath_equal(last, skb)) return IPFRAG_MIXED_SECPATH; + if (skb->truesize > INET_FRAG_MAX_TRUESIZE - q->truesize) + return IPFRAG_TOOBIG; + /* An IP fragment is never a GSO packet, but an untrusted source * (virtio_net_hdr) may have attached GSO metadata to it. Do not let * that reach the reassembled skb, whose head keeps the first @@ -510,6 +514,7 @@ int inet_frag_queue_insert(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb, if (offset) nf_reset_ct(skb); + q->truesize += skb->truesize; return IPFRAG_OK; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_frag_queue_insert); -- 2.53.0