From: Tristan Madani <tristmd@gmail.com>
To: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 ipsec-next] xfrm: check state validity under lock in xfrm_state_find()
Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2026 14:52:29 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261030145229.74412-1-tristmd@gmail.com> (raw)
From: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
The output-cache insertion path in xfrm_state_find() checks
x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_VALID before acquiring xfrm_state_lock,
then inserts the state into pol->state_cache_list under the lock.
While this insertion block is currently unreachable -- cached is set
unconditionally at the cached: label, making the !cached guard
always false -- the correct pattern is to perform the validity
check under the lock, matching the fix in commit ddd3d01329203
("xfrm: Fix xfrm state cache insertion race") which addressed the
same TOCTOU for the input cache path.
Move the XFRM_STATE_VALID check inside the critical section so the
pattern is correct when the cache insertion becomes reachable.
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
---
Changes in v2:
- Reclassify as hardening: the insertion block is currently unreachable
(cached is unconditionally true at the cached: label), as identified
by sashiko AI review. Drop Fixes: and Cc: stable tags accordingly.
Move from ipsec to ipsec-next tree since this is a cleanup.
- Reword commit message to describe the current state honestly and
frame as a preventive correctness improvement.
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
index e45aa1ed5b965..03baa50f0df7c 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
@@ -1632,10 +1632,11 @@ xfrm_state_find(const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
*err = acquire_in_progress ? -EAGAIN : error;
}
- if (x && x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_VALID && !cached &&
+ if (x && !cached &&
(!(pol->flags & XFRM_POLICY_CPU_ACQUIRE) || x->pcpu_num == pcpu_id)) {
spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock);
- if (hlist_unhashed(&x->state_cache))
+ if (x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_VALID &&
+ hlist_unhashed(&x->state_cache))
hlist_add_head_rcu(&x->state_cache, &pol->state_cache_list);
spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock);
}
--
2.47.3
reply other threads:[~2026-10-30 14:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: [no followups] expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20261030145229.74412-1-tristmd@gmail.com \
--to=tristmd@gmail.com \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=edumazet@kernel.org \
--cc=herbert@gondor.apana.org.au \
--cc=horms@kernel.org \
--cc=kuba@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=pabeni@redhat.com \
--cc=steffen.klassert@secunet.com \
--cc=tristan@talencesecurity.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox